Community policing: an international perspective

Editor
Lawrence F. Travis III

CONTENTS

Access to Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management online ____________ 3
Editorial advisory board ___________________________ 4
Abstracts and keywords ___________________________ 5
Editorial __________________________________________ 8
Introduction _______________________________________ 9
Between a rock and a hard place: RCMP organizational change
Curtis A. Clarke ________________________________________________ 14

Personalized policing: results from a series of experiments with proximity policing in Denmark
Lars Holmberg _________________________________________________ 32

Community-oriented policing in Germany – training and education
Thomas Feltes__________________________________________________ 48

Dutch “COP”: developing community policing in The Netherlands
Maurice Punch, Kees van der Vijver and Olga Zoomer _________________ 60

Community policing in Israel: resistance and change
David Weisburd, Orit Shalev and Menachem Amir ____________________ 80
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community policing and the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
<td>Jim Smyth</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing in the Caribbean: context, community and police capability</td>
<td>Ramesh Deosaran</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork – not making the dream work: community policing in Poland</td>
<td>Maria Haberfeld, Piotr Walancik and Aaron M. Uydess</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping up appearances? A community’s perspective on community policing and the local governance of crime</td>
<td>Tom Van den Broeck</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local security management – policing through networks</td>
<td>Sirpa Virta</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectives on policing: a synopsis of recent research</td>
<td>Lisa Bostaph and Julie Keirnan</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing on the Web: the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)</td>
<td>Brad Smith</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note from the publisher</td>
<td></td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Between a rock and a hard place: RCMP organizational change
Curtis A. Clarke

Keywords Police, Organizational restructuring, Neo-liberalism, Canada

Examines how the collision of neo-liberalism and regionally specific social forces have created a specific manifestation of community based policing. The merger of neo-liberalism and community policing has taken place under common conditions of downsizing, fiscal downloading and organizational restructuring. These conditions have not, however, led to a consistency of application. The political, economic and social variables differ across regions, as do the stimuli for reform and the manner in which community policing has been implemented. As a result, each region has uniquely articulated the neo-liberal tenet of community involvement in community based policing. This range of reform initiatives is examined first from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of Alberta (K-Division).

Personalized policing: results from a series of experiments with proximity policing in Denmark
Lars Holmberg

Keywords Police, Strategy, Denmark

Describes the emergence of proximity policing – a Danish version of COP – and evaluates a series of experiments with implementation of the concept. The design and scope of each experiment is described, and their degree of implementation is assessed. Proximity policing in Denmark differs from other COP projects in that this kind of work is still the responsibility of a number of designated officers instead of the whole police force. Geographical assignments and long-term affiliation with the local areas provide for a personalization of policing – a personalization that is very popular with local and municipal liaisons to the police. The goals of the Danish experiments are very extensive, and it is concluded that all cannot be accomplished at the same time.

Community-oriented policing in Germany – training and education
Thomas Feltes

Keywords Police, Strategy, Germany

Presents data from two surveys and arguments in favour of a restructuring of the police service, in general, and police training in particular. Contends that to keep up with an ever-changing world, the police has to become more versatile itself, without losing sight of its core functions: protection and security provision. These objectives can only be achieved by a police force that cooperates intensively with the people, i.e. relies on a community-oriented approach to policing, and one whose members have been provided throughout their training with problem-solving skills and techniques and have developed a high degree of self-motivation. Suggests that in the current social and economic climate there is an urgent need for such reforms, best achieved through international cooperation.

Dutch “COP”: developing community policing in The Netherlands
Maurice Punch, Kees van der Vijver and Olga Zoomer

Keywords Police, Strategy, The Netherlands

Dutch policing has followed the three generations of community policing identified elsewhere. The paper outlines the three waves, arguing that progressive Dutch society has influenced policing styles, giving Dutch policing a strong social orientation. The material draws on action research projects from the 1970s and 1980s and current innovations with special attention to developments in Amsterdam and Utrecht, in which the authors are involved as researchers or consultants. Following models from the USA there is a tendency to run hard and soft features of policing together. Contemporary community policing has then both a problem-solving and a crime-control rhetoric. New-style community beat officers are better integrated into the organisation and are strongly involved in crime prevention. Difficulties arise in areas that are not conventional communities, such as inner cities, with a diverse public, an accumulation...
of social problems side-by-side with “entertainment”, and a potential for public order disturbances. Policing in The Netherlands has changed significantly in recent years to an emphasis on problem solving, partnerships with other agencies, crime prevention, fostering self-reliance among citizens, and sponsoring the return of early social control mechanisms in public life – in schools, transport and with “town patrols” on the streets. Police have taken others on board and have relinquished their monopoly on safety and crime.

Community policing in Israel: resistance and change
David Weisburd, Orit Shalev and Menachem Amir

Keywords Police, Strategy, Problem identification, Israel

The Israeli National Police began to implement community policing on a large scale in January of 1995. In this paper we describe the main findings of a three-year national evaluation of community policing in Israel that was initiated by the Chief Scientist’s office of the Israeli police in the Fall of 1996. When community policing was envisioned and planned in Israel it was seen as part of a total reformation of the Israeli police in structure, philosophy and action. Our research suggests that this broad idea of community policing was not implemented in Israel, and indeed the program of community policing was found to lose ground during the course of our study. While community policing did have specific impacts on the Israeli police, it did not fundamentally change the perspectives and activities of street level police officers. We explain the difficulties encountered in the implementation of community policing in reference to three factors: the speed of implementation of the program; the resistance of traditional military style organizational culture within the Israeli police to the demands of community policing models; and a lack of organizational commitment to community policing. In our conclusions we argue that these barriers to successful community policing are not unique to the Israel case, and are indeed likely to be encountered in the development of community policing in many other countries.

Community policing and the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
Jim Smyth

Keywords Police, Strategy, Northern Ireland

In deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland the question of police reform cannot be divorced from broader political issues. This article looks at the connections between police reform and the political process, in the particular context of the recommendations of the Patten Report, which put forward a framework for a fundamental reform of policing in Northern Ireland. The problems encountered during the subsequent reform process – both political and institutional – are discussed. It is argued that the model of a decentralized and democratically accountable police service, based on the core principle of community policing, although not fully realized, offers a model for policing in societies which are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic.

Community policing in the Caribbean: context, community and police capability
Ramesh Deosaran

Keywords Trinidad and Tobago, Police, Strategy

Examines community policing as a relatively new policing feature in the Caribbean. Compares the key expectations of such policies with the officers’ understanding of what such policing means to them. The community policing policy is then assessed against the background of public opinion. Data are then derived from two levels of community policing officers to assess the extent to which the climate in the police service organisation is facilitative for such a new policy of policing. Specific “internal organisation factors” are examined – organisational readiness, individual learning ability and team spiritedness – which will in turn serve as benchmarks for continuous improvement. These data would be useful for increasing community support, enhancing the human resource capability and improving the operations of the organisation and officers themselves, all critical for effective community policing within the region.
Teamwork – not making the dream work: community policing in Poland
Maria Haberfeld, Piotr Walancik and Aaron M. Uydess

**Keywords** Police, Strategy, Empowerment, Perception, Poland

In January of 1999, following the philosophy of community oriented policing, the Polish National Police restructured its organization. This article presents results of two phases out of a larger research project conducted with the Polish police and community members representing diverse environments including college students, politicians, and media representatives. Our results represent an analysis of over 2,000 questionnaires distributed to the members of the Polish police and contrasted against data collected from hundreds of questionnaires answered by college students in three cities. The questionnaire was designed to measure the degree of understanding of the role of the police in a democratic society, as perceived by both the public and the police. Some of the main principles of community-oriented – problem-solving policing are revisited in the questionnaire, providing a baseline for discussion about the feasibility of implementation of a philosophical paradigm in real-life environments, when the actors involved have no clear concept about the roles they are supposed to play.

Local security management – policing through networks
Sirpa Virta

**Keywords** Finland, Police, Strategy, Partnering, Networks

Anglo-American community policing has been implemented in Finland since 1996 but there has been a long tradition of the community policing style, called the village police, since the 1960s. The police enjoy a great deal of public confidence, the welfare society has been stable, with no significant social divisions and rather low crime, and therefore there have been no urgent needs or pressures for policing reform. Both the adoption and the implementation of the community policing strategy have been a part of wider public sector modernization, including the service orientation, improved efficiency and responsibility. This paper is based on two process evaluation studies: “The implementation of community policing in Finland – a management of change approach” (2000) and “Local security networks and safety planning a case of Tampere” (2001). The implementation process has been one of learning by doing. There was a shift in thinking and practice in 1999 when community policing was seen more as a dynamic development process and means rather than a model and a goal, as before. Community policing policy in Finland prioritizes strategic partnerships, networks and local safety planning, and it is re-named as local policing or local security management. A process evaluation of local networking and safety planning (Tampere) shows that several factors contribute to the successful process of partnership formation, networking and collaboration.
This issue focuses on the development and implementation of community policing around the world. I am indebted to Professor Maria Haberfeld of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice who put this issue together. Dr Haberfeld has brought together a diverse group of scholars and her efforts have produced a timely assessment of police strategies internationally. This issue also contains our regular features, “Perspectives on policing” and an Internet resource review.

As always, we welcome your suggestions and opinions on how we can improve the journal. Please do not hesitate to contact us, should you have questions, comments, or concerns. We also want to encourage you to consider submitting manuscripts to the journal for future publication, and volunteering to serve as a manuscript referee. For the journal to continue its tradition of high standards requires the participation of police practitioners and scholars in the important roles of author and reviewer.

Lawrence F. Travis III
INTRODUCTION

Four horizons: some features of the rationalizing and transforming of democratic policing

Consider this collection of imaginative papers. It is a collage considering a new kind of social technology, a transformed democratic policing. To imagine something is to see it against some horizon, and to contrast the present to the future. Even the most precisely articulated, planned, measured and implemented social technology has to be imagined, as a fiction, a dream or a wish, prior to its being realized. In many respects, as several of the authors of the following papers note, the concept of policing is vague, as are the recently proliferating variants on it such as community policing (CP), problem-solving policing, and some terms used here: proximity policing, village policing, and detachment-based policing. This is not surprising, as the concept of policing, as an organized agency for regulating city life, has wide connotations and has no consensual meaning in the research literature of police studies or criminology more broadly. Let us take that up first then.

Democratic policing defined

Policing in democratic societies is best defined by what it is not first. It does not include torture, surveillance of citizens solely for their thoughts or beliefs, is not devoted entirely to the political interests of the state insofar as it is limited by historical and legal traditions, eschews terrorism and counter-terrorism, and ensures minimal damage to civility (Liang, 1992, pp. 14-17). This is the context within which democratic policing, although unstructured quite variously, can be more precisely defined. Bittner’s (1972) brilliant proximal definition, encompassing the situational application of force, does not take into account the value context that is essential to the definition of democratic policing, a matter much clarified by Liang’s tenets. Furthermore, the police as an organization must be distinguished from policing as a process. Policing is done by many agencies, only one of which, usually the publicly supported and paid police, is what is normally referred to as “the police.” I suggest the following working definition of democratic police:

The police, constituted by many agencies, are authoritatively coordinated and legitimate organizations that stand ready to apply force up to and including fatal force in specified territories to sustain politically defined ordering.

Democratic policing illustrated

In these papers, many illustrations are given of the flexibility of the mandate, strategies and tactics of police and policing in democratic societies. For
example, the Israeli police and the RUC in Northern Ireland have adopted the Anglo-American mandate modified by British colonial rule; the Trinidad and Tobago police and the RCMP draw heavily on the British version of policing, with the special case of the RCMP which has evolved national security obligations; the police in the European societies reported upon here draw on the continental and civil law traditions (although “Mediterranean” variants are not discussed here – the police of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece); Poland is an emerging democracy which is developing policing institutions after Soviet influences and functions. Although this collection of papers weaves a rich international tapestry, it is a primarily European picture, and missing are police organizations in the vast territories of the Hispanic world of central and Latin America, China and Japan, southeast Asia and Africa and the religiously-based traditional police of Islamic countries.

The methods employed in the research are appropriately mixed. The papers draw on many methods and techniques, including case studies (Clarke, Holmberg, Virta, Punch, de Vejiver, and Zoomer); systematic observation (Holmberg, Weisburd, Shalev, and Amir); questionnaires (the most common approach – Haberfeld, Walancik and Uydess, Weisburd, Shalev and Amir, Feltes, Deosaran) interviews (all use them save the focus group approach of Van den Broeck); focus groups (Haberfeld and colleagues, Van den Broeck); and quasi-experimental designs (Weisburd, and colleagues; Holmberg and colleagues). Their approach to analysis varies from narrative to quotes, to descriptive vignettes, to programmatic statements of needs or future hopes for reform of police. Some of the papers report statistical analyses, but the analysis is restricted to bi-variate tables, chi squares or simple descriptive assessments of relationships or patterns in the data. About half the papers combine statistical analysis with qualitative work. They are in most respects preliminary reports of on-going and fairly major research projects. Most, although there are several exceptions, are governmentally funded and supported by the countries studied or by the United States Department of Justice. The authors are academically trained, researchers, and are university-based almost exclusively. In part, the similarity of the approaches and questions asked concerning the efficacy and impact of community policing on police and citizens arises from the training of the researchers in North America, or their sensitivity to the community policing movement that began in the USA.

Themes
There are some common themes in the papers in my reading. First, external pressures for police reform varied. In some cases, it arose from external political and economic pressures as described so pointedly and sympathetically by Clarke, in some it arose from central government’s perceived wish to reform the police; in Poland it came directly from broader sociopolitical forces associated with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, while often the reforms seemed to arise from a combination of external factors and internal reform-oriented decisions in departments of justice and the like. In no case reported here was a “ground swell” of public opinion or pressure the originating source,
although Holmberg reports that citizens in Denmark were unhappy when a station was scheduled to be closed.

This suggests the irony of the community policing movement. It is attributed by the police to the citizens, and the citizens, where data are reported here from Poland and Israel at least, are ignorant or indifferent to the idea, or have no idea what it denotes. How are partnership, participation, and community input central to an idea and a practice when they do not exist? Surely this notion of deep involvement of citizens in community policing is a fictive political creation.

Second, American ideas of community policing, a buffet of intriguing variety and quality, often unexplicated and promoted via buzzwords, have been creatively and imaginatively shaped in the countries written about here. In Finland, the idea of networks and networking became central in a very successful innovation in village policing; in Denmark, the idea of personalized or more proximal policing was met with great favour and served some personnel and organizational needs of an aging police force; in The Netherlands, variations on zero tolerance and public order policing were both civil and well-supported by the populations served. Perhaps the vagueness of the concept of CP permits its flexible use to drive reform and rationalizing (linking ends or objectives to means, providing resources, and evaluating the outcomes), adding and subtracting features and changing their salience or priority in the programs undertaken. These features include such things as mini-stations, special territorial responsibilities, flexible hours for patrolling, training, surveys to assess public needs and evaluations, and reorganization and decentralization. It would appear that two things cling together in the projects reported here – decentralization of budgeting and programs, and a series of innovations designed in some way to reduce social distance between police and their publics.

Third, certainly practices are being modified and changing, and to some degree attitudes of officers are changing (sometimes in the “wrong” direction as reported in the research done in Israel). This requires further research using a panel design as was used in Israel. Although there is an implicit time dimension in the research reported here, systematic long range evaluations such as that undertaken by Skogan and associates in Chicago is much needed.

Fourth, some of the programs discussed can fairly claim to be successful in some specified fashion, especially the work in Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, and the “K” division in Alberta (Clarke). This latter research suggests that unanticipated consequences and awkward results are intimately linked with the hoped for in social experiments. Clarke shows that the external pressures on the RCMP were adapted to first in one way and then the other and the net effect was demoralization, lost budgets and perhaps increased cynicism among a previous proud force. Rising expectations can also be an ironic consequences of hoped for change.

Fifth, the fit between citizens’ perceptions, needs, attitudes, and police versions of these is loose and ironic. In these papers at least, when citizen attitudes are
Sixth, the global, national and international context of economics, politics and globalization of life-styles seem to come in and out of the analyses of policing. The extent to which this is pressing and taken into account varies in the papers. Perhaps most strikingly, the research on the Israeli police reform does not discuss the problems and consequences for democratic policing of the constant threat of terrorism, the West Bank and the Palestinian conflict, or broader issues of international politics in which Israel is a central player. Only in the case of the reform of the RUC did questions of human rights become part of the rhetoric of reform. On the other hand, the research in Belgium makes reference to international global-economic context, and several papers (Holmberg, Punch et al., Clarke) make clear the essential need for external support from governments if democratic police reform is to succeed. Skogan’s work (Skogan and Harnett, 1996) in Chicago, is a fine example of the benefits of direct political and economic support from local government for police reform. Clarke also shows that not all reforms in the name of community policing benefit either the police or the public, although they may yield reduced costs and budgetary obligations of local and state governments. These research reports all suggest that external, governmental pressure is present in virtually all these attempts at reform, and in no case did the police develop a program in which this pressure was absent. In concert with this and the absence of direct citizen involvement, all these reports describe top-down innovations that are more supported by command staff and civil servants than by police on the ground.

Seventh, these reports describe an amazing range of vibrant, creative rethinking of democratic policing and its many faces. Imagination is at work here. Finally, it should come as no surprise that the actual amount of time spent in the identified CP activities carried out by officers is small if measured, or virtually non-existent. Some of the ideas, such as those advanced in Israel concerning making arrests and rapid response time, are antithetical to conventional views of what CP connotes. Yet, in Toronto, the Toronto Police Service emphasizes that rapid response time is a part of community service and its community policing program (fieldnotes, Toronto, 2000). The idea of community policing is not an idea, but a very loose family of concepts, perhaps a Trojan horse, but it is possible that many forces could be unleashed by the imaginative work now under way.

Strengths and weaknesses
What of the limits and strengths of this research? This set of reports, at least in my view, represents something like the fourth horizon of community policing research. The first was the initial work of Trojanowicz and associates at
Michigan State in the late 1970s and early 1980s, followed by the work of Kelling on foot patrol in Newark and the Houston fear of crime studies done by Pate, Wycoff, Sherman and Skogan amongst others. The second horizon was set by the works of those collected in the edited volume of Jack Greene and Stephen Mastroskfi (1987). This was the first compilation of critical analyses and data bearing on the virtues of CP. A third horizon was set by the works of Fielding and Bennett in the UK, Murphy in Canada, and Rosenbaum (1996), Skogan and Harnett (1996) and Bordeur (1996). In these more recent studies, detailed and more ambitious, entire departments were surveyed and sophisticated research designs used to test general inferences and claims then emerging in the rhetoric of police reformers. In many respects, the international aspects of police reform are well captured in the papers published here and in other recent publications (Mawby, 1999; Marenin, 1998) on international aspects of community policing. This research takes as a contrast work undertaken in the USA, using it as a touchstone rather than an achieved excellence. The concept of CP is not rejected as a result of its origins and the often chauvinistic promotion of the idea by many American scholars when appearing at international conferences.

These papers are yet another piece of a large puzzle that faces us – the transformation of policing, including its movement into more rational and information based crime prevention activities and its being buffeted by international trends arising from terrorism and counter terrorism, drug distribution and selling networks, cyber-crime and globalization of law enforcement tactics.

Some of the limitations of these papers are more suggested by the context of policing studies than by the particulars of the research. These are questions such as the one that began this essay: what is policing? What is the family of ideas embedded in the idea of community policing and how shall we unpack it? What are the range and types of policing in the industrialized world? How does policing, the law and the politics of the state (preserving its legitimacy) intermix in times of routine and of crisis? Finally, as is clear in these papers, the equation X → Y when “x” (policing) is transformed into “y” is misleading because the x is a pleomorphic matter, the transforming process is complex, time-bound and patterned by traditions and culture, and the outcome, y (policing as changed) is also a complex matter. These papers move some way toward clarifying the equation.

Peter Manning
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Between a rock and a hard place

RCMP organizational change

Curtis A. Clarke
Athabasca University, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

Keywords Police, Organizational restructuring, Neo-liberalism, Canada

Abstract Examines how the collision of neo-liberalism and regionally specific social forces have created a specific manifestation of community based policing. The merger of neo-liberalism and community policing has taken place under common conditions of downsizing, fiscal downloading and organizational restructuring. These conditions have not, however, led to a consistency of application. The political, economic and social variables differ across regions, as do the stimuli for reform and the manner in which community policing has been implemented. As a result, each region has uniquely articulated the neo-liberal tenet of community involvement in community based policing. This range of reform initiatives is examined first from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of Alberta (K-Division).

Modern institutions must keep pace with the changes surrounding them. The RCMP has embarked upon a journey of organizational renewal several years ago . . . The years ahead signal continued alignment of the organization's priorities with those of government (and ultimately, of taxpayers), supported by cultural and structural changes (RCMP Commissioner J. Murray, 1999).

The RCMP has a unique role in Canada’s mythology of policing. Images of the red serge, musical ride, rugged frontiersmen, protectors of law and order in Western Canada and international peace keeping are key elements of Canada’s national policing psyche. Unfortunately, the APEC inquiry, the Airbus investigation, the commercialization of the RCMP image (Disneyfication), financial concerns and apparent service-wide poor morale have diverted Canadians’ attention from these earlier RCMP icons. And yet in our acceptance of these current images we have ignored other changes within the RCMP. Changes that have been guided by a variety of assumptions, political reforms and managerial calculations. Existing research gives little attention to the fact that external variables have in fact contributed to a disjointed process of organizational reform. Analysis of the RCMP’s early attempts to confront the political winds of change suggests the service was strategically unprepared and, as a result, instinctually fell back upon old structural and cultural assumptions. Disappointingly, reform was hindered by the service’s broad mandate encompassing federal, provincial and municipal policing responsibilities[1], and an organizational belief that little was required in terms of structural change. It would not be until the mid 1990s that the service would, after a period of internal reflection, recognize the need for organizational and managerial renewal. Eventually, as with other police services, the RCMP would root its reform in community policing and au courant models of corporate management.
Unfortunately, community based policing would be implemented not because it represented a new found commitment to citizen involvement and democratic participation in governance, but because of an ideological commitment to reducing the size of government and emulating the private sector.

This paper examines this range of reform initiatives first from the perspective of broad RCMP organizational shifts and then within the context of contract policing in the Province of Alberta (K-Division). The Alberta experience is unique for a number of reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is the political environment through which RCMP reform was guided; an environment articulated by the neoliberal agendas of both the federal and provincial governments. The imposition of federal and provincial governance agendas placed Alberta’s RCMP in a compromising situation both fiscally and organizationally. While “K” Division can be understood in terms of a semi-autonomous organizational unit it was and remains situated within the potentially fractious dynamics of federalist politics in Canada. Diverse, and yet ideologically similar, centers of influence prodded and shaped both the organizational and managerial character of the RCMP within Alberta. This has resulted in an organization characterized by three-year strategic business plans, corporate organizational models, organizational and cultural reform based on the commodification of police service governance. “K” Division’s navigation of these federal and provincial directives has garnered both distressing and innovative stages of reform.

And while this general direction of reform continues, it is important to indicate that current organizational structures and practices are, in fact, a synthesis of two realms of political influence. The prominent orientation of political influence was the dismantling of the welfare state and subsequent delegitimization of the public sector, a dismantling which included attacks upon “big government” and unwieldy bureaucracies.

Looking down the barrel of reform
In October 1990, Solicitor General Pierre Cadieux introduced the discussion paper Police Challenge 2000: A Vision of the Future of Policing in Canada (Normandreau and Leighton, 1990). As this was an initiative of the Federal Solicitor General it did not transcend the provincial jurisdiction and although it could not be enforced elsewhere, the RCMP would have to respond. This document had a profound impact upon the operational, philosophical and structural shift of the RCMP. Its directional tone was unmistakably reflective of corporate sector models of reform. Private sector jargon and strategies filled the text of this document. Palango notes:

The discussion paper was larded with the kind of American technocratic ideas and Harvard Business School buzzwords and phrases that have been so seductive to the business elite over the years: total quality, core values, empowerment, partnerships, excellence risk taking, conflict resolution, ownership and user pay systems (Palango, 1998, p. 125).

Although this customization of policing encompassed a tone reminiscent of private sector reorganization, the specificity of its policing context was also apparent. Here the rhetoric and philosophy of community policing framed the
strategic model from which reform was to evolve. The transformation of police services would occur through the implementation of community policing. Old hierarchical organizational structures and bureaucratic empires consistent with the existing police management would fade once the implementation of community policing occurred. As noted in Police Challenge 2000:

> Police organizations will be transformed. They will become more open and accountable, less hierarchical, allow greater responsibility and autonomy for front line officers and be based increasingly on the mission of solving local problems in partnership with the community (Normandreau and Leighton, 1990, p. v).

Solicitor General Cadieux lauded community policing as the savior of Canadian policing, asserting that it offered an effective strategy for the future. With Police Challenge 2000 Cadieux encouraged Canada’s Chiefs of Police to “get on with the business of systematically implementing community policing” (Cadieux, cited in Seagrave, 1995, p. 164). But moreover, the chiefs of police were also urged to embrace corporate sector models of management. In Police Challenge 2000, Cadieux prodded police managers to shape the restructuring of policing in a manner similar to those reforms taking shape within the federal public sector. Policing was to shed the vestiges of past public service privilege and structures and view itself in terms consistent with those of the private sector. This argument is apparent in the introductory paragraphs of Police Challenge 2000 wherein it states:

> Police organizations in the future will, much like private organizations, pursue excellence. They will no longer be stagnant and assume that funding will be stable or constantly increasing and that the public will remain supportive but passive. Total quality service is now being demanded. Further, quality service must be delivered within the context of a lean department because fiscal constraints are expected to be ever present in the future (Normandreau and Leighton, 1990, p. 1).

This tone of operating police services as a business was echoed throughout the “Challenge” document. It can be argued that Cadieux set in motion an agenda that would continue to frame the structures, culture and strategy of policing within a private sector enterprise model[2]. And while community policing was wrapped in the rhetoric of better responsiveness, the objective was not really better governance through enhanced community participation, but rather, better governance as a product of private sector emulation and fiscal austerity. Combining community policing and business analogies became increasingly popular with administrators and politicians who were consistently facing diminished funds and heightened pressure for effective public service (Palango, 1998). Not surprisingly, the RCMP was a primary target.

Yet despite the RCMP command’s rhetorical commitment to and philosophical understanding of community policing, from an implementation stance there was little sense of the direction or manner in which the process of reorganization was to occur. S/Sgt Jack Briscoe notes that early stages of implementation took on the moniker “if you decree it, it shall happen” (1999). In other words, the command seemed to be operating under the belief that they only need voice the broad concepts and philosophy of their reform objectives
for the troops to give them shape. With respect to the implementation of community policing, this belief was predictable, due, in part, to the administration’s conviction that empowerment, community partnerships and problem solving were what the RCMP had always done by the nature of policing in a detachment environment. As indicated in the Solicitor General’s 1988-1989 annual report:

The detachment is the front line unit with which the force ultimately performs its policing responsibilities. It is therefore the foundation on which the force builds its resource requirements. Detachments are generally the first contact between citizens and the police, and they represent approximately 60 per cent of actual resources. They are the focus of attention in crime prevention programs and are the most visible uniformed police presence . . . The philosophy of detachment policing is based on the Community Based Policing model. This model asserts that the community involvement is an integral part of policing (Solicitor General of Canada, 1989, p. 25).

Given this understanding of the RCMP operational structure and practice, the administration felt the service was well on its way to achieving the specific goals set out by Challenge 2000. Unfortunately, what was to actually happen was a massive downloading of responsibility onto the shoulders of the officers and administrators at the detachment level without a corresponding transfer of fiscal resources. Reform was foisted on the backs of the detachments and framed in the rhetoric of enhanced governance through decentralization, ownership and empowerment. The workings of this strategy, however, had little to do with citizen empowerment and police responsiveness. Instead, decentralization represented a quick fix for the achievement of budgetary reductions. As one constable stated, “decentralization is fine, but if you are not going to give us any support then how can you expect us to do the work and implement the programs that need to be implemented” (1999).

In the initial stages of structural reorganization, the implementation of community policing did little to shift the RCMP from its paramilitary, centrally controlled structure. Early implementation of community policing was more an attempt to structure a policing strategy that would in some fashion emulate operational and managerial realignment consistent with federal public service organizational objectives. Reform initiatives were not perceived as a means for altering operations or behaviour. Rather, they were perceived as a means of coping with budget reductions (RCMP, 1995, p. ii). In large part, this was achieved through a wholesale downloading of fiscal responsibility onto the detachment with very little true managerial or structural realignment of its centralized bureaucracy.

**Downloading to the community**

While the Federal Government’s reform agenda had immediate implications for the service, the communities policed by the RCMP would also be affected by the Government’s underlying reform objectives. The strategic maneuver of downloading to the detachment level would play into the Government’s overarching goal of reducing expenditures as a means of addressing deficits.
Decentralization, integral to community policing, had implications for the community and also offered the potential for downloading responsibility. Here, the community[3] was expected to take on an active responsibility for policing itself and to become more proactive in the issues of crime control. This role is articulated in the Solicitor General’s 1990-1991 annual report wherein it states:

Community policing means the police and the community working together to identify and resolve crime and social order problems of communities. This style of policing recognizes that communities have an essential role to play in police decision-making. This role includes joint problem-solving, priority-setting and formulating requests for service that influence the attitudes of members and the delivery of policing services (Solicitor General of Canada, 1991, p. 25).

In this context, a community policing strategy would imply greater community interaction. What this definition of interaction does not overtly note, however, is that emphasis was placed on the fiscal dimensions of governance rather than community empowerment through the self-identification of needs and strategies to address these needs. As was the case with other public service programs, communities were now forced by government belt tightening to take on the responsibility of meeting the financial needs of specific crime control programs within their jurisdiction. In this respect community policing was integral to the process of divesting the state of responsibilities related to the maintenance of social order. Furthermore, downloading of responsibility to the community effectively realized the Federal Government’s objective of fiscal austerity through decentralization.

Budgetary cut backs and an emphasis on decentralized decision making forced communities to provide additional resources and to take on more responsibility for policing their own community. As argued by one RCMP superintendent, the “trend has been to get the community to do things that the police have traditionally been doing. If it is a priority to the community and goes beyond the core development of policing, as set out in Provincial and Municipal contracts, then the community must come up with the resources” (1999).

Among the policing functions most susceptible to budget reductions was crime prevention. The implementation of new crime prevention programs or the maintenance of existing ones was increasingly reliant on the sharing of community resources. As a result, officers found themselves in the peculiar position of serving as fund raisers. Traditionally, officers were told not to take money from the community and yet now they were told to go out with cap in hand looking for resources. Interaction with the community became one of asking what more could the community give both in terms of money and time. Community volunteerism became a valuable resource to be tapped by the local detachment. Community members were to be considered a source of both manpower and financial resources.

Throughout the service there was a realization that decentralization meant policing could not be done in isolation but must be inclusive of the community. Interestingly, inclusion of the community quickly came to symbolize downloading fiscal responsibility to maintain services that were ancillary to
traditional operational duties. Communities could no longer expect the RCMP to supply all the resources or take the lead in identifying the focus of crime prevention initiatives. This reality is succinctly noted in Commissioner Philip Murray’s 1997 Commissioner’s directive wherein he states “The RCMP cannot be all things to all people”. In other words the apron strings were to be cut. The old welfare state assumptions were no longer applicable. Decentralization and empowerment meant communities were to be more responsible for a broad range of crime prevention services and to take an active role in the fiscal support of ancillary policing functions.

Prior to 1994, decentralization, downloading and empowerment characterized the early stages of the RCMP’s reform process and yet much more was to be accomplished. The efforts to download responsibility to the community and detachment did little to resolve the continued fiscal crisis. Both internal and external pressures to reengineer the organizational structure of the service continued to confront the command. Simply downloading responsibility or proclaiming the implementation of community policing was not an acceptable resolution to the call for institutional reform. Moreover, the 1993 federal election of the Chretien Liberals did nothing to diminish the intensity of fiscal conservatism. The RCMP continued to feel the pressure for organizational reform as a function of the liberal’s budgetary austerity. Addressing these concerns would fall on to the shoulders of newly appointed Commissioner Philip Murray.

**RCMP Inc.**

Under Commissioner Murray’s leadership the pressures of fiscal conservatism and neo-liberal policy agendas were manifested in various ways. Between 1993 and 1997 the RCMP had lost 2,300 positions and had $173 million slashed from its operating budget (Hovey, cited in Palango, 1998). The service was continuously confronted with the challenge of how to save money while striving to be more effective and efficient. Further aggravating this dilemma were concerns regarding the encroachment of private policing, greater competition for resources between government agencies and an increased demand from communities to be more involved in policing. These were factors the service could not ignore since the consequences of inaction were profound. Communities and provinces could decide to use another service, create their own, spend less on policing, or they could put enough pressure on the RCMP that change was inevitable (RCMP, 1998). The reality of this threat was made clear in Commissioner Murray’s statement “change or be changed, or just be shown the door” (RCMP, 1998).

Avoiding being shown the door required implementing a strategy by which the RCMP could counter forces undermining its “service of choice status”. In other words, the RCMP needed to articulate a strategy whereby it remained competitive and maintained its market share of policing. Essential to this strategy were the provisions “of a quality service at an affordable price, responding to what the community wants and needs, thinking of clients first and negotiating for service priorities” (RCMP, 1998, p. 6). What is perplexing
about these strategic elements is their correspondence to market oriented strategies of competition. The relationship between the police and the citizens of a community were now to be negotiated in terms of market commodities, a bottom line, client relations and a competitive edge. This deviation from citizen to client based considerations was becoming more and more apparent within the rhetoric by which the RCMP articulated its strategic plans. Progressively, the relationship between the RCMP and the community departed from the conception of a police service as being a public service whose task it was to “establish and regulate the common good ” of citizens to one articulated by market concepts and activities. Especially perplexing in this trend is the replacement of the citizen with the customer (consumer). This difference is aptly noted by Heintzman, who states:

The reality is that in the public sector we do not really serve customers. We serve citizens, which is not the same thing at all. One of the reasons why this is sometimes difficult to grasp is that there are at least three different dimensions to democratic citizenship: The citizen as user or recipient of public services and programs, the citizen as taxpayer; and the citizen as voter and more broadly as the participant in a civic community, with all the rights, duties, obligations, relationships and concerns that go along with membership in a democratic community. In any interaction with government or with an agent of government, all of these dimensions of citizenship are brought into play to some degree or other and all can be enhanced or diminished by the exchange. The concept of citizen is therefore very different from that of customer, where no such obligations or relationship exist. The concept of customer is an atomistic one, with no overtones of obligation or of community, where self-interest is, appropriately the dominant motive. If a customer is dissatisfied with a service transaction, he or she normally can and should abandon, walk away from the service relationship and seek another supplier. If a citizen is dissatisfied, by contrast, he or she normally cannot or should not walk away but rather must work with other members of the community to seek improvement (Heintzman, 1999, p. 13).

As the RCMP embraced the tenets and rhetoric of the market it began to lose sight of the conceptual differences between citizen and customer. Communities became grounds from which to wage a competitive market strategy against all others who would undermine their position of prominence. And while these rhetorical maneuvers may seem benign there are significant issues of philosophy and concept which have the capacity fundamentally to change policing and its relationships to society. This changing relationship between police and citizen, while in itself problematic, was symptomatic of the broader political shift to a neo-liberal relationship between state and citizen. The RCMP, like many other federal departments, could not resist the intense pressure to adopt market practices and corporate relations. And yet, there is an apparent contradiction in using community policing to achieve these corporate/market ends. Community policing, in its best form, is a means to strengthen citizenry through strengthening the link between the individual and the well being of his/her social environment. Management reform fails to achieve this link in the fact that it attempts to create an enterprise culture wherein the link to community members is based on individual service.
Fine tuning the corporation

In order for the RCMP to adapt to its new role as service provider in a competitive market of policing, it needed to reflect on its own practices and identify internal impediments to reform. One example of this reflective process was the January 1995 tabling of an internal RCMP audit. The audit highlighted a number of concerns related to corporate structure and service delivery, but was especially critical regarding issues of management. As the following excerpt suggests, the RCMP needed to reconsider its existing management ethos:

Community policing requires a fundamental change to the RCMP management paradigm. Attention must be focused away from complaint control systems that are designed to minimize the chance of mistakes, to a business plan where opportunities for success are maximized through innovative and creative interaction with the community and with members. (RCMP, 1995, p. 14).

Interestingly, this finding countered earlier beliefs that organizational reform was not necessary and that by simply implementing a process of decentralization the supposed benefits of reform would unfold. In fact, the audit was highly critical of this strategy, suggesting the service had missed many of the essential components of organizational reform.

Implementation of community policing and reform initiatives prior to the 1995 audit had been narrowly focused, thus limiting organizational reform. In its first steps, the implementation of community policing had been primarily dedicated to reuniting the RCMP with the communities it served. The service-wide review indicated community policing was more a means by which to download responsibility to the detachment than it was a serious attempt at organizational and managerial reform. Little attention had been paid to the fact that community policing was to be a “blueprint for organizational and management reform” (RCMP, 1995, p. 22). In fact, organizational and managerial reform had virtually been ignored. As noted in the audit findings:

The RCMP assumed that members could easily adapt to a new service delivery model without education and within the current organizational structure. It was also believed that all administrative and operational support personnel would readily and willingly modify their policies and practices. We know now this has not occurred. As a result, fundamental impediments have not been removed and the slow transition to a new service delivery model continues to be a source of concern (RCMP, 1995, p. 18).

Audit findings indicated there was little internal understanding or support of the basic philosophical principles which characterize community policing. Therefore implementation at the service delivery level was not understood and thus frustrated further development. Structurally, the RCMP provided what seemed at times to be an insurmountable barrier to reform, the existing paramilitary, centrally controlled bureaucracy only hindered organizational streamlining or empowerment of those at the detachment level. With respect to the internal communication of service strategies, clear and consistent dialogue had been lacking. Throughout the service there had been little effort to share best practices regarding the new service delivery model. Yet perhaps the audit’s most damning conclusion was that the RCMP had implemented its
reform process in the wrong order. The audit asserted that reform would have been more effective if the RCMP had, in fact, addressed organizational and structural concerns before downloading to the detachment and assuming frontline officers would quickly adapt. As noted in the audit's executive summary:

Community policing is not a program. Rather, it is an organizational philosophy that requires fundamental changes to the structure and culture of the organization in order for strategies to be successfully implemented. Communication, education and eliminating organizational barriers are absolutely essential to achieve a complete and sustained transition to community policing in the RCMP (RCMP, 1995, p. iii).

The audit presented RCMP command with the inescapable proof that recent attempts to implement community policing and, more specifically, broad service reform, had been ineffective. And yet, while organizational reform lagged well behind the desired outcome all efforts at reform were not considered dismal failures. Clearly, the goal of decentralization and down loading had been a huge success. There could be little doubt that the service had effectively implemented a strategy of downloading or, in the corporate lexicon, empowered the community and detachment. But as Palango suggests “this was simply a downsizing exercise wherein more and more responsibility was being thrown onto the backs of the street level officer” (Palango, 1996, p. 144). Moreover, it was a maneuver in keeping with the federal government’s attempts to download responsibility to the community. RCMP decentralization played well into the objectives of the service’s political leaders. Interestingly, future organizational reform would capitalize on this process of decentralization and empowerment.

Unfortunately, the RCMP’s attempt to achieve fiscal austerity through decentralization has in fact handcuffed divisions, particularly those who must operate within the confines of tight provincial and municipal budgets. An exemplar of this is found in the experiences of the RCMP in the province of Alberta (K-Division). Here, the imposition of command directives and federal belt tightening aggravated divisional restructuring. Not only had K-Division needed to respond to the political winds blowing out of Ottawa, but also the prairie storms whipped up by the conservative government of Premier Ralph Kein. K-Division had the misfortune of being pressed between two political fronts, each demanding fiscal austerity, public service reform and a downloading of services.

A view from contract policing: K-Division’s response
As with other RCMP Divisions, K-Division began the 1990s encountering community based policing as a process of decentralization and downloading to the divisional level. And yet, not much would change structurally within the division, for as noted earlier, in the initial stage of reform community policing was seen as synonymous with RCMP practice and detachment policing. Furthermore, provincial/federal government funding formulas had remained the same and, in fact, budgets had increased throughout the previous decade, so there was no stimulus to address a process of wholesale restructuring. But all of this would change in 1992 beginning with the re-negotiation of provincial
and municipal police contracts between Alberta Justice and the federal government. While these negotiated contracts dramatically changed prior funding formulas, what is more interesting is the manner in which the new formula reflected the federal government’s emphasis upon decentralization and a downloading of responsibility onto the provinces.

On 1 August 1992 the Provincial Police Service Agreement along with the Municipal Police Agreement between the Province of Alberta and the Federal Government came into effect[4]. These agreements set out the contractual particulars whereby “Canada (RCMP) shall, subject to and in accordance with the terms and conditions of these agreements provide provincial and municipal[5] policing in the Province of Alberta” (Alberta, 1992, p. 4). Immediately apparent in these agreements is the inversion of the federal-provincial funding formula. Prior to 1992 the federal government had been responsible for 70 percent of the cost while the remaining 30 percent was the responsibility of the province[6]. The outcome of the 1992 re-negotiated policing agreements was a reversal of this formula. These agreements divested the federal government of its past fiscal responsibility, clearly a maneuver consistent with the federal government’s neo-liberal commitment to achieving spending reductions through shifting greater responsibility onto those who require services, more specifically the provinces.

A further implication of these agreements was the creation of a fragmented realm of control with respect to issues of management, organizational restructuring and fiscal oversight. While the internal management of actual police services remained the responsibility of the RCMP, both the Provincial Justice Minister and municipal governments assumed fiscal responsibility for local police services because of their larger slice of the funding pie. This decentralized set of responsibilities and varied political agendas would compromise any form of consensus between the three levels of government regarding restructuring or operational reform. Furthermore, the fragmented oversight structure created by the 1992 police service agreements would force K-Division into an untenable fiscal position wherein it was accountable to two levels of government, each imposing severe financial constraints.

Prior to 1994 the pressure to change had been consistently driven by the federal government. With the election of Ralph Klien’s conservatives to public office in Alberta, pressure for reform would also come from the provincial level. Policing was not to be sheltered in the government’s agenda for public service renewal. Clear signs of reform came in the guise of drastic cuts to municipal police service budgets and reduction of policing grants, a move that aggravated the already tight fiscal environment of the RCMP. K-Division was now squeezed under two political agendas espousing fiscal austerity, downsizing, decentralization and a neo-liberal tenet of responsibilization. The squeeze was intensified as each locus of political influence began articulating different platforms from which to pursue restructuring initiatives.

The Alberta context was quickly clarified by the deployment of fiscal policies that sought to trim budgets and download a variety of responsibilities
onto the citizens of Alberta. Minister of Justice Neil McCrank set out to trim municipal policing grants by 50 percent by the end of 1994. In fact by the fiscal year 1995/1996 these grants would no longer exist as separate budget line items as they were incorporated into broad municipal service grants. This was made even more perplexing by the fact that in the fiscal year 1995/1996 these municipal grants were trimmed by $59 million and a further 10 percent in the following year. The outcome of these cuts placed a particular burden on municipalities, especially in light of the fiscal formula articulated within the 1992 policing agreements. Reductions in funding had dire implications for municipalities, particularly when federal financial support for the RCMP had already been reduced. Moreover, municipal policing was not the only victim of the province’s financial bludgeon. Provincial policing funds would be reduced by $2.9 million in 1994/1995 and a further $1.2 million in 1995/1996 (Alberta Government, 1999). These funding levels would not increase substantially until the fiscal year 1998/1999.

Further complicating the fiscal reality of K-Division was the federal government’s “Project Renewal”. The outcome of this project was a federal government reduction in budget allocations to K-Division by $5.5 million spread over a three-year period beginning in the fiscal year 1995/1996. The breakdown would amount to a reduction of $2,333,000 in 1995/1996, $1,370,000 in 1996/1997 and a final amount of $1,800,000 in 1997/1998 (RCMP, 1997, p. 2). The result of these reductions coupled with those levied by the provincial government left K-Division in a somewhat precarious position. The immediate impact was a service deficit of $6,657,949 million. And, as noted in an internal memo drafted by Assistant Commissioner McDermid, “A deficit of this magnitude will have a severe impact on K-Division until such time as it is eliminated” (RCMP, 1997, p. 1). Articulating the broad implications of this fiscal shortcoming A/Comm McDermid concludes:

No one will be exempt from the impact of our present financial situation as all post budgets have been reduced which means we may not have the financial capacity to do what we did in previous years. This is not a situation that benefits anyone but it is the present reality and we must focus on rectifying the situation within as short of time as possible (RCMP, 1997, p. 9).

Solutions to this fiscal crisis were tackled by way of 13 strategic actions developed by the Divisional Executive Committee (DEC). While many of these solutions focused upon administrative streamlining, the four largest cost saving initiatives were linked to operational components. For example, detachment budgets were reduced by 5 percent, placing an onus on detachment commanders to closely scrutinize all expenditures and set strategic plans enabling them to stay within their budgets. A further incentive to achieve this fiscal austerity came by way of a directive indicating that any amount of over spending by detachment commanders would be extracted from the following year.

While decentralization and downloading increased the authority of detachment commanders, it also limited the range of opportunities and the varied policing strategies available to them, particularly, since basic operational duties constitute the largest share of budgetary costs. Moreover,
the community is placed in a difficult position if it hopes to access services other than those provided by the performance of basic operational duties. The community must now negotiate for these additional services, find the funds to offset the cost or relieve staffing pressures through greater volunteerism. While this has forced officers to be innovative and set realistic objectives it had nonetheless placed a great deal of pressure on the community and volunteers. More and more was being asked of the members and community volunteers.

Augmenting these constraints was the action plan solution of reducing the divisional membership by 15 officers. This solution of personnel reduction furthered a trend in membership reduction that had begun in 1994. Between 1994 and 1997 K-Division lost 100 sworn members. As operational duties remained a priority for all detachments, reduced membership resulted in fewer opportunities for alternative program development or problem solving initiatives – key components of community policing. Once more the community became the pool from which resources were drawn both in terms of financial support and human resources via volunteerism. The strategic alternatives forwarded by the DEC were a means by which the command could off-load responsibility onto Service members. Unfortunately, there was little recognition that service members were being asked to do more with less, front line officers and community members were being tasked to the limit.

DEC micro management strategies had taken a play sheet directly from the strategic plan guiding federal and provincial attempts at public service renewal and deficit reduction. The overall tone of DEC solutions echoed the importance of downloading, sharing of responsibility and empowerment of those who are tasked with the operationalization of services. And while these strategies were an attempt to address K-Division’s deficit, its emulation of provincial and federal government restructuring techniques did not end there. The DEC would continue to rely on Alberta’s restructuring for a means by which to make the service more efficient, including the development of three-year business plans[7].

The provincial government of Alberta began a wholesale recasting of government services in 1993. The framework of recasting was shaped within the text of the province’s three-year business plan, a document which outlined the government’s objectives for line departments and all agencies under its jurisdiction. Provincial agencies were to formulate similar business plans that would articulate a mission statement, service objectives, spending targets and methods of measuring outcomes. An underlying purpose of these business plans was to set in place a yardstick by which agencies could analyze their effectiveness and alignment with the overall “business objectives” of the provincial government. And although internal RCMP management remained under the tutelage of the federal government, the provincial government’s budgetary dominance and 20-year policing agreements gave it a jurisdictional trump card. Therefore, K-Division, as with other provincial agencies, was accountable to the provincial government and thus required to develop and implement a three-year business plan.
Perhaps one of the most interesting passages within K-Division’s business plan for 1996-1999 can be found under the heading of “Mandate and responsibility”. It states:

The RCMP engages in community policing to fulfill its responsibilities and to achieve its agenda of regionalization. Community policing is the application of modern management principles to policing. It involves decentralization, empowerment, decision making at the service delivery level, risk management, client consultation, problem solving and mobilization of community resources to supplement the role of the police. These techniques which have proven to promote effective police services at the front line, also ensure efficient management of the organization (RCMP, 1997, p. 3).

From this statement one can infer that community policing was to remain an integral tool in achieving government objectives of decentralization, downloading of fiscal responsibility, managerial restructuring and citizen responsibilization. The link between community policing and fiscal management is further reinforced under the Strategic Vision subsection, which indicates:

The vision of the RCMP is to create centres of excellence for policy, operations and service delivery and, before fiscal year 1997-1998, through the extension of community policing, review the organization and reduce the cost of doing business (RCMP, 1997).

Throughout the business plan, issues of fiscal austerity and managerial change are interwoven with concepts of community policing, empowerment of service members and decentralized budgetary responsibility. The RCMP’s business plan continuously emphasized the importance of decentralized budgets, particularly at the detachment level. This sentiment is noted in the business plan’s Financial Considerations section wherein it suggests:

In order to make the most efficient use of all available funding we will continue to focus on fiscal responsibility. Through the implementation of post budgeting in the past several years, the mechanisms are in place to permit budget management at the lowest possible level. We will continue to support and encourage “bottom” driven financial management (RCMP, 1997, p. 18).

It goes on to indicate that:

K-Division has performed well in our efforts to cope with dwindling financial resources and the financial uncertainty caused by changing policing strategies and changing client and employee expectations. We will strive to ensure that detachment commanders, unit commanders and program managers have the tools and skills to mange their budgets (RCMP, 1997, p. 19).

Community policing was a foundational girder of K-Division’s three-year business plan. Moreover, its value was not lost on Alberta’s Justice Ministry. The Ministry’s 1996/1997 annual report extols the value of community policing in achieving its own objective of seeking more effective methods of police service. The Ministry had outlined, in its own three-year business plan, the objective of enhancing the partnership with the RCMP, through the administration of the Provincial Policing Agreement it hoped to improve “accountability, cost effectiveness and citizen satisfaction” (Alberta, 1992a, p. 21)[8]. The success of this objective had already been achieved in that the RCMP in cooperation with the Ministry, had established a three-year business plan that set the
implementation of community policing throughout Alberta as a business priority (Alberta, 1992a, p. 21). Ministerial interests in pursuing community policing can be further noted with respect to its fourth business strategy of “improving public awareness of the Justice system, increasing community involvement and develop partnerships with the community and justice stakeholders”. This objective was to be achieved by way of “supporting and working with police services to further the concepts of community policing and developing measurements to identify its effectiveness” (Alberta, 1992a, p. 28). Moreover, the Ministry actively encouraged police services to embrace community policing as a service model and announced its intention to track the effectiveness of these initiatives.

The rhetoric of partnership is readily recognizable but so too is the underlying tone of citizen responsibilization and a relationship to provincial government objectives of downloading a greater share of service delivery onto the community. There is little doubt the Ministry recognized the value of community policing as a vehicle by which it could achieve not only its own business line objectives, but also support many of the broad provincial objectives of neo-liberal governance. Through its capacity to set policy directions for subordinate agencies, the Ministry influenced the tone and nature of a variety of initiatives. Hence, with respect to its ability to influence the direction of police services it is not surprising that community policing would become paramount to the development of new service delivery models. This direction is affirmed in K-Division’s 1998/2001 business plan which states, “an objective jointly negotiated with Alberta Justice and corresponding to strategy 4, community policing forms the cornerstone of the services provided by the RCMP to Albertans” (RCMP, 1998, p. 13). In light of the RCMP’s adoption of three-year business plans and its close working relationship with the Ministry, there should be little surprise that service objectives would reflect those of the provincial government. For both the RCMP and the Ministry of Justice, community policing held the promise of achieving a variety of objectives, the least of which was fiscal downloading, increased citizen responsibility for service delivery and organizational streamlining.

It is also important to note that public service reform continued to occupy an important place on the agenda of the federal government and RCMP Headquarters. As noted in K-Division’s 1998/2001 business plan, “while the momentum for the process of change within the Federal Public Service has begun, much remains to be done. The RCMP is affected by the same environmental and demographic factors faced by the rest of the Public Service. We are also in the process of engineering new ways of doing business” (RCMP, 1998, p. 5). Issues of government fiscal policy, resource constraints, efforts to implement service delivery mechanisms consistent with the Federal Quality Service Initiative program and demands for a cost effective service delivery continued to influence RCMP strategic planning.

In terms of the RCMP’s contract policing, two initiatives influenced K-Division’s strategic choices. The first relates to the 31 March 1997 five-year review of existing 20-year provincial/federal government policing agreements
that concluded existing agreements should remain in effect with no significant changes to the cost sharing formula. Thus, there was to be no change in the existing fiscal contract nor was there to be any shift in the cost sharing responsibility between the federal and provincial governments. The second initiative is a continuation of the federal government’s pursuit of decentralization and streamlining the layers of public service management.

Restructuring RCMP management was to be achieved by way of implementing an organizational model based upon regionalization. The objective of this initiative was to remove one complete layer of management through the elimination of the sub-divisional level. With respect to K-Division, regionalization would divide Alberta into two areas designated by the north and south districts. In a manner consistent with the philosophical premise framing decentralized decision making, RCMP HQ did not prescribe standardized procedures for regionalization but allowed the process to take shape within each division. Each Divisional Executive Committee was to tailor the process to its own specific needs. And yet regardless of the flexibility of the process, the overriding objective was a further downloading of responsibility onto the detachment level of operations. The objective of the two district restructuring was to make the detachments first, more autonomous, and second, improve accountability to the communities they police. Furthermore, the objective of this restructuring was to make the detachments more innovative both in terms of budget control and service delivery.

As one detachment CO claims, the objectives of improved innovation and greater autonomy have been both achieved and welcomed. He goes on to suggest:

The downloading of services has made this process easier. The manner in which HQ no longer sets the goals and objectives for detachments has made it easier for detachments to approach communities and have them set goals. HQ policy has been relaxed, there is greater freedom at the front line, there is greater discretion in terms of the community and detachment setting the objectives. HQ is less invasive, the North/ South district division of Alberta has further facilitated this. Detachments no longer need to submit goals and objectives to the sub-unit. This shift now places the detachment in greater proximity to the community, it creates greater accountability and resource sharing (interview, 1999).

And while a positive view of decentralization does exist, all service members do not embrace it. As one officer points out:

Decentralization has faced a difficult transition. There are a number of problems. For example most of the current unit commanders are poor managers. Decisions are being made based on bottom line perspectives. These bottom line issues start to cloud the decisions that affect service delivery. Fiscal responsibility and decentralization will become a problem which will eventually set the members and community up for disappointment (interview, 1999).

This tone is frequently echoed as more and more members view downloading as merely a means by which to achieve fiscal objectives and broad political agendas.
Conclusion
By 1 January 1999 K-Division had begun to implement its second three-year business plan and claimed it was the model of a cost effective police service (RCMP, 1999). Streamlined management structures, decentralized budgets, empowerment of detachments and the community are, without question, objectives K-Division could claim success in implementing. RCMP reform has struggled to balance between political agendas that seek to cast policing as a generic public service agency and those that recognize a broader set of social responsibilities specific to policing. The question that frequently surfaces in this debate is whether objectives of cost efficiency, downsizing and downloading undermine the ability of a police service to remain both equitable and effective. We can see that the RCMP has become cost effective, it has streamlined its management structure and has certainly downloaded responsibility onto the shoulders of the community, but whether it has become more equitable; more responsive to the communities it serves, is an open question. Have these reform initiatives been merely an attempt to bring the service in line with broad public service reform, a downsizing of government? I would suggest that the question of equitable police service has not been lost in the foray of change. While recent reform initiatives reflect neo-liberal objectives of fiscal austerity and downsizing they have also laid the foundation for a more accountable and equitable police service. The task now is for communities to take advantage of this, to assert their role in the partnership that community policing affords. But more importantly, take the reins from the hands of those who have set neo-liberal objectives by which police services are to operate. Empowered communities, coupled with innovative and accountable detachments, may in fact provide exemplary models of equitable and democratic policing.

Notes
1. "The RCMP enforces provincial statutes and municipal by-laws in all provinces and territories with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, which have their own provincial police, and those portions of Newfoundland and Labrador policed by the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. The RCMP also enforces federal statutes in all provinces" (Solicitor General, 23, 1991).
2. The concept of treating police services as a business or at least seeking the assistance of business models to address operational ineffectiveness had been floating around Canadian police circles since the early 1980s. An example of this can be noted in a speech given by the Honourable Rene Marin during a Canadian Police College Workshop in June of 1982. His presentation “Management under financial restraint” frequently suggested that police managers look to the business world for solutions to their organizational shortcomings. He states: “Where does the police department turn when it is hit by economic reality? I suggest that the best place to start looking for profitable lessons is the business world” (Marin, 1997, p. 2). Interestingly, many of the points he highlights, such as decentralization, empowerment and total quality service, are echoed in the document Police Challenge 2000.
3. The RCMP articulated a diverse understanding of community. Community is defined as “ a group of people who share certain elements: geographic location, cultural and racial background, socioeconomic status, common interests and goals or concern with the same crime and social issues” (RCMP, 1995, p. 4). The RCMP also acknowledge the presence of numerous communities within the jurisdictional boundaries of a detachment. "It is possible
for one detachment to have a number of communities within its jurisdiction, and it is incumbent on members to clearly identify these groups so that the unique needs of each can be addressed" (RCMP, 1995, p. 4).

4. These agreements were assigned a 20-year term to be renewed in 31 March 2012.

5. Noted exceptions to this agreement are municipal police services of Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge.

6. Municipalities with populations less than 15,000 faced a similar funding formula as the Province, a 70/30 split, but those municipalities with populations greater than 15,000 were shackled by a 10/90 funding formula.

7. Business plans were not specific to divisional operations but would also be utilized at the detachment and program level. An example of this is Drayton Valley detachment’s business plan developed by the accounting firm KPMG after it had completed an internal audit. A further example is the 1999/2000 business plan developed by the Leduc detachment’s community policing unit.

8. While the RCMP appreciated, at some level, the conceptual distinction between community policing and private sector management principles, the Alberta Government saw them as synonymous.

References and further reading


Alberta Justice (1992a), *Provincial Police Service Agreement*, 1 April.


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RCMP, Leduc Detachment Community Policing Unit, Strategic Plan 1999-2000.


Personalized policing
Results from a series of experiments with proximity policing in Denmark

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Abstract Describes the emergence of proximity policing – a Danish version of COP – and evaluates a series of experiments with implementation of the concept. The design and scope of each experiment is described, and their degree of implementation is assessed. Proximity policing in Denmark differs from other COP projects in that this kind of work is still the responsibility of a number of designated officers instead of the whole police force. Geographical assignments and long-term affiliation with the local areas provide for a personalization of policing – a personalization that is very popular with local and municipal liaisons to the police. The goals of the Danish experiments are very extensive, and it is concluded that all cannot be accomplished at the same time.

Introduction
What is community policing? Apparently, nobody knows for sure (Seagrave, 1996; Rosenbaum and Lurigio, 1994), a fact that is all the more surprising given the enormous interest the concept has generated over the last two decades. There is little doubt that we are dealing with a “semantic sponge” (Manning, 1997), but apparently a very popular one. One reason for the lack of a precise definition, however, might be that one of the central features of community policing is exactly the adaptation of policing to local communities – a feature that must generate heterogeneity and thus some difficulties in definition.

Given this international confusion and debate, it is perhaps not surprising that the National Danish Police did not define the concept of proximity policing – a literal translation of the Danish equivalent of COP, also used in The Netherlands (van der Vijver, 1999) – before engaging in a series of experiments on the subject. Instead, the definition was left to the participating police districts themselves, and indeed the National Police expressed the hope that the experiments themselves would provide a sort of definition: “the overall goal of the six pilot projects is – by trying out ideas and suggestions, and through (possibly scientific) evaluation – to gather, spread, and utilize knowledge and experience about proximity policing” (Rigspolitiet, 1997)[1].

This paper reports some preliminary findings from an evaluation of the Danish experiments[2]. Whereas the designs of the six individual projects are very different, it is nonetheless possible to point out a number of common features as well, features that define a Danish version of community oriented, or proximity, policing. As several of the experiments have not ended yet, the results should be interpreted with caution.
The organization of the Danish police

Denmark (population 5.3 million) has been served by a national police force since 1965, at which time the then independent municipal police forces were unified. Today, the Danish police force is formally headed by the Minister of Justice and employs approximately 10,000 officers of all ranks. One fifth of these officers are detectives, the rest belong to the uniformed branch, including various special units. The police force is subdivided into 54 districts (excluding Greenland and the Faroe Islands) ranging in size from 1,849 officers and detectives serving 491,000 citizens in the capital of Copenhagen, to 42 officers and detectives serving 62,000[3] citizens in the town of Ribe in the southwestern part of the country. As these figures indicate, the ratio of citizens to police varies greatly around the country, as does the size and characteristics of individual districts. Each district is headed by a police chief and a deputy (both jurists), whereas all other police leaders are recruited from the sworn personnel. The police chief also heads the district’s prosecutors, who are stationed in the police station as well.

The Danish police force is characterized by uniformity and diversity at the same time. Uniformity is strengthened by the fact that all officers begin their careers at the national police academy (situated close to Copenhagen), where training consists of a four-year curriculum, including two one-year periods of apprenticeship in a police district (all officers start in the uniformed branch and may specialize at a later stage); furthermore, there is only one (very influential) police union; and finally, decisions about funding, equipment etc. for each of the 54 districts are made by the National Police.

But uniformity goes only so far: each district chief is granted wide autonomy, and decisions about daily operations, management, and procedural decisions in different types of cases are made at the local level. Differences exist between districts regarding the way cases are handled: what types of crimes are given priority, whether or not the police will enforce the law regarding certain misdemeanors, and so on. Even though the National Police may, in principle, be very influential, in practice they rely heavily on the voluntary cooperation from the districts. One result of this condition is that, given the ongoing struggle between districts about allocation of funds and personnel, the National Police must ensure that every district gets a “fair share” of officers so as not to alienate any one district.

This semi-autonomy of each police district has influenced the proximity policing experiments described in this paper as well. For instance, participation in the experiments was voluntary, and the experimental designs were left to the districts themselves. Furthermore, participating districts were not given extra manpower (apparently since that might generate complaints from other districts), a fact that has had major impact on the scope and design of the experiments.

Decentralized policing in Denmark

In Denmark, ideas about community/proximity policing did not really gain momentum until the early 1990s. Before that time, the police in many larger
towns and cities of Denmark did employ a number of designated "local officers", but such units often led an isolated life. Assigned to specific areas, their responsibilities were limited to local patrolling, contact with citizens, and, first and foremost, taking care of administrative duties: serving subpoenas, checking motor vehicle registrations[4], and other routine (but often time-consuming) tasks. Such units were not created solely for the benefit of the public, they served an important organizational purpose as well: with a retirement age of 63, and few possibilities for officers to leave the force before the age of 60, the Danish police force is in dire need of positions that are less strenuous than working shifts.

From about 1990, local policing was gradually replaced by the new concept of proximity policing[5] – small police units often stationed in local proximity police stations. In some police districts, this change was only superficial; the new units had the same duties, and were manned by the same officers as before, but in others, the officers were given new tasks in addition to the old ones. The most important of these was participation in the SSP-network (a local cooperation between schools, social authorities, and the police, focused on crime prevention among children and juveniles under the age of 18).

The new proximity police units were intended to reach out to local citizens with a focus on crime prevention, but in practice they had limited success. Studies of proximity policing in Denmark showed that these units were often alienated from the rest of the police, they found it difficult to define their role towards citizens (Holmberg, 1996), their work was often derided as "social work" and not "real police work" (Reiner, 1985), and a study undertaken by the National Police (Boddum, 1996) shows that proximity policing units around the country spent from 60 to 82 percent of their time on administrative duties – as opposed to an ideal maximum of 30 to 35 percent. In turn, these findings led the National Police to consider reorganizing this part of the police organization. Boddum (1996) proposed that the National Police should carry out a series of experiments with proximity policing, and this suggestion was eventually supported by the National Police commissioner (though at a more modest level than suggested by Boddum).

External forces played an important part in this development as well. The Danish police force is funded by the national government, traditionally through a sort of block grant. In 1995, however, a majority in the Danish parliament agreed on a deal that specified the funding for the police for the period 1995-1999, while at the same time demanding specific developments in police work – most notably a 10 percent increase in police patrol hours. In the year 2000 a second agreement was made for the years 2000-2003, which, among other things, requires an expansion of the personnel dedicated to proximity policing, and a further 10 percent increase in police patrol.

Space does not allow a more elaborate analysis of how the idea of proximity policing gained so prominent a position in political and police discourse, but one thing should be noted: popular demand has not been the driving force behind the development, as reported with some COP initiatives abroad (e.g. Skogan et al., 2000). The public interest in the six pilot projects has been very
modest; only in one municipality, where citizens faced the closing of their proximity policing station, did we experience a genuine citizen involvement.

The experiments
Ranked (1)-(6) from the least to the most comprehensive, the experimental designs look as follows:

1. This experiment covers a small town within a larger police district. Minor expansion of staff, no alterations in workload or responsibilities.

2. This experiment covers most of the district. Six previous proximity police stations, some with one, some with two officers assigned, will be expanded so that by 2002 all stations will have two officers assigned. No change in responsibilities.

3. This experiment covers a part of a larger district. A proximity police station has been established in a big mall (visited by eight million customers each year), responsible for patrolling the mall and the surrounding area. Personnel have been increased several times, but still, work in the mall (contrary to prior plans) takes up most of the manpower, partly due to extensive order problems in the mall.

4. This experiment covers two proximity police areas in a major city. One area, with 30,000 inhabitants, employs between 15 and 30 proximity officers, responsible for almost all policing from morning till midnight. The other area, inhabited by 90,000 citizens, was supposed to employ eight or nine officers, but after the first two years, only two officers remained, rendering the term proximity policing all but meaningless. Resource problems are prevalent, and, especially in the second area, proximity policing is not given priority by local police management.

5. This experiment covers a whole police district, consisting of one, geographically small, exclusively urbanized, municipality. The district is divided in three proximity policing areas, each assigned two proximity policing units: an investigating unit (partly manned by detectives) and a patrol unit.

6. This experiment is the most extensive, and the one that was most thoroughly planned, and this district has been named a possible model district for the future developments of proximity policing in Denmark by the National Police.

The police district covers five municipalities (several of which are rather affluent), with a total of 160,000 inhabitants, and a geographical size of 298 square kilometers. In 1999, the district employed a total of 160 uniformed officers and 42 detectives (both numbers including superior officers). Prior to the experiment, the district employed a modest, but permanent, number of designated proximity police officers stationed in substations in each municipality. The bulk of the uniformed officers were assigned the patrol division, the size of which fluctuated with department size.
As part of the experiment, this organizational setup, which is common in Denmark, was turned upside down in order to enlarge the proximity policing division as much as possible, and to make proximity policing the core activity of the force. The number of watch officers is now fixed (77 including superior officers), and the rest of the uniformed officers (apart from preexisting special units) are assigned to one of the six proximity policing units (one for each municipality, two for the largest town in the district). The existing proximity police stations in each municipality were closed, and instead three units were placed in an existing substation in the southern part of the district, the remaining three in the main station. This reorganization, which can be seen as a kind of centralization rather than decentralization, was carried out in order to promote cooperation between proximity policing areas, and to save the manpower necessary to keep the small substations open. In theory, the reorganization should provide the proximity police units with a number of officers varying from a low of 41 (including six superiors), to a high of 66, depending on the available manpower in the district. Manpower estimates, however, have been too optimistic, and the number of proximity police officers is often well below the expected minimum[6].

Even though executives from the National Police have regretted the limited scope of some of the experiments, they have not intervened in any substantial way, for instance by granting the experimental districts additional funding or personnel. This, in our view, has been the most important impediment to the experiments. Another problem has been that we, as external evaluators, were not consulted on experimental design, and plans for the evaluation were not in place until most of the projects were already launched[7].

**Research methodology**

As researchers, we had to realize that comparisons between the six districts would be of limited value. Furthermore, it was, in general, not possible to establish with any certainty the conditions in each police district before implementation. These difficulties led us to adopt an evaluation design using several different methods.

Observational studies of the daily work of proximity policing officers were conducted in all six districts, and officers were interviewed both formally and informally about their work and their views on proximity policing. In all, 136 eight-hour shifts were observed, and data about time spent on different assignments were collected. The majority of observations were conducted in the districts with the more extensive experiments. Observations were carried out partly by the author of this paper, partly by students and assistants with prior training in fieldwork.

In addition, a total of 76 semi-structured interviews were conducted – 27 with police officers, the rest with different liaisons to the police (local politicians, social workers, municipality employees, schoolteachers etc.).
In addition to the qualitative study, Balvig (1999, 2001) is conducting a citizen survey in three waves, the first two of which are now completed. In each wave, 2,000 people, 1,000 from one of the experimental districts, 1,000 from the rest of Denmark, are interviewed by telephone. A detailed description of these surveys is beyond the scope of this paper, since they only cover the most extensive experiment, but some of the results will be recounted below.

Common features of proximity policing – in theory
Whereas the organizational setup and scope of the six experiments vary very much, there are some common features as well. Each district has produced an initial report describing the intentions of its project, and a comparison between these reports provides an overview of the common features believed by the police to be at the core of proximity policing, Danish style.

- Proximity policing should be carried out by officers assigned to specific geographic areas. All six districts would maintain a patrol division responsible for motorized patrol and handling emergencies and urgent calls to the police. The ratio of proximity police officers to patrol officers differed, but the patrol division was larger than the proximity police division in all six districts. In this regard, the Danish version of proximity policing differs from many other countries. In parts of Sweden – as in many departments in the USA dedicated to community policing (e.g. Skogan et al., 2000; Skolnick and Bailey, 1986) – proximity police officers are also responsible for handling the call load (Lindström et al., 2001), but in Denmark calls are most often handled by the patrol division – just as is the case in The Netherlands (van der Vijver, 1999)[8].

- Proximity police officers should decide their own hours, in accordance with the present needs of their area.

- An important part of the work of proximity police officers should be to patrol their local areas, in order to induce local citizens with a feeling of security and to create and maintain ties with local communities. Foot patrol and bicycle patrol should be given preference, a notion supported by international research (Pate, 1986; Trojanowicz, 1986).

- Proximity police officers should be responsible for handling administrative cases regarding local citizens. Handling such cases should, ideally, bring the proximity police into close contact with the citizens in their area.

- Proximity police officers were given responsibility for the handling of “everyday crimes” (vandalism, theft, and burglaries) in their areas. In districts where the proximity police employ detectives as well, all investigation of these crimes is the responsibility of the proximity police[9].

- The proximity police should be responsible for maintaining the cooperation between schools, social authorities and the police in the SSP organization. This organization, focused on crime prevention among juveniles, predates the proximity policing experiments.

- The proximity police are supposed to engage in problem oriented policing.
Proximity policing in Denmark – in practice

In Denmark, geographical assignment was implemented in all districts, but in several, the intended number of officers assigned to a certain area was never reached. The number of citizens per officer differed very much, with a low of 1,400 citizens per proximity policing officer and a high of 45,000 citizens per officer. Some of the larger proximity policing areas were not geographically subdivided, instead officers were given different functional duties.

In most districts, officers were given responsibility for planning their own schedule, but many officers had a tendency to adjust their schedule as much to their individual needs as to the needs of their area, so most proximity police work was carried out in the daytime and early evening. In many areas, supervision was limited, to the point of being non-existent. Officers had often been assigned to the same area for several years and did not welcome interference from supervisors.

The actual time officers spent on local patrol differed very much. In the model district, our estimates showed that patrolling took up only around 5 percent of total working hours, in another it amounted to one third of the officers’ time. Since both of the recent parliamentary agreements on the police demand increases in patrol, a great emphasis is put on measuring the amount of time officers spend patrolling. What is actually measured, though, is not patrol hours *per se* but the overall time officers spend outside the police station – what is called outside time. Outside time, however, is not a very reliable measure of either patrol or police availability to the public, since much of this time was spent on the administrative caseload, a task not necessarily connected with general visibility.

The administrative caseload is a spillover from the local district police, and officers in general regarded it as a burden. Especially cases with fixed – and often short – time limits (such as subpoenas and summonses) require the police to put other work aside. In the (frequent) periods with shortage of personnel, some proximity policing units could only barely manage their caseload, resulting in proactive and problem-oriented policing being put on hold.

The parliamentary agreements on the police budget mentioned above also stipulate that a substantial part of everyday crimes should be investigated by the proximity police. In this respect, the experiments have had limited success. Proximity policing may mean that the officers (and in some districts, detectives working in the proximity police) get more and better information about their area, but the processing and utilization of this information is not very well organized. None of the projects have had any positive effect with regard to clearing rates, as has been reported from Sweden (Lindström et al., 2001), but a preventive effect might be demonstrated, as will be discussed below.

Proximity police officers held very diverging views on the effectiveness of the SSP organization. Some regarded participation as very worthwhile; others found that there was too much talk and too little action.

Whereas all six districts mention problem-oriented policing as a crucial part of the work of the proximity police, its actual implementation was limited. In
the initial reports providing the foundation for the experiments, POP is not defined in any clear way\[11\]. When confronted with persistent crime problems, the Danish police often employ a strategy of goal-directed policing, mainly consisting of intensified patrol and investigation. Many officers confused the two strategies, and found the differences hard to define. Officers often failed to recognize the difference between symptoms and underlying problems, and thus failed to perform a thorough analysis. They also often failed to engage other citizens or professionals in solving the problems. Finally, evaluating the effects of a particular effort posed difficulties.

**Goals of proximity policing – does it work?**

Three out of six districts (among them the ones with the most extensive projects) adopted a set of five goals for the experiments to accomplish:

1. Citizens should feel more secure where they live, as a result of the new way of policing.
2. Citizens and liaisons to the police should experience a closer connection to the proximity police.
3. Ethnic minorities should experience a greater empathy and understanding from the proximity police.
4. The number of “everyday crimes” should be reduced.
5. Officer satisfaction in the proximity police should improve, as should other divisions’ appreciation of the proximity police.

Several of these goals are rather ambitious, and, regarding some of them, the degree of success is difficult to measure.

**Subjective security**

The impact on citizens’ level of subjective security can only be gauged in the model district where the surveys were carried out. The first two waves of the survey have yielded consistent results with regard to several questions. First of all, citizens’ perceived level of security was significantly lower in the model district than in Denmark as a whole (Balvig, 2001, p. 178). Since the first survey was not completed until after project implementation, we cannot be sure that the low level of subjective security in the model district did not predate project implementation. However, according to Balvig (1999), the most probable explanation for the difference is that it is related to a rather extensive “marketing” of the proximity policing experiment\[12\], and a lot of public debate regarding the closing of the existing proximity policing stations. The public came to expect a level of police service that was impossible to deliver. The level of subjective security has not improved during the first two years of the experiment; furthermore, citizens perceive the visibility and availability of the police in the local areas to have declined in the period 1998-2000.
Connections between citizens, liaisons and the police

With regard to citizens’ and liaisons’ connectedness to the police, neither the survey results nor the observational data indicate that citizens have established closer ties to the proximity police than before[13]. On the other hand, there is little doubt that relations between proximity police and their liaisons (municipal authorities, local politicians, social workers and other professionals, and a limited number of active citizens) have improved with the advent of proximity policing. Almost all liaisons praised the fact that the proximity police officers now have “a name and a face” – a personal relationship was established. They also emphasized the emergence of an informal network, supplementing (and sometimes almost replacing) the preexisting formal network between the police and other authorities. Of the 49 liaisons interviewed, only one expressed serious reservations regarding the proximity police, whereas a few complained about their local officer – while praising the overall concept.

However, in the majority of districts, the good relations between liaisons and the proximity police often dated back several years. Only in the model district did interviewees report a clear, positive change before and after project implementation. Here, according to the liaisons, the police have become more professional in the sense that they take a broader view of their work, they engage more wholeheartedly in preventive work, and their order of priorities have changed. One liaison says:

> Whereas the “old” proximity officers took pride in a visible presence with regard to the general population, it is my experience that the new proximity police have the courage to choose their time and place. When people expect to see you in the mall on a Friday afternoon, it takes some courage to say: “Well, but I’m not really needed there at that time. I might be more useful at 3 a.m., even though I might not be observed by very many people at that time.” I think the new officers display more of that kind of attitude.

This statement reflects not only the general view of most of the interviewees (from this district, that is) but also the actual way officers prioritized. The proximity police did spend a lot of their time cooperating with other authorities, and general patrol/visibility was among the first tasks they gave up on when time was scarce. To the officers, cooperation with other authorities/parties offered the possibility of immediate results of their efforts, albeit often solely in the form of acknowledgement from their liaisons. In fact, more than one liaison in the model district described their satisfaction with the new level of cooperation even though they could point out no specific results – the cooperation was, in itself, experienced as a success. Part of the explanation may be that, prior to the experiment, these (often municipal) liaisons have felt both isolated and powerless when facing problems with crime and disorder, and so were much encouraged by the new possibilities of cooperation. This finding gives us reason for caution as well: whereas the establishing closer cooperation may in the short term be considered an accomplishment in itself, in the long run it must be the results of such cooperation that counts.

The more personal kind of policing manifests itself in other ways too. When prompted about possible negative effects of the experiment, another liaison said:
I can give you an example of something that is at once good and bad. There had been some problems downtown, and when the police took action, the whole thing escalated. The reason was that the problems were not handled by our own proximity officers, but by personnel from other places. This may be a bad development – we become so dependent on the cooperation with specific officers that the young people react with hostility when confronted by officers they don’t know personally. But this also demonstrates that [the new way of policing] works, doesn’t it?

Again this view has been corroborated by other liaisons and proximity police officers, from several districts: a personal acquaintance between police and juveniles will in some instances calm things down that otherwise might have escalated.

The term “proximity police” seems apt insofar as these officers have established a closer connection to different people in their area. Thus, the second goal of the experiments has been at least partly achieved.

The relations to ethnic minorities
The third goal was that the proximity police establish better ties to ethnic minorities. This is a very difficult topic to evaluate, for two reasons. The first is that the citizen surveys were conducted in Danish only, thus barring some citizens with other ethnic backgrounds from participating. The second is that the qualitative methods have not yielded any representative data on this subject. Thus, we must limit ourselves to some general observations.

The first is that, according to both police officers and their liaisons, police rapport with some of the juveniles with a minority background has improved, in turn making police work with these groups less confrontational, as illustrated by the quotation above. The second observation is that some individual officers have embarked upon cooperating with different ethnic groups on an array of projects. The people involved in this kind of cooperation have uniformly expressed their satisfaction with the officers (but again, they have praised the individual officers and not the proximity police in general). Finally, it should be noted that this criterion for success is a very difficult one to evaluate, especially for the police themselves.

Reduction in the level of “everyday crime”
With regard to the crime level, we neither expected nor found any discernable influence from the experiments in most districts, since no major changes were implemented. In the model district, however, the number of reported burglaries has declined by 22 percent, from 1998 to 2000, while Denmark as a whole experienced a 5 percent increase. Furthermore, the surveys indicate that citizens perceived the number of problems in their local area as significantly reduced in this period, whereas citizens in the rest of the country experienced a growing number of problems (Balvig, 2001, p. 181)[14]. Due to the short evaluation period, these findings should be interpreted with caution.

Job satisfaction
In the absence of representative data from job satisfaction surveys[15], our conclusions on this matter can only be tentative, but our observations and
interviews suggest that job satisfaction has, in general, not increased. There are four major reasons for this.

(1) **Lack of resources.** This observation pertains primarily to the most extensive projects. Here, many officers found that their expectations about new kinds of assignments and ways of work were not fulfilled. One unanticipated result of the reorganization carried out in the most comprehensive projects has been that the proximity police units become seriously understaffed in periods of low manpower, thus leaving no room for proactive or problem oriented work. In addition, it seems inevitable that a well-functioning proximity police unit will over time expand its field of activity, thus making it even more difficult to make ends meet.

(2) **The administrative workload.** As mentioned above, it was not uncommon that such duties took up all available time, keeping the officers from doing other work.

(3) **Unrealistic expectations.** Interviews with 12 officers conducted before project implementation revealed a general uncertainty as to the actual work of proximity police officers. Many officers harbored unrealistic ideas about their future autonomy, and thus were disappointed when they found that they could not work solely based on their own initiative. In contrast, others complained about lack of supervision and leadership. In general, most projects suffered from an initial absence of clear objectives.

(4) **Lack of recognition and acceptance from other officers.** As has been reported with other COP projects (e.g. Lord, 1996; Sadd and Grinc, 1996), Danish proximity officers often complained about lack of recognition from their colleagues, and of being accused of not doing a proper job. Positions here were not sought after, a fact that created even more distance to the rest of the organization.

Whereas some officers praised their conditions as proximity police officers, we found that, especially for officers working in the more extensive projects, job satisfaction did not improve very much. Organizational resistance and the general low esteem of proximity police work have a major influence on the development of proximity policing.

**The personalization of policing – possibilities and pitfalls**

The Danish projects on proximity policing do not all deserve the label “experiment”, and even the ones that do have had limited overall success. In one respect, however, proximity policing (experiments or not) seems genuinely successful. The outstanding feature of the Danish version of proximity policing is the personalization of policing. Positive consequences of the personalization of policing include:

- Enhanced contact between the police and other professionals, enabling a swift reaction to problems, and enhancing the exchange of information between agencies.
• A more personal relationship between the police and (some of) the policed citizens. There are several examples that such a relationship helped the police reduce or avoid a hostile confrontation.

• Proximity policing makes room for officers with personal drive and new ideas. Many officers have developed special interests and projects to which they devote considerable time and energy. One, for instance, helped in establishing a meeting place for immigrants of Arabic origin; another had a weekly “consultation time” in two local schools and took a keen interest in the problems brought to him by pupils; a third was involved in a shelter for homeless people. In the view of these and other officers, this kind of work is at the core of the proximity policing idea, and they devote a lot of energy here.

• An improved foundation for the exercise of police discretion. In Denmark, patrol officers have been shown to use their rather wide discretionary freedom in a way that relies heavily on what could be termed “social profiling”. Citizens fitting the police stereotype of “typical perpetrator” – that is, known or suspected criminals – were subject to extensive control and were in some instances denied the leniency granted other citizens (Holmberg, 2000, 2001). Whereas there is no doubt that proximity police officers exercise an even greater discretionary freedom than do their colleagues from the patrol division, their decisions are not in the same way based on stereotypical signs of social status and affiliation, but rather on a personal knowledge. Furthermore, it is our impression that proximity police officers in general take a more lenient and less legalistic stance towards citizens breaking the law[16].

Negative consequences of the personalization of policing include:

• Confusion of roles in the cooperation between police and professionals. For instance, in one case involving minors suspected of extensive vandalism, the social worker (whose function in such cases is to assist the suspect(s) during police interrogation) actually threatened to withhold his assistance from one of the suspects, unless the young man confessed to the charges (which he did). Thus, the closer ties between authorities may in some cases endanger the rights of suspects.

• The individualization of police work makes it very difficult for supervisors to maintain an overview of the actual work carried out by officers.

• Such individual projects furthermore make it difficult to uphold a set of shared priorities within a proximity policing unit. Each officer finds his/her own specialization the most important, but individual projects frequently coincide with each other, or must be put on hold due to the general lack of personnel in the proximity police, thus leading to frustration among the dedicated officers. In general, proximity policing means an increased need for supervision and common perspectives, while at the same time supervisors’ possibilities of maintaining a comprehensive overview are impeded.
The personalized police work makes it very difficult for other officers to take over, when a colleague leaves the unit. Personal ties take time to create, and they are hard to pass on to others. Thus, once well established in an area, the individual officer is hard to replace.

Personalized policing also means personalized law enforcement. Whereas most officers seem to exercise their discretion with discretion, there is a real risk of abuse of power. In addition, in districts where each proximity policing area is served by a single officer, we have found major differences in the general level of enforcement. Some officers found the goal of establishing ties and providing service to local citizens incompatible with general enforcement of the law, others found it important to uphold their role as first and foremost police. Such differences coincide with an ideal of equal justice for all (see also Bayley, 1986; Wycoff, 1986).

**Conclusion**

The Danish version of community oriented policing, called proximity policing, differs from the general trend in COP initiatives in several ways.

First and foremost, a division is maintained between proximity policing officers and other police departments. Given the necessary manpower, this division provides a solution to one important problem reported with many COP and POP projects in the Western world: the difficulty of carrying out problem oriented work while at the same time managing the call load. A negative effect of this division, however, is that it isolates the proximity police and gives rise to accusations of ineffectiveness and lack of a proper police perspective.

Second, officers in general maintain an affiliation to a limited geographical area for several years, a factor that seems important for their success in establishing closer and more personal ties to local liaisons and – albeit to a lesser degree – to local citizens. This personalization of policing offers a number of advantages, including:

- an improved cooperation with other local professionals;
- the possibility of creating personal ties also to parts of the citizenry that hold a negative attitude towards the police, and in turn preventing confrontations from escalating;
- a more informed exercise of police discretion, based on individual knowledge.

Disadvantages include:

- an individualization of police work, to the point where certain tasks can only be carried out by the officer(s) who initiated them;
- problems with priorities – each officer finds his or her individual tasks the most important;
- difficulties in management oversight – only the individual officers know what work is actually done;
- possible abuse of power and unequal law enforcement.
In our view, one of the most important problems for the future of proximity policing is the documentation of results. Whereas traditional policing may not in fact prevent crime (Bayley, 1994), at least it yields tangible “results” in the form of cleared crimes and apprehended perpetrators; such “results” are not so common in the proximity police. It is far more difficult to document a crime prevented than a crime cleared. These difficulties put the proximity police in a precarious position, not only in relation to the rest of the police force, but also in relation to the general public.

Our research so far suggests that the achievements of proximity policing are of a somewhat contradictory nature. Liaisons to the police in all the experimental districts praise the proximity police for their involvement in preventive work, whereas the rest of the police criticize exactly this kind of work as being “social work” rather than “police work”.

Proximity policing in the model district seems to have had a positive impact on the level of burglaries and the local problems perceived by citizens, but at the same time, citizens in this district were more fearful of crime and less satisfied with the police than were citizens in the rest of Denmark. The results are tentative, but if the perceived improvement in the level of local problems can be attributed to proximity policing, the police have yet to receive their part of the glory. The improved quality of life has not improved citizens’ subjective security or their view of police service.

Is proximity policing worthwhile? The present study does not provide any clear answer to this question – it depends on the goals one wishes to accomplish. So far, the proximity police in Denmark have not accomplished all the intended goals, and they probably never will; different people want different things from the (proximity) police, and some of these wishes are indeed contradictory. Thus, an appraisal of proximity policing does to a certain extent depend on one’s own point of departure. As one police informant, resigned to the fact that he would never be able to prove the results of his efforts, put it: “Proximity policing is a question of belief”.

Notes
1. Our translation.
2. The evaluation has been made possible through a research grant from the Danish National police.
4. In Denmark, possession of a motor vehicle is rather expensive, and the registration system is complex. If a vehicle owner does not pay his/her insurance or annual registration fee, or fails to present the vehicle for inspection every second year, it is the duty of the police to seize the license plates. This kind of work (almost always undertaken by the proximity police) is very time-consuming, since it involves tracking down the vehicle.
5. In a few pioneer districts, this transition took place before 1990.
6. In the fall of 2001, recurrent manpower problems have forced the district to reorganize. This reorganization is not completed at the time of writing, but a decision has been made to employ a fixed number of proximity officers instead of a varying one.
7. The Danish police force has, in general, been very reluctant to grant outside researchers access to the organization. The study at hand is the first external evaluation of police work in Denmark that has been funded by the national police.

8. In one Danish district, reports about burglaries (with no suspect present) are taken by the investigation team from the proximity police unit.

9. Investigation conducted by the proximity police is one of the demands stipulated in the parliamentary agreements on the police.

10. Here, the term patrolling refers to visible, uniformed patrol without any specific purpose other than being visible and accessible in the area. Time spent on visible police activity exceeds patrol time, since officers may be in the area with specific purposes. In no districts, however, does the amount of time spent on activities visible to the general public exceed 50 percent of officer time, and in several, the percentage is significantly lower. In general, our observations suggest that officers spend a significantly lower part of their time outside the police station than official records indicate.

11. Built into the outlines of the proposed next phase of proximity policing in Denmark is an adapted version of the SARA model proposed by Eck & Spelman (1987).

12. Public meetings about the project were held in all the district’s municipalities, and there was extensive coverage (most of it of a very critical nature) in the local media.

13. Whereas citizens seem more inclined to report crimes to the police, citizens’ satisfaction with local police service and their perception of police availability and visibility have declined (Balvig 2001).

14. Still, citizens in the model district experience a higher level of local problems than do citizens in Denmark as a whole.

15. Only in one district was such a survey conducted at the time of writing, and this survey did not indicate any major improvements. Surveys in other districts will be conducted at a later stage.

16. This finding is in accordance with findings in the USA (Mastrofski et al., 1995).

References


Community-oriented policing in Germany
Training and education

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Keywords Police, Strategy, Germany

Abstract Presents data from two surveys and arguments in favour of a restructuring of the police service, in general, and police training in particular. Contends that to keep up with an ever-changing world, the police has to become more versatile itself, without losing sight of its core functions: protection and security provision. These objectives can only be achieved by a police force that cooperates intensively with the people, i.e. relies on a community-oriented approach to policing, and one whose members have been provided throughout their training with problem-solving skills and techniques and have developed a high degree of self-motivation. Suggests that in the current social and economic climate there is an urgent need for such reforms, best achieved through international cooperation.

In a world of rapid social change no important actor can escape the need for reform, least of all institutions like the police which are in constant interaction with society. It therefore seems logical that any reform should take the direction of opening the police towards the community and enable it to react more flexibly to future change.

Community policing is a relatively young strategy that is used to tackle the manifold new problems that today’s police forces are faced with. To consider the validity of this new approach to policing it is important at first to assess the evolution of postmodern society, the changing nature of crime in this society and to what extent current police structures are limited in their reaction to this crime. It is then possible to evaluate consequences for police management structures and develop a new model for police training and even police philosophy. The aim of this essay is to show the relevance of the idea of community policing and its implications for the training of police officers.

The police
Community oriented policing and community oriented (decentralized) government services seem to be a promising strategy to address the rapidly shifting needs of contemporary societies where traditional forms of police work increasingly fail to live up to their task. This is true not only for Germany, but for all democratic countries. Over the last few years a radical reappraisal of policing philosophy and the role of the police has therefore taken place in these countries. Drives for greater efficiency, ideas like new public management and changes in workplace philosophy forced the police to revise the old-fashioned militaristic approach to policing. A community-oriented strategy broadens the definition of the police as an agency and of its functions. This approach includes order
maintenance, conflict resolution, problem solving and provision of services as well as other activities. The police does not, indeed cannot effectively control crime or criminal structures and situations. Prevention through repression is rather ineffective. As a result, forces have begun to devise plans to evaluate police performance through local crime surveys and through police activity surveys with the view of improving quality of policing at local level. Decentralized budgeting and new workplace philosophies in public administration turned the spotlight onto two of the most severe problems the police has: money and members.

Money is never enough, and members (i.e. police officers) are getting more and more frustrated, frequently experience harassment by their peers and/or superiors and in consequence retire early. However, it is the employees that are at the core of any service-based institution: they produce, perform and communicate with customers, and hence can make or break a “company’s” image. Furthermore, members and money are inextricably intertwined: an institution which uses about 70 percent of its budget for salaries and employs public servants, i.e. people who cannot be fired except in very rare cases, is inflexible and unable to survive under the pressures of a modern economy. This is the current situation in Germany as well as in virtually all other European countries.

Police officers frequently experience dissatisfaction with their work, which they perceive as not very effective or efficient, highly wasteful and bureaucratic (Loveday, 1999). This feeling is often shared by politicians, resulting in mistrust and a steady call for more and closer regulation of the police. The reason for this is not so much fear of abuse of police powers as lack of knowledge about police activities. By contrast, the general public actually has a much better opinion of the police than the police itself assumes.

In Germany, the police regularly comes out on top of public rankings. Thus a survey conducted by EMNID and the magazine Der Spiegel in late 1997 found that more than 50 percent of respondents regarded the police (rather than schools, politicians, the church or the family) as bearer of values (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1](image-url)
Surveys about this topic usually reveal a high degree of satisfaction with the police service. Another example of this is the Shell Report (Germany) from 1997, which examined young people’s attitudes towards authorities (see Figure 2). The police came in joint fourth out of 11, a ranking that places it ahead of political parties and the church, and behind only those institutions that are traditionally popular with young people, such as environmental, human rights and other pressure groups.

Police officers themselves, however, have a very different self-conception: they presume that the public distrusts the police and depreciates their performance on the job. Such an evaluation shows an obvious lack of self-confidence among rank-and-file officers. This can lead to a situation where the policemen assume a defensive attitude, making it impossible for them to react in a proactive, positive and future-oriented way. Only a self-confident police officer is able to deal with criticism and communicate frankly with people, without hiding information from them (in so far as that information could include or engender criticism).

Society
Police and society are interdependent. Developments in the area of one actor cannot but reflect on the other. In Germany the current social situation is problematic, particularly in the east, where many people are grappling with frustrated hopes that reunification ten years ago evoked but could not fulfil. Instead of flourishing industries there is high unemployment, and social stability seems to have vanished alongside socialism. This difficult situation inevitably needs to be addressed by the police, too. In order to provide security it has to find ways of talking to people and alleviate tensions. Yet Germany is not the only country where recent years brought an increase in social turmoil and a corresponding rising need to adopt effective security measures.

Postmodern society and its institutions are organized along the principles of fear, risk assessment and the provision of security. Security in modern society

![Figure 2.](image1.png)

**Figure 2.**
Trust in organizations by juveniles: Shell Study 1997 (Germany)
is multi-faceted and includes – as Richard Ericsson pointed out – security of territory (e.g. safe streets, secure premises), of the environment (e.g. healthy natural environment, safe products), of living standards (e.g. social security, private insurance) and of identities (e.g. protection of national and ethnic identities in multi-cultural societies). This focus on security in return creates fear and the need for protection. Postmodern institutions are driven by the production and distribution of knowledge regarding risk assessment and security provision. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that they constitute a “risk society” (Beck, 1992).

This is true for most West European societies and it will most likely become true within the next few years for East European societies also, since the “free market” (i.e. capitalism) is rapidly dismantling and replacing the planned economy (i.e. socialism) – resulting in the dissolution of traditional social bonds and less communication between people. Theft, fraud and other crimes are becoming widespread, a result of which could be a call for the restitution of a powerful state and police. This could pose a great danger to these new democracies: if police are not able to cope with rising crime, then politicians could blame the police for their failure to carry out their duties and the old system and its supporters might try to take advantage of the situation by attempting a counter-revolution.

The “Make believe crime war” is also taking place in Western countries, despite the fact that it lacks any empirical support. But it can be used to focus public attention on a “problem” that fits well into moral beliefs and can save politicians the trouble of dealing with other problems and having to give explanations to the public (e.g. regarding unemployment, domestic violence, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency or political scandals like the Dutroux-case in Belgium or the secret account affair surrounding former German Chancellor Kohl). Furthermore, a recent empirical study in the USA has shown that criminal justice legislation is related more to economic conditions rather than to the actual crime rate (Fowles and Merva, 1996). Economic conditions, and more exactly the level of poverty in turn have a significant positive relationship with all crime categories, and changes in the unemployment rate are reflected in the number of murders, robberies, burglaries, and larceny/thefts (Fowles and Merra, 1996). In studies conducted in Germany, it has, however, proven difficult to establish a direct causal relationship between unemployment and crime since there are a lot of additional factors (e.g. lack of future perspectives, availability of social security) to be considered. Nevertheless, the current state of research suggests that unemployment is an important criminogenic factor.

It is predictable that in the near future policing will face an increase in protests by special interest groups, with a corresponding rise in civil disobedience and violence. Hate groups will proliferate in coming decades. The unsolved problems of unemployment, poverty and homelessness will contribute to social turmoil, which in turn leads to a rising number of minority-related crimes in both West and East European states. Crime and especially fear of crime were the most important issue during the 1990s in Germany, the 1980s by contrast were quite
calm in this respect. The demand for help from or intervention by the police has risen since the 1990s and is still rising. The upward trend in police-registered criminal offences is only partly responsible for this, mostly increasing demand for police services is due to the decreasing readiness and/or capability of citizens to settle conflicts by means of peaceful communication. Victims are less equipped or capable of helping themselves. More and more frequently official authorities are called in to clear and settle conflicts. The rise in registered offences can be explained by this phenomenon.

Consequences for police management

The key words for police management are flexibility, shared power, autonomous teams and regional responsibility. Police officers of the future will be active problem-solving participants, particularly when given the necessary discretion, encouragement and opportunities by their supervisors. Small work units, free-flow information, cooperation with private security institutions or even other private enterprises to run “Police Shops” (together, e.g. with book stores, supermarkets or gas stations) are some other key words that are currently challenging the former militaristic, bureaucratic structure of police forces and the old conventional thinking of police representatives. Every organization or institute, private or public, sooner or later experiences the need to review its organization and procedures and to check its mission and objectives against the daily realities and socio-economic changes of the society it is supposed to serve. The need to introduce or intensify skills in the police officers’ training is conditioned by a number of external and internal factors. These factors have a direct and continuous influence on the professionalism of police activities and training programs, the effectiveness and the efficiency of the agency.

But what do “efficiency”, “effectiveness” and “professionalism” for the police really mean? The patrolman, the lowest man in the hierarchy – and usually the least well trained and educated – is in a key position for exercising the greatest amount of discretion on criminal or possibly criminal activities. She or he is also the most active and most visible partner in interaction with the public and in communication policing. He has “wide discretionary power concerning if, when, why, and how to intervene in private affairs” (Manning, 1995). In order to be able to use these powers effectively and to the advantage of the community the professionalism of police training has to be improved. To view the social reaction against crime as a police monopoly is obviously untrue, as Jock Young pointed out more than ten years ago. Public opinion and informal social control play the central role, not only in defining what is crime, but also in maintaining social order (Young, 1987). Yet by providing a modern and professional service for the prevention and control of crime the police can fulfil its role as a major actor in the field of public security. When creating a new curriculum for a modern police training the following external factors will have to be taken into account:
the increase of the police product in volume, gravity and complexity, aggravated by the expanding international dimension requiring new resources, connections and information exchange;

- the development of new technologies;
- a greater mobility and the abolition of borders clearing the way to larger markets with easier escape routes for criminal organizations and making effective communication systems available to them;
- the economic and political situation with social and political unrest, economic crunch, massive unemployment, juvenile crime and further migration waves;
- the budget restrictions imposed by the government or local authorities cutting down on additional human and material resources.

Police training has to tackle these factors in order to provide police students with first hand information and academic knowledge on the theoretical and practical background of these very same developments.

**Consequences for police philosophy**

Community crime prevention and community policing are main reforms in crime prevention strategies, developed over the last few years (Skogan et al., 1995; Greene and Mastrofsky, 1988; Sadd and Grinc, 1996). Both have implications for police management and the philosophy of policing. While the reform itself is targeted at crime and public order, emphasizes police-community relations and local crime analysis and environmental analysis, the background philosophy is based on a distinct set of values within the police force and the understanding that crime prevention is a task for all members of a community.

Community policing is a comprehensive approach suggesting a multi-causal view of crime and a multidimensional approach to crime prevention. Problem oriented policing, team policing, and finally community policing are terms reflecting the change in policing philosophy over the last few years. Although this change might be too slow from an outsider’s point of view it is a tremendous challenge for the internal system of the police, because the structure and form of the organization and its leadership have to be changed. This includes attitudinal, organizational, and sub-cultural changes. The keywords are participation, decentralization and motivation in working together with the community to solve problems of crime and related social ills.

The policeman’s or policewoman’s view of his or her role and their occupational culture are very influential in determining the nature of policing. As Manning points out, the basic source of police trouble is the inability of the police to define a mandate that will minimize the consistent nature of their self-expectations and the expectations of those they serve (Manning, 1995, p. 120).

The development into a more citizen-responsive force and oriented to a closer relationship with the community has to be real rather than superficial.
and therefore requires a significant change in philosophy, a reordering of priorities and potentially massive restructuring of police organizations.

There is a need for greater coordination of police and other agencies within the criminal-justice system in order to increase the benefits for the client and break down the isolation of the police. An organizational change within the police could lead to the creation of the post of “Special Generalist”, who would be responsible for all general problems brought to the attention of the police: a coordinator of family health, a source of records and information (for the client, not for the state), a family counselor. This “would begin to bridge the chasm between the police and many hostile segments within the public, a process that could be facilitated by the creation of a community-relations division within police departments” (Manning, 1995, p. 123). By re-organizing the police force into a community-oriented, decentralized and independent organization with participatory management we can get both satisfied customers and satisfied employees.

Police must engage in community-based processes related to the production and maintenance of local human and social capital. The means by which these goals are to be achieved are through the development of strong relationships with institutions and individuals in the community.

The one and only way to deal with the public concerns is to develop programs tailored to individual areas. In other words, we must not assume that each community has the same problems or that each community should respond similarly to certain problems. An open system of policing will find tailored solutions for a small world (neighborhood) within an institution which acts and behaves like a learning institution.

There have been several attempts to define community policing (Dölling and Feltes, 1993; Trojanowicz, 1995; Skogan, 1995), but it is best described as a family of reforms (Rosenbaum, 1994). In defining necessities for police training it seems to be more fruitful to focus on important characteristics of community policing rather than to attempt a strict definition. The following points are vital for any definition of a community-based approach to police training:

- To solve problems where they appear = local approach.
- To solve problems by creative means and where necessary with unconventional measures = creative approach.
- To solve problems by analyzing the structural causes and not sticking to individual explanations. A view of all underlying factors and available means of creating safety, not just those related to traditional police work = structural approach; problem oriented policing.
- To look at problems from a more general point of view and not only using a crime-fighting and repressive approach. Safety orientation means that creating a safe community is considered more important than mere control of crimes or compliance to norms = multi-factor approach.
- To solve problems together with others; police must cooperate with all individuals, institutions and groups in a community (private security
Policing in Germany

services included); police should deny responsibilities where others are more competent or have better resources for solving a given problem. A broad strategic co-operation with other authorities, communities and people is needed = division of labor approach.

- To see police as a part of the community (pars pro toto) = cooperative approach.
- The police takes the initiative and is not captured by sheer reactive measures after crimes have been committed or calls for service have been received = proactive approach.
- To decentralize police organization = decentralized approach.
- To-be-named-characteristics... = work-in-progress approach.

Consequences for police training

Highly educated officers and better trained staff do not per se guarantee better cooperation and communication, but training and education is a sine qua non factor on the way to improving the quality of police work (Dennis, 1995). As highly educated police officers could become frustrated in their jobs, grow cynical and look for formal or informal ways out of an unsatisfactory situation, changes must occur not only in the recruitment, selection and training programs, but in the organizational environment as well (Goldstein, 1997). Otherwise new staff will have little chance of surviving in the organization. The pressures for conformity are so strong that new officers are either forced into the police subculture, with the values and orientation of the larger group replacing their own, or their life can be made so unpleasant they may even decide to resign (Sewell, 1985).

Police today are more highly trained than ever before, and the quality of the training has probably never been higher. Though the positive relationship between training and law enforcement seems to be evident, this effect has not been studied in depth. The benefits of specialist training for institutions are generally more assumed rather than empirically demonstrated and often serve as an important legitimating factor for headquarters. Empirical studies have focused on officers’ attitudes rather than actual behavior (Mastrofsky, 1990).

A recent study by Mastrofsky and Ritti showed that the impact of training depends on organization-level considerations (Mastrofsky and Ritti, 1996). Training has a significant positive effect in agencies that provide a supportive environment, but fails to have an effect in agencies that are otherwise indifferent or hostile to the purposes the officers are trained for.

The effect of the training therefore depends on the opportunities with which the institution affords the individual to apply it, on superiors who encourage the trainee and his intention to pursue further studies, and on its relevance to the prospects for career advancement (Mastrofsky and Ritti, 1996, pp. 296, 304).

The philosophy “Go out there and don’t get into trouble” is not a good one to encourage well trained and educated police officers. Instead, superiors
themselves should “live” what they expect from their staff and show how they value intended initiatives.

As the complexity of workload is not only increasing, but also changing with time, police training must constantly evolve. Contents and targets have to be changed and adapted to new circumstances and advantages. Police agencies have to deal not only with a workload that is ever-increasing in volume and complexity, but also with budgetary restrictions imposed by the authorities. As a result, senior police staff members at different levels need to master modern management skills and techniques to run their organization efficiently.

We have to realize that police agencies are big organizations, sometimes the size of large companies. They have to manage thousands of employees, public finances and an increasing range of sophisticated equipment, with high technology being introduced at an increasing pace. There is an urgent need for police managers who master the abilities and skills required to ensure an effective functioning of the agency and an efficient use of the limited resources. As management is a never ending process, so is the training which has to be regularly up-dated and completed by refresher courses. They are a unique instrument to complement the basic training and adapt to specific local needs for further education. Contents and structures of the training depend very much on the career and career profiles provided by the agency.

There are essentially two different career profiles and two different ways of structuring a police career:

(1) The bottom-up career, in which case the different (usually three) levels of training are accumulated and necessary for promotion; you can become a senior police officer only by starting from the lowest rung of the career ladder.

The “advantage” of this system is that police officers who have to work their way through the ranks are more easy to lead, identify more with the institution, are more adjusted to the formal and informal rules of the police, more adapted to the old conception of police work as the execution of state authority and more dependent on orders and instructions by their superiors.

The disadvantage of this system is that an insider training is provided, which is not controlled by external supervisors and not evaluated by independent institutions. “Success” is an implicit component of this system, since due to their civil servant status unsuccessful police officers can only be fired within the first stage of their training. Another disadvantage is that the system provides no incentive for police officers to look into other training institutions or into other methods of thinking. In other words, officers are not really trained to act independently and to take decisions by themselves, although they have to do exactly that in their everyday work.

(2) A career with (at least the possibility of) direct entry at a higher level. The training is provided not only by police institutions, but by independent institutions such as universities etc., or in joint-venture
activities between private and state, police and non-police institutions. The advantages of this system are that it educates well trained, well motivated, independent and reliable police officers who are able to cope with new situations and challenges and who are eager to learn more and to take their career into their own hands.

Main objectives of police training
Police training should provide students with:

- information on the practice of modern management, modern police structures and community oriented police activities;
- enough insight and practical understanding of the techniques and tools available to the police;
- the ability to identify the possible benefits and opportunities of new techniques and to apply these in the accomplishment of their daily tasks; and
- the possibility to manage decisions in a structured way, to run effective and efficient operations and to serve the public in the best way possible.

In order to achieve its goals, police training has to operate along the following basic principles:

- Topics and contents must be adapted to the practical daily police work.
- A consciousness of the importance and the value of the individual’s contribution to overall reliability of the management process of the agency and the its product is necessary.
- The attitude and behavior of each individual agent is crucial for the image of the whole agency. One negative incident can annihilate all positive experiences a customer had before.
- To see the public as client and stress the notion of service.
- Attitude, language and body talk are important aspects that impact on communication in different practical situations.

Conclusion: targets for police training under the CP philosophy – a holistic approach
Police training has to be suited to a modern police force that is evolving constantly along with the society it serves. This is not an easy task and one that requires continuous in-service training to keep up to date with developments inside and outside the police. Within the training programmes, communication and conflict solution abilities will assume an importance equal to that of law, social sciences and police sciences.

An increasing workload and budgetary restrictions require police staff at different levels to master modern management skills and techniques to run their organisation efficiently. Out of this modernisation process arises the need
to review organisational procedures and to check mission and objectives against daily realities, routines, and socio-economic changes in the society the institution is supposed to serve.

Many police agencies are mainly bureaucracies functioning at the organisational level. Quite a few are essentially static organisations running by structural inertia with little managerial capability. Others suffer from organisational gravity. Police training should provide the students with tools and knowledge to break this circle of bureaucratism. Police agencies are also big organisations, sometimes the size of large companies. They have to manage employees, finances and equipment, with high technology being introduced at an increasing pace. There is an urgent need for police officers to master these problems. Outsourcing and privatisation of tasks should also be considered. The exchange of information and curricula between police training institutions all over the world might support the transition processes in different police forces. Everybody may learn from everybody. The exchange of students and teachers is both necessary and useful.

Finally, students should learn to distinguish between the individual culture of the members of the institution, established over time between peers, and the “official” culture of the institution. Since “Cop culture” and “Police culture” are not necessarily the same, changes in “Police culture” (like CP) are useless if “Cop culture” stays the same or even contradicts the community oriented CP culture.

And be aware: a fool with a tool is still a fool! Training which provides just tools without delivering the philosophy and understanding of one’s own role as a police officer as an integral part of the community is not only useless, but dangerous for our society.

References


Dutch “COP”
Developing community policing in The Netherlands

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Abstract Dutch policing has followed the three generations of community policing identified elsewhere. The paper outlines the three waves, arguing that progressive Dutch society has influenced policing styles, giving Dutch policing a strong social orientation. The material draws on action research projects from the 1970s and 1980s and current innovations with special attention to developments in Amsterdam and Utrecht in which the authors are involved as researchers or consultants. Following models from the USA there is a tendency to run hard and soft features of policing together. Contemporary community policing has then both a problem-solving and a crime-control rhetoric. New-style community beat officers are better integrated into the organisation and are strongly involved in crime prevention. Difficulties arise in areas that are not conventional communities, such as inner cities, with a diverse public, an accumulation of social problems side-by-side with “entertainment”, and a potential for public order disturbances. Policing in The Netherlands has changed significantly in recent years to an emphasis on problem solving, partnerships with other agencies, crime prevention, fostering self-reliance among citizens, and sponsoring the return of early social control mechanisms in public life – in schools, transport and with “town patrols” on the streets. Police have taken others on board and have relinquished their monopoly on safety and crime.

Introduction
This paper looks at the social face of policing in The Netherlands during the last 30 years. It argues that significant changes in Dutch society ushered in a period of considerable experiment and innovation. In a sense this development has continued almost unabated and has suffered less of a cycle of discovery, disappearance and re-emergence (as could be said to have characterized policing in the USA). Nevertheless, certain problems in community policing seem to have remained the same over the years, e.g. the conservative, if not reactionary, police culture which has been a major obstacle in implementing community policing. And also coping with basic dilemmas such as “hard” (repressive) versus “soft” (preventive) policing and “reactive” versus “proactive” policing. Those dilemmas clearly have an organizational aspect, but they also relate to the police role (“what functions should the police perform?”) and to the police and the community (“what philosophy should determine their relationship with the public?”).

In this paper we will first examine the history of social innovation in Dutch policing since the 1970s. We will show that the Dutch police have been experimenting with various forms of socially oriented policing and will outline the status of recent initiatives in policing and their relationship to the diffuse
notion of “community policing”. Before we describe the Dutch approach to community policing, however, we would first like to make the following brief observations about some basic dilemmas in community policing.

Key issues pertaining to community policing
Police forces reflect in some way the societies that they serve. While there may be some universal elements to policing (Waddington, 1999), there are also wide national, and regional, variations as comparative studies continually reveal (Bayley, 1991). This also holds true for community policing, an ill-defined concept that may mean many different things in different countries, or even within one country. However, crucial dilemmas surrounding policing seem to abound just about everywhere and appear universally difficult to resolve.

The term “community policing” emerged in the USA and was given a methodology by Goldstein's seminal work on “problem-solving” (1979, 1990). These two concepts represented a period concerned with research into policing, institutional innovation and efforts at organizational change with a rich variety of research and action-research projects (notably by the Police Foundation; Bayley, 1994). Some of the impetus for change came from revelations in early research and public inquiries of corruption, discrimination and violence but there was also something of a reform movement arguing for a more socially responsive police. Indeed, some research data revealed that most police work comprised helping people rather than being concerned strictly with law enforcement (Cumming et al., 1965; Punch and Naylor, 1973). For a number of reasons, including the political move to the right in the 1980s, the persistence of rising crime (with increasing violence and drug use) – and with academics arguing dismally that research tended to show that nothing the police did had much impact on crime – policing became tied almost exclusively into an emphasis on crime control.

The turning-point came in the early 1990s with the emergence of a ground-swell of public opinion that life in major cities had become intolerable because of seemingly unstoppable crime. New-style mayors and police chiefs, notably Guiliani and Bratton in New York as figureheads, adopted new policies which combined so-called “zero-tolerance” with resurrected notions of community policing (several leading figures of the time now reject the concept of zero tolerance but it entered the police and popular lexicon (Kelling and Coles, 1996)). The New York “miracle” represented two main thrusts: first, that the police organization could be “re-engineered” to be far more effective against crime; and that multi-agency approaches with public-private funding could lead to considerable improvement in the “quality of life” of people in communities by reducing “nuisance” and petty offences. There has been a great deal of controversy about the nature of such policies in various American cities and their relation to falling crime rates (Bowling, 1999). Also the terms used are “container concepts” that can be redefined in many ways and need to be unraveled within their situational context.
Of importance is that the police claimed that it was their efforts that brought about change (Silverman, 1999). We do not want to enter this debate except to say that it gave the police new elan and a belief in their abilities and also unleashed major federal funding for projects that ostensibly favored community policing. In a number of ways new technology and managerial approaches had improved the police organization’s capacity to respond to complex issues; but in other ways old concepts had been invested with a new life. Kelling, one of the architects of the New York “miracle”, with his metaphor of “broken windows” (representing a spiral of decay) and with his consultant work with the NYPD, went back to Sir Robert Peel and the founding of the Metropolitan Police in London in 1829, and to Bittner and Goldstein, for his conceptual inspiration (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996). Somehow certain police forces in the USA in the early 1990s seemed to have stumbled on the formula of successfully combining crime control with selectively tackling social problems. Perhaps never before in the history of social science has so much been owed by so many to one broken window!

The term “community policing” – or “COP” for community oriented policing – emerged, or re-emerged, around that time as a buzzword for initiatives which ostensibly meant decentralized units with a territorial mandate and a problemsolving focus that took into account local citizens’ priorities. A considerable debate has emerged about the definition, contours and effectiveness of community policing (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997: Peak and Glensor, 1996). Scholars in the police field comment on its diffuseness, openness to multiple interpretation and diversity of implementation; to us it seems that its current popularity is closely related to the assumption that the police can reduce both crime and public “nuisance” (depending on how that is defined); and within that assumption there is room for the “social” task of policing (Alderson, 1998). And, as noted earlier, the evidence is consistent that police spend much of their time responding to citizens’ calls for help (Bayley, 1994); however reluctantly it is performed they have an unavoidable social function (with Punch (1979) speaking of the “secret social service”). In some way new style policing manages to combine both “hard” and “soft” elements; and its apparent success in the USA has led to its somewhat uncritical export abroad, including to Europe.

However, given the traditional mandate of the police and the pressure from most stakeholders, it is almost universal that the police are primarily held to account for controlling crime and maintaining order (Waddington, 1999). Organizationally and culturally the police were mostly just not geared to helping people. Attempts to put a more social face on policing have all too frequently led to short-lived projects where a few “marginal” figures could tackle a limited range of problems, usually without much enthusiasm or support from the mainstream organization, and usually with expressions of near contempt from some colleagues. A Home Office report, for instance, on the introduction of problem-oriented policing in Britain, revealed that implementation was patchy, had little managerial backing, was poorly understood, was often used as a label to conceal other activities and rarely
enjoyed a long run, with most projects being prematurely abandoned (Leigh et al., 1996). This gloomy picture need not be true of innovation in all areas, or in all countries, but until recently the police were not usually renowned for their managerial sophistication and institutional finesse in adapting to change, while die-hards within the occupational culture would continually insist that the core business of policing was “catching crooks”.

There have been a number of significant developments within the last decade that helped to change this. First, the police organization has gone strongly down the road of “new public management” (Leishman et al., 1996), which has led to a view of itself as a public service that should take account of the public’s views in shaping policies, to see citizens as “clients”, to engage in measurable performance and to be held more accountable for its expenditure. In an analysis of “policing for people”, Mastrofski (1999) maintains that the public wants attentiveness, reliability, responsiveness, competence, manners and fairness from the police as part of providing a “quality service”. Second, new strategies and new technology have shown that the police can book success in crime fighting in certain areas with specific targets; this not only gave the police new elan but led to seeing that much crime occurred in particular areas of multiple deprivation where there was an accumulation of social problems. On the one hand they discovered the victims; on the other hand they learned that the costs of operations could be partly financed by public-private projects in order to mount collective efforts at crime control and prevention.

Third, and most importantly, New York provided an ideology and a model that apparently worked. However much the experts debated the causes, most New Yorkers and outside observers would maintain that the city is a better and a safer environment to live in than before the changes. The message emanating from New York was positive and coherent; and it was marketed with vigor – leading to its export to others all too willing to take it on board. Ironically the USA, which for years had been viewed by many as the model of how not to police, suddenly provided a new, seemingly successful “paradigm”. Of considerable significance for contemporary policing is that this tied both ends of the policing spectrum neatly together: you could attack crime and solve problems as part of the same strategy, which satisfied both politicians and the public – even if many academics remained skeptical of the causal links given the contentiousness of the claims and of the evidence. Community policing had been “marketed” as successfully linking crime fighting and prevention.

What remains to confuse matters on COP are a number of resilient issues. Have the police in all cases really thought through their strategy or are they muddling along on the basis of ill-digested models from elsewhere? Is there consensus on what COP is; and what is the definition of “community”? In Ericson and Haggerty’s Policing the Risk Society (1997), for instance, there is a portrait of a “community” where the police dispense information via pre-recorded messages dispatched automatically by computer! Finally, how is COP set up within the organization; is it well resourced; and does it face institutional resentment from others? In Houston, for example, the project “NOP”, for neighborhood oriented
policing, was known as “No-one on patrol”! (Taylor et al., 1998). In brief, is COP rhetoric or reality, genuine innovation or fashionable fad, a cultural sea-change in policing or a manipulative public relations exercise?

Community policing in The Netherlands

In briefly providing some background information on the Dutch police and on the development of community policing in The Netherlands we wish to convey two central features. First, Dutch police are socially conscious and take their “social” task seriously; and, second, they have learned to combine “hard” and “soft” elements in their philosophy and practice. The Netherlands is a small country (population 16 million) with virtually open borders, a multi-cultural population, and a high standard of living. After the Second World War it was a relatively harmonious society with a broad consensus on reconstructing the damaged country, with a low crime rate and a remarkably low rate of incarceration (Downes, 1986). It simply did not experience the crime wave and racial tensions of many major American cities. In contrast, it represented one of those “progressive” societies with a strong welfare state, enlightened attitudes to social issues, and lenient approaches to crime and punishment. It would be strange if this context did not in some respects color policing styles in The Netherlands. Since the 1970s, however, there has been the growth of a substantial drugs industry, a significant rise in conventional crime, and the importation of criminal gangs with an ethnic background. From the early 1990s onward there was a discernible shift in government thinking that traditional Dutch “tolerance” had gone too far, that there should be a stronger emphasis on tackling crime, that sentencing should be tougher and that more prisons should be built (Punch, 1997; Punch et al., 1997, 1998). Despite rapid social change, Dutch society can still be seen as representing a civic culture based on consensus, negotiation rather than confrontation, the avoidance of extremes, allocating resources for social problems, lack of overt racial discrimination and the avoidance of severe poverty and the development of ghettos.

After the Second World War, the Dutch police was structured in many separate organizations: there were nearly 150 independent municipal police forces and one national police force. In 1994 these organizations were merged. This new police force was regionalized in 25 forces with one national service for support and certain national tasks. Amsterdam, with 5,600 officers, is the largest regional force; the smallest regional police force having 640 officers. The policing style is generally laid-back, fairly tolerant, non-violent, and negotiation plays a vital role. A liberal police chief lamented that this “paradigm”, born in the 1970s, was receiving less emphasis by politicians recently:

... in our work there is a strong caring element, which seems to be moving out of the picture in government. In the parliamentary debate on government policy the problems of young people were only mentioned twice. It makes you want to weep. The assignment for the Dutch Police is the reduction of violence, which reflects the ideal in our society. With a high level of violence you don’t send in predominantly the strong guys, but precisely those people who are good at reducing violence (Elias, 1997, p. 219; emphasis added).
In our opinion this strong social element has proved a consistent theme in Dutch policing. This has been reinforced in recent years by the importation of concepts and practices from the USA, the UK and elsewhere (including the koban concept of local police kiosks from Japan), by renewed innovation at the local level, and by the resurrection of the community beat constable. But now the latter has a new identity and new technology (a mobile smart phone with WAP technology giving instant access to police and other databanks and networks).

Furthermore, Dutch police officers are normally well-trained, speak several languages, like to travel and are well aware of developments elsewhere. For example, a delegation of senior officers, mayors and prosecutors visited the USA in the 1990s and in New York they were received by Mayor Guiliani and Commissioner Bratton of the NYPD. George Kelling and other experts have been invited a number of times to talk to police audiences in The Netherlands. Senior officers, while inevitably making the proviso that Dutch society is different from US society, would be familiar with the concept of zero tolerance, had perhaps witnessed COP in operation in several cities in North America and in other countries, had attended conferences abroad on COP, and would be fairly up to date on the literature.

We shall deal with community policing in The Netherlands by dividing its development into three phases spanning the last 30 years and bringing it up to the contemporary situation, with special attention to policing in Amsterdam and Utrecht.

Community policing, phase I: the beat officer
Initially the structure and culture of policing in the post-war period remained fairly rigid, if not conservative, with a predominantly legal interpretation of the police role. The 1960s saw a broad desire for change and this helped to usher in a far more progressive and tolerant society with considerable repercussions for the police. From the early 1970s onwards Dutch policing became socially conscious and engaged in a range of experiments (Broer and van der Vijver, 1983). Many police forces were structured on the “three-layered model” of reactive patrol, preventive patrol (comparable to a “problem oriented” approach) and of beat constables. Beat constables had at that time a widely defined task: their main duty was “to keep their neighborhood quiet and safe”, to “restore contacts” with citizens, and to gather information for the Criminal Investigation Branch (CID). Beat constables worked only in their beat area: they solved problems; communicated with other public agencies; and their task was primarily defined in terms of crime prevention. They were often adopted by the public as “our police officer” (Punch, 1974).

Community policing, phase II: neighbourhood teams
At the end of the 1970s, a number of critical studies seriously questioned the legitimacy and credibility of the police in relation to citizens. This brought about a fundamental shift in thinking based on two main causes. First, there was a report published in 1977 by a working group of young, critical officers (in
the “Project Group on Organizational Structures” or “POS”) entitled “A changing police”. This argued for changes in policing and enhanced legitimacy through a problem-oriented organization, stressing prevention, explaining their mission to the public, and becoming “social professionals” (rather than “legal professionals”). In the second place, the changes were caused by the mounting criticism of the practical functioning of the police (Bastiaenen and Vriesema, 1980). The criticism concerning specifically the system of the beat-constable; they were often typified by the public as “loners”: they were criticized by their colleagues for not being “real policemen” (calling him, or her, the “beat-nurse” (Punch, 1979), also “social worker” or “police psychiatrist” (Torre, 1999). The criticism from the public was that “he is too soft and always alone”; “if there is any real police authority needed to solve genuine problems, the beat constable just isn’t there”; and “everyone knows where he always drinks coffee, and he will never do anything nasty to his friends in the neighborhood” (Bastiaenen and Vriesema, 1980).

This criticism stimulated the start of the “neighborhood teams” movement in The Netherlands. The beat constables should disappear and neighborhood teams should be installed to promote integration. External integration between the police and the public would improve legitimacy; this would be aided by internal integration (between parts of the organization) and task integration (each constable should be sharing in more or less all kinds of daily police work). The teams would deal with nearly all “routine police affairs” and this externally focussed and problem-oriented approach would improve legitimacy and effectiveness at the local level.

These change processes started in several police forces often proved to be very difficult in implementation. There is no doubt that the impact and complexity of the change processes were severely underestimated by the chiefs of police in charge of the innovative forces. To a large extent, then, those first experiences in The Netherlands are somewhat comparable to those in the USA in the early 1970s: it proved virtually impossible to fully implement community policing and, if even where it was held to have “succeeded”, the external effects when measured were found to be marginal (Broer et al., 1980; Broer, 1982; Slothouwer, 1983). Many projects started with considerable enthusiasm only to fail after a honeymoon period. There was usually strong resistance from some of the specialist departments, particularly the Criminal Investigation Department, which simply refused to co-operate with the neighborhood team. In one particular case, research later proved that the quality of the detective police work carried out by the “generalists” of the neighborhood team was no less competent than the work of the CID detectives, but by then the experiment had already been stopped (Jong, 1983).

Amid the failures mentioned above, there was one police force that did implement neighborhood teams in a successful way in the beginning of the 1980s and that was the municipal police force of Haarlem (a city of 150,000 inhabitants in the western part of The Netherlands, some 15 miles from Amsterdam). The chief, one of the authors of “A changing police”, was deeply
Policing in The Netherlands

committed to neighborhood team policing. This change process was extensively evaluated, both internally and externally. The external results were measured in two ways: by citizen surveys and by interviewing key-persons. Those studies aimed to get insight into the efficacy of the change process as far as the external goals were defined. The goals were: reduce the level of victimization; reduce the fear of crime; reduce the problems in the neighborhoods; improve citizens' attitudes towards the police and also contacts between citizens and the police.

The Haarlem police force started in 1983 with the implementation of neighborhood teams in three areas, covering roughly one third of the city. The results of the studies turned out to be positive: after the first year in two of the areas the level of victimization, the problems and fear of crime had diminished significantly. Citizens' attitudes towards the police had improved and the contacts with the police were evaluated more positively. After two more years, a third external study took place when neighborhood teams had been implemented in the whole city. The results were even more convincing, although there were striking differences between the different areas (it is beyond the scope of this article to go into those differences more deeply here; Broer et al., 1987). The results of the interviews were in line with the data from the surveys. Most interviewees stated that the functioning of the police had improved substantially. Of course there was also criticism. In the first place some interviewees remarked that there was an improvement, but even better results were now expected and were demanded. Some interviewees stated that the team paid too much attention to criminal matters and not enough attention to “smaller” problems of direct significance to the locals. Then people indicated that they did miss the “old beat constable to whom they can talk, whom they can trust” while a team could never quite take his place. Often it was stated: “why can’t we have both, neighborhood teams and beat constables?” This result is interesting given that citizens were complaining about the beat constable before and, partly as a result of those complaints the beat constable had disappeared, but now they called for his return.

The positive results from the evaluation studies in Haarlem had a substantial effect on policing practice in the rest of The Netherlands, prompting, among others, the Amsterdam police to follow suit. Amsterdam is considered to be the leading force in the country and by the beginning of the 1990s had set up some 25 neighborhood teams. Many other police forces soon followed.

**Community policing, phase III: community officers**

The most recent step in the development of community oriented policing in The Netherlands has been the introduction of the new-style community beat officer during the 1990s. This form of community policing was introduced as a “new paradigm”, with a strong emphasis on the differences between the new philosophy and the “traditional” ways of (community) policing. With this new form of community policing it was intended to avoid a number of the shortcomings of the earlier systems. For instance, the teams did not always
co-ordinate well with the rest of the organization and their members were not as well known as the community police officer.

However, in the new philosophy, as well as in practice, the proximity to the public, citizen involvement in dealing with crime and safety problems and police working together with local public and private agencies, were equally if not more important than before. The small-scale approach and the orientation towards prevention remained the same. New is the extensive co-operation with external partners and the strong involvement of citizens in determining what issues should be the focus of policing in their neighborhood. But perhaps most important is the shift in responsibility. Whereas the former beat constable was “just an ordinary cop”, the community officer is held responsible for “organizing security” in his area in a much wider sense. If he, or she, needs assistance from colleagues in specialized departments then they are formally obliged to help (although practice may diverge from this). With their place in the community as “the face of the police”, the community officers take a spearhead position. Thanks to this position they are, unlike the beat constables who usually operated in the margin of the organization, generally well embedded in the organization where they are supposed to aid in directing the work of others. Responsibility is thus pushed down to a lower level in the organization; this means that the traditional top-down approach in setting police priorities is, at least partly, replaced by a bottom-up approach. Community policing is, then, no less than the pivot around which the rest of the force is organized.

The lack of a clear definition does in practice leave police departments ample opportunity to put the concept of community policing into practice in their own particular way. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as a central notion of community policing is that it is tuned to the needs of the community; this implies that the police services needed in one area may differ from those needed elsewhere and have to be “tailor-made”. Therefore, differences between police forces, but also between departments within forces, do exist, as was shown in a study of four police forces in which community policing had been introduced (Zoomer et al., 2000).

**Current issues in The Netherlands**

Community policing requires changing the organization as well as the functioning of individual officers, and this is a process that may take years to accomplish. But the specific tasks of the new community officers include building and maintaining networks with external partners, such as local government and social agencies. The aim is to effectuate an integral approach to local safety problems, to support and encourage citizens to rely on their own ability to do something about security problems they experience and to improve the quality of life in their own neighborhood. “Self-reliant behavior” (Denkers, 1993) fosters the idea that citizens can play an active and important role in a multi-layered process of social control. It is exactly involvement in these complex tasks and intricate activities, leading ostensibly to lasting solutions, that distinguishes current community officers from the beat constables of the past. They are active agents
and skilled negotiators in seeking permanent solutions for recurrent problems that are a continuous burden to the police and a constant source of irritation and unrest to the community. In practice, community policing does not develop according to a single unidimensional process, and several factors (such as a lack of support, management priorities, internal communication problems, a shortage of police capacity, emphasis on emergency situations) may hamper, or even set back, the development of community policing. Community officers often feel they have a very important function in their neighborhood but still a somewhat marginal position within the organization.

When discussing the relation between the police and the community it is mostly in terms of effects and that tends to mean effects on the crime rates and feelings of (in)security. Increasingly police priorities are based on specific characteristics in the local environment. This is especially clear in intelligence-led policing, with the localization of “hot spots” and the targeting of individuals or groups who are causing, or expected to cause, problems. Community oriented policing is quite different, but it is also based on intimate knowledge about the neighborhood. However, this information is normally used to find appropriate ways to deal with problems before they get out of hand, in co-operation with other agencies. For it is not just knowledge about the community, but the relationship with the community that is important. Probably most characteristic in the new relationship between the police and the community is the acknowledgement that the police are no longer the sole guardians of public safety as they used to be. This new notion was strongly put forward by the central government in 1995 when, together with the mayors of the four largest cities, the “major cities policy” was formulated (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) (Aronowitz, 1997). With the active involvement of citizens in identifying local problems the people in the community are meant somehow to direct the priorities and activities of the police.

In some neighborhoods with serious crime and security problems, or recurring public order disturbances, the “needs” of the community are often expressed in terms of a desire for a much harder line and more repressive action by the police. There are several examples that in such cases not only the citizens, but also the local government (some cities have devolved local government to the “borough” level), demand a much tougher approach to diminish these problems. Clearly, such demands by the community or local politicians can have a negative effect on the development of conventional notions of community policing. Putting things back in order with repressive measures is often seen as a prerequisite for community policing to be able to work. This suggests that not every neighborhood is best served with a community policing approach, although one might argue that a multi-agency approach, focused on the causes of existing problems, can always be more effective than solely the (repressive) activities of the police. In the next section the dilemma of coping with different policing policies in a highly complex environment will be discussed in the context of the Amsterdam City Center policing project; all three authors were involved in this project in various
capacities (and the account is based on Zoomer (2000)) and one was consultant to the police regarding the Utrecht “High Catherine” project.

The case of Amsterdam
Amsterdam is the capital city of The Netherlands with a population of around 800,000. Traditionally it has been a Labour Party city with progressive policies and with a very laid-back culture of “anything goes”. It is a major tourist center, has many offices of companies and businesses, and has a substantial concentration of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. The inner city is an area with a great diversity of urban functions (in that sense it differs fundamentally from many US cities). It is not only an attractive living area (with soaring house prices), it also boasts a large number of restaurants and bars, theatres, museums, discos, cinemas and shops. There is also a renowned red light district, and there are so-called “coffee shops” where soft drugs can be bought. Obviously, it is a place where many people – residents of Amsterdam and tourists alike – go out, and during special events the city may attract hundreds of thousands of visitors. There is a concentration of street crime on its busy streets, in public transport and at crowded night spots. Young people in large groups, football supporters and some ethnic youth groups, can suddenly cause trouble and ignite violence (the riot squad was frequently called out and was eventually permanently stationed at strategic spots during the weekends). Considering the problems that come with the great number of visitors – mainly disturbances of the public order and “anti-social” behavior – policing this area demands much of the capacity of the police to meet such sudden outbursts, and this is often at the cost of the regular neighborhood team work.

There was a general feeling that public order disturbances, aggressive or anti-social behavior by street people, and leisure activities were getting out of hand. It needed a professional response of a consistent policy, forceful operational practice, and a move to “take back” the streets with more officers on patrol and swift but restrained back-up force. This was discussed at length with the town council so that various efforts could be coordinated with other agencies: for instance, by moving street prostitution out of the center, providing more sheltered accommodation for the homeless, setting up an improved crisis intervention response for the mentally disturbed, and setting priorities for tackling the problems of those people who persistently cause difficulties for multiple agencies. In particular, it was recognized that many of the main, resilient social problems were concentrated in the inner-city and required a response tailored to that area. On the one hand the inner-city was somehow the barometer for the rest of the city; if the police were “on top” of things there then they were judged to be doing well. On the other hand, an inner-city is not like a conventional “community” (whatever that may be) and Amsterdam could better be compared to the inner areas of other cities in other countries with similar problems.

The Amsterdam police organization has undergone several changes during the second half of the 1990s. Like many other forces in The Netherlands the Amsterdam police force had beat constables in the 1970s and introduced
neighborhood teams during the 1980s in an attempt to improve police-public relationships, which were during the 1970s plainly bad in parts of the inner city. Since then community oriented policing has been further developed with the introduction of community police officers, whilst maintaining the neighborhood teams. At the same time, a quite different movement started. Until 1999, the city center of Amsterdam was roughly divided into two police districts (with parts of two more districts also intruding into it), which in turn were divided into six neighborhood teams (and part of a seventh team).

In order to be able to deal with the highly specific problems of this area, it was decided to establish one police district for the entire inner city area, consisting of six neighborhood teams and to adjust the boundaries with neighboring districts in such a way that the inner city became a more or less "homogeneous area"; this in terms of typical inner city problems and the type of police attention needed to police it and then within one set of organizational boundaries. This new district comprised some 700 officers, making it larger than a number of small regional forces: a team might have 60-95 officers while the team in the red-light district which originally had 170 officers was reduced to 95.

As a part of the new inner city district, a special support team, the Inner City Support Team (ICST), was set up with the task to maintain public order in the whole district (other than the neighborhood teams which are basically restricted to their own area). Officers in this team can be sent into places where temporary disruptions of the public order are expected, thus supporting the neighborhood team responsible for the area concerned. Especially during weekend nights, they can follow the problems from one location to the other in order to provide rapid response. The busiest time in the red light district is until around 2 a.m. After this, in the main locations with many bars, drunks appear on the street after closing time; then after 4 a.m., when the discos close, the streets fill again with young people who may not be altogether sober.

The formation of the Inner City Support Team (with about 75 officers but designed to grow to 120) was intended to bring the police back onto the streets and to increase the visibility of the police. But it served also to regain authority and bring back a sense for norms amongst the public by means of a low tolerance approach to small breaches of the law and of going beyond the boundaries of what is held to be "socially acceptable". For instance, urinating in public became public enemy number one and was even held to be undermining the foundations of the historic sixteenth century buildings in the center; at weekends portable urinals are placed at “hot-spots”. The local chief can tell you with some relish exactly how many litres of urine have been transported each weekend!

In fact, this new approach was introduced in the whole force with a directive sent to every member of the force (called “Streetwise”) that all officers should write at least 200 tickets a year. This change of policy followed a long tradition of leniency towards deviance of the social order. Amsterdam was not the only place where the feeling arose that leniency had gone too far. Inspired by the alleged successes in the USA of adopting a zero-tolerance approach, several police forces in The Netherlands adopted strict law and order maintenance. In Amsterdam
this was not called “zero-tolerance”, but “doing again what we used to do, and what we always should have done, but had forgotten to do”. The new approach was greeted with wide approval, particularly by those who thought the police should finally act against those causing a public nuisance. They thought this way the police could lend support to law-abiding citizens and be an incentive to other forms of informal social control. There had been a government-sponsored move to bring back traditional control agents in public areas such as tram conductors, school doormen, the “concierge” in apartments, and a “town patrol” (stadswacht) of uniformed officials geared to cooling out minor offences.

In a way, the underlying ambivalence of the police can be seen in these developments; as if they are saying “we can have a bit of zero tolerance but let’s not call it that, as this is Amsterdam not New York. Let’s get our officers hitting the numbers because for years they did what they fancied (but now the politicians are moaning about value for money); and let’s regain control of areas we have left alone for too long and become ‘boss’ on the ground again”. These were the sorts of views that senior officers would express informally.

A fundamental question is whether or not the “streetwise” policy is compatible with community-oriented policing. It is argued that “the community” agrees that the police should take strong action against those who do not comply with the rules or community norms. Unfortunately, the division between “good” and “bad” is not very clear in this setting. The inner city of Amsterdam can be described as a microcosm of conflicting interests; in such a “fragmented society” the needs for police services vary considerably (Bottoms and Wiles, 1995). The interests of residents clash with those of bar owners or shopkeepers when it comes to times they may be open, the prominence of their advertisements, the size of pavement terraces and the loudness of music they play. Some residents are academics, journalists, politicians, and professionals who are highly vocal and demand safety and comfort for themselves and their children; others make their living there from shops and the “entertainment” and are understandably more tolerant of practices that provide their income (while organized crime plays a significant role in the vice industry). Many residents feel that the city government has given the area away to the tourism industry and the “night-time economy”, so in a way the authorities and residents are sometimes opposing parties as well. Conversely, residents, especially the newcomers, are often seen as complainers who want to take away the fun out of the area. There is some truth in this: parts of the inner city have undergone a process of “gentrification” (McDonald, 1986). Upper middle class newcomers were attracted to the area where, during the last decades, much has been done to preserve and restore the historic character. They are quite demanding as to maintaining the quality of life of their neighborhood for which they hold the authorities (the local council, and particularly the police) responsible. But as the physical environment in the inner city – and the quality of life – often underwent major improvements, the social environment deteriorated. Examples of this are the large and obstreperous groups of noisy drunken youths, men visibly urinating in public, motorists and cyclists massively ignoring traffic regulations, resourceful plagues of pickpockets whose targets are mainly tourists,
but also locals, drug addicts shooting up and dealers carrying out transactions in public places, syringes and used condoms in public parks, and homeless people with a background of mental illness and/or substance abuse behaving strangely or aggressively on the streets. It must be added that residents are not only the passive victims of these nuisances, but contribute to it by parking their cars where they should not, or by letting their dogs voluminously foul the pavement (across the globe dog droppings seem to head the complaints’ lists compiled by community officers). There is, then, not always a clear distinction between those who cause problems and those who suffer from them.

Obviously, with so many different social categories causing so many different kinds of problems, the police cannot possibly deal with them all in one specific way. What is then important is to choose the appropriate strategy in varying situations. This means also that the police have to continually take into account the interests of different groups (including the thousands of anonymous “outsiders” passing through). For instance, chasing away a group of drug users from one location simply has the effect that they spread to other areas. If these “sweeps” take place more than once during a day, the main effect is probably that more people notice “there are so many drug users around suddenly” and call the police. In this case, a more effective approach (which also takes the interests of the drug users into account) would be to send drug users to a certain location or refuge where they can stay for a short time (and preferably overnight). This way they really are sent off the streets and not just moved about. Also actions against harmless homeless people to make them move can be considered doubtful. When they just sit on a bench in the street, the only “nuisance” they cause is that other people feel uncomfortable. This seems insufficient ground for a low tolerance approach and to harassing them.

Although one of the objects of the Inner City Support Team was to make the police more visible, because they can also be used for larger actions apart from their public order role and put “blue on the streets” (to use a current catch-phrase), it is the community police officers who really give the police a personal face. They are the ones that get involved in consultation meetings between residents and traders in the inner city. They are also the ones whose task it is to co-operate with other agencies and the local government in dealing with social problems that are more complex than just crime. The police management has the task to make sure that these different ways of policing do not interfere with one another.

The case of Utrecht
The Utrecht Regional Police Force covers an area with a population of over one million and has a police force of roughly 2,500 officers. Its major city is Utrecht, an attractive university town of about 500,000 inhabitants. Although Utrecht does not have quite the same magnitude of problems as Amsterdam it is considered one of the four large cities in the “randstad” (the western part of the country with Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) and with many of the problems associated with these cities (street crime, concentrations of ethnic
minorities, large-scale sporting and social events). The police also worked very much along the neighborhood team model as described in Amsterdam. At the end of the 1990s they were faced with a particular problem in one area.

The city is a major train terminus and the railway lines dissect the city through the middle; a major shopping mall was built straddling the rails and it granted access to the railway station and formed a foot-bridge linking two parts of the city; the paths through the mall were permanently open and from early on the setting attracted a varied population of “street people”. For a number of reasons, the city council wanted this problem “sorted”. The response reveals a number of factors about the social role of the police and the particular approach in Utrecht (Punch et al., 1998).

The impetus was originally a social control issue (with the mayor under pressure from stakeholders who wanted the area swept clean). The police, however, approached it very much with the concepts of “COP” and “POP” in mind and they adopted a multi-agency approach. They soon came up against the limitations of working with “professionals” as well as coming up against the limitations of the Dutch welfare state. For they were dealing effectively with an “underclass” that no-one really wanted to deal with. There was considerable irony in all this; the police were taking the lead role, and finally doing what people had been telling them to do for years, and the rest of the system could hardly cope.

This particular case was located in a shopping mall, Hoog Catherine (“HC” or “Upper Catherine”). The complex attracted some 35 million visitors/passers-by per year (making it one of the busiest “public-private” complexes in the country, surpassing even the international airport of Schiphol Amsterdam). For years it had housed a sort of “community” but then one comprising the homeless, junkies, dealers, former mental patients, absconded asylum seekers who had faced expatriation, youth gangs, buskers, beggars, and alcoholics. The other inhabitants of the complex were the shopkeepers who worked there every day and they formed another “respectable community”. The transient homeless group were visible during the day but came out particularly at night when the shops were shut; they fouled the area and formed a threatening presence for the passers-by who had to reach the station or cross the city.

In 1997 a coalition of factors – a forceful right-wing mayor, complaints from shopkeepers, pressure from the owners of the complex, and surveys showing that users of the complex perceived it as unsafe and dirty – led to the police being told to “sort it out”. This was the decree of the mayor (who in The Netherlands is the head of the police): the word “zero tolerance” was even bandied about. The police chief for the city center had recently been on the delegation to the USA and to the NYPD (see above), was familiar with the “broken windows” idea and was prepared to take the lead by setting up a special team dedicated to HC. However, he was given a mission impossible; tackle the street people but do not allow them to spread out to other areas of the city. The following dynamic emerged. A dedicated team of 14 officers with an inspector was set up; their task was to maintain order and deal with the problems: within a short period of time they
displayed high enthusiasm for the task and swiftly gained intimate knowledge of the several hundred regular “residents”. The philosophy was strongly based on elements of the broken windows concept in the sense of differentiating between the categories “have-nots, can-nots and will-nots” (Kelling and Coles, 1996), setting up clear rules of conduct, considering changing the physical environment to reduce opportunities for crime, endeavoring to solve problems where possible (e.g. find accommodation for a young runaway), cooperating with and instructing shopkeepers, and negotiating at the multi-agency level. Behind all this were political and commercial ambitions for the inner-city, which was contemplating a massive and costly face-lift. The mayor wanted a clean inner city to attract business and events; the owners of the complex owned many malls in The Netherlands and these were all private property, could be closed at night and were patrolled by private security; it was clear they wanted nothing more than to be able to lock the complex, get rid of the public police and introduce exclusively security guards; and the shopkeepers wanted no street people outside their shop in the daytime and no-one fouling their doorways at night and also safety for their personnel going to the parking garages around the building. The public wanted a safe environment to shop in or walk through; in fact HC was one of the safest locations in the city so that the issue was one of subjective perceptions of safety. The police took the initiative in mounting multi-agency partnerships; meetings might comprise numerous representatives from churches, voluntary agencies, local government departments and other control agents (Railway Police and private security firm).

The willingness to meet and talk was high. But within a very short period of time it became obvious that agreements could be readily made with other control agents (say on coordinating patrols and sharing radio frequencies, etc.) and also with voluntary agencies and churches (who were prepared to provide more basic facilities to help the homeless, the addicts and the mentally ill). The major difficulty proved to be getting any action out of the “professionals”; agencies such as the mental health services and detoxification units worked on a quite different basis – of appointments, selection and husbanding of scarce resources. They were not looking for unreliable clients with a poor “compliance” record; and some local government officials seemed to exemplify the stereotype of the comfortable bureaucrat making paper plans but without delivering the goods. The “HC police team” had worked out a quite sophisticated protocol where conduct and response was based on time, place, context and offence; some conduct did receive “zero tolerance” in that drug dealing and shop-lifting were not accepted; but the members of the team soon began to realise that most of the people they were meeting daily were “cannots” with a background of multiple failure – homeless, mentally ill and addicted. They formed a sort of underclass that no-one really wanted; even in the benign Dutch welfare state these were people who fell through the cracks and no-one was really interested in them. Yet it was not possible to just hound them out of the complex because they would only go elsewhere in the town; team members would recount instances of people who clearly needed help but the agencies did
not want them and the system could not legally impose treatment. Having taken the initiative the police were left holding the baby.

There are a number of issues that arise from the experience in Utrecht. One is that the team was highly motivated; given a limited area, a clear philosophy for action and signs of success, they reacted with great enthusiasm; but other units with a general task looked jealously at their autonomy (and this is perhaps one reason why special units attract negative remarks and lack of cooperation). Second is that the police had done their homework; they had read the literature, understood the concepts and had a coherent plan; they took the lead role and balanced their operations between control and care – explaining to others that zero tolerance would not work because of dispersion. Third was that they genuinely endeavored to solve problems, only to find that the capacity and working style of the regular “system” did not respond; they were trawling up problems beyond the welfare state’s ability to cope. Ironically they often worked most productively with people who seemed to be their ideological opposites, radical social workers and volunteers, because these had a genuine desire to help the street people and were prepared to expand their facilities (as did the churches and Salvation Army). Finally, anyone observing the HC team at work would have witnessed motivated officers a with strong social awareness of the predicament of the people they were policing; but having learned to adopt a tailor-made approach with considerable insight into a multi-layered style of operation they discovered that they were ahead of the game. The rest of the system had great difficulty coping with this new proactive role of the police where the police claimed the lead role.

Conclusion
In this paper we have given an overview of the development of community policing in The Netherlands with illustrations from two cases. By now people are talking of the “third generation” of COP (Oliver, 2000); yet they are still arguing about its definition and its impact while policing has changed considerably in the intervening years (Bayley and Shearing, 2001). Recent attempts in The Netherlands to assess its impact have encountered difficulties because the areas policed differ so widely, the causal links prove so difficult to trace, and the approaches are so numerous. It is as if someone has decreed “let a thousand flowers blossom”; and when a Dutch police chief says “all policing serves the community therefore all policing is community policing”, then you can witness the conceptual confusion, self-delusionary semantics and rationalizations in this area. In essence, our material on The Netherlands displays four main factors:

First, the Dutch police have experimented with COP for some 30 years – indeed for three police generations, have made a substantial effort to evaluate these changes, and their policing philosophy and style reflects to a certain extent the social caring features of Dutch society while incorporating concepts and practices from abroad; at the basic service delivery level in the districts nearly all forces work with a combination of neighborhood teams and community beat officers which are much better integrated into the organization
than previous efforts at COP (in one force the community officer has direct access to the district chief).

Second, in Amsterdam we saw that an inner-city presents specific dilemmas for the police in terms of an accumulation of big city problems, a widely diverse range of residents, constant negotiation on policies in a highly political environment with a great deal of media attention, and the need to balance service delivery with a public order capacity. The intricacy of the issues and the variety of stakeholders makes this quite unlike conventional notions of COP in a relatively homogeneous community with a limited range of problems. Inner-city problems invariably mean that the police will have to give multiple answers. Sometimes the beat constable can give the answer, sometimes the problems have to be tackled by groups of police officers, and sometimes the issues have to be solved at the strategic level. For citizens this seems to be quite confusing: they sometimes make arrangements with beat constables that are later overruled by other police. It becomes obvious that the police are not “one” single organization but a diversity of sub-organizations where at times no-one seems to be fully in control of the processes.

Third, community policing cannot solve the “hard-soft” dichotomy in police work, nor the dilemma of proactive and reactive policing. Although community policing is oriented to a proactive, problem solving approach, the reality of policing always means that the police have to fulfil their reactive duties in the field of calls for emergency service and criminal incidents as well. Organizational solutions will have to be specific, attuned to local and temporal circumstances. And if these circumstances change, the organizational solutions may have to change in accordance. But one aspect is of the utmost importance: whatever solution is chosen, people want the police to be in their vicinity. They want a supportive police, easy to contact, attentive, reliable, responsive and competent. In this respect, community policing will remain one of the most important imperatives for police leaders.

Finally, does COP represent a new policing paradigm? Yes and no. “Yes” in terms of shifting from a legalistically oriented style of policing, where officers are impersonal officials tied to their cars and wary of involvement in any messy and burdensome social task, to a more devolved, concerned, approachable group of public servants with a service orientation. People continually say that they want a visible, recognizable local unit that is available, takes their problems seriously and treats them with respect. In short, people in a community want their own cops. For when you raise expectations you also have to deliver and the evidence is that demand for police services rises with availability; and this is especially the case when other services fail; so the police as the only available 24-hour service may stimulate an insatiable demand it finds difficulty coping with (PF/PSI, 1996). But there can be no doubting that policing as a service has improved considerably at the delivery end in the districts and in that sense a lot has changed.

“No” in that policing is a complex business related to social control, repression, exclusion and the use of force (Waddington, 1999). The rhetoric has
clearly changed, what is the reality? The reality is that the police has become a complex service organization, with a new rhetoric of service, with much improved management and technology, and with some creative and committed officers doing excellent and sophisticated work implementing COP and POP to the best of their ability. As an institution, however, the police still retains its duality between “force” and “service” because that is inherent in its mandate. To a certain extent, however, contemporary policing in The Netherlands has drawn on its own past, and on models from abroad, to combine a tradition of social policing with order maintenance and crime control; perhaps another example of typical Dutch opportunism and compromise.

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Community policing in Israel
Resistance and change

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Abstract
The Israeli National Police began to implement community policing on a large scale in January of 1995. In this paper we describe the main findings of a three year national evaluation of community policing in Israel that was initiated by the Chief Scientist’s office of the Israeli police in the Fall of 1996. When community policing was envisioned and planned in Israel it was seen as part of a total reformation of the Israeli police in structure, philosophy and action. Our research suggests that this broad idea of community policing was not implemented in Israel, and indeed the program of community policing was found to lose ground during the course of our study. While community policing did have specific impacts on the Israeli police, it did not fundamentally change the perspectives and activities of street level police officers. We explain the difficulties encountered in the implementation of community policing in reference to three factors: the speed of implementation of the program; the resistance of traditional military style organizational culture within the Israeli police to the demands of community policing models; and a lack of organizational commitment to community policing. In our conclusions we argue that these barriers to successful community policing are not unique to the Israel case, and are indeed likely to be encountered in the development of community policing in many other countries.

Introduction
Community policing refers to a philosophical position about the role and functions of the police. It demands that the goals of policing, the conditions which it addresses, the means used to address them, and assessments of police success, should be developed and formulated with reference to the distinctive mores, experiences and special structures of local communities (Weisburd and McElroy, 1988). While there is much disagreement about the specifics of community policing, most scholars agree that community policing must

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involve the community in a practical way in the police mission (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). In community policing the police are expected not only to serve the public, but also to learn from citizens, to involve them in crime prevention, and in the end to be accountable to the community. This contrasts with earlier police community relations programs, which sought to develop contacts with the public but did not seek to involve the community either in defining crime problems or ameliorating them.

But community policing has not just served to reorient the ways in which police view the community and their involvement in crime prevention, it has also led to fundamental changes in the organization of the police. Traditional policing has relied on a military model of control, which centralized command and limited discretion of street level police officers (Bittner, 1980; Eck, 1993; Goldstein, 1977; Punch, 1983). Such a command structure has been assumed to be inconsistent with community policing, which naturally placed more emphasis on those police officers closest to the community (Cardarelli et al., 1998; Cordner, 1995; Murphy and Muir, 1985; Roberg and Kuykendall, 1990; Taft, 1986; Peak and Glensor, 1996, Weisburd et al., 1988). Moreover, flexibility is required if the police are to operate in ways that allow them to integrate their efforts with local communities, and direct them at the places where police service is most needed. The street level police officer is the first line of contact between the police and the community, and because of this, community policing has required that more autonomy and discretion be given to these officers in carrying out their duties. This decentralization of command has been defined as a central element of community policing (e.g. see Mastrofski, 1998; Skolnick and Bayley, 1987).


It is against this backdrop that the Israeli National Police began to implement community policing on a large scale. In January of 1995 a unit for the development of community policing was established. Its mission was to implement community policing in all Israeli police stations by the year 2003. Our study was initiated by the Ministry of Public Security in 1996 and over a
three-year period sought to describe and evaluate the progress of Israeli models of community policing (see Weisburd et al., 2001a).

In this paper we describe our main findings regarding community policing in Israel and discuss their implications more broadly for community policing programs in other nations. Overall, our observations suggest that community policing encountered serious barriers in its implementation in Israel, and the main components of community policing were weakened over the course of our study. As discussed below, we find these difficulties to be linked to the speed of implementation of the program, the resistance of traditional military style organizational culture within the Israeli police to the demands of community policing models, and a lack of organizational commitment to community policing. In our conclusions we argue that these barriers to successful community policing are not unique to the Israel case, and are indeed likely to be encountered in the development of community policing in many other countries. Nonetheless, while our study documents the difficulties encountered in implementing community policing in Israel, it also suggests that despite these barriers the program did produce significant and long term impacts on the service orientation of the Israeli police, the growth of the role of local authorities in police decision making and the development of problem oriented policing approaches.

**Research methods**
Policing in Israel is organized as a national police force with six geographic districts (each with two or three sub-districts) and 70 police stations. The main focus of our study was upon four specific police stations in four of these districts that began community policing initiatives in the winter and spring of 1996. The four stations were chosen to represent in broad terms the different geographic and social contexts in which the Israeli police work. So, for example, we chose one station that operated primarily in an Israeli Arab community; another that had responsibility for a section of a large and diverse city; a third with responsibility for a medium sized city with a heterogeneous population; and a fourth, a medium sized city with a large immigrant population. Across these four stations we tracked and analyzed changes in the attitudes of the police toward community policing, their involvement with the community, the methods they used to define and analyze problems, and the nature of the strategies that they employed to deal with those problems.

Over the course of our study, we conducted intensive field observations in these four stations. In three stations, located in cities, such observations were generally carried out weekly. In the fourth, a town with a much smaller population and a smaller number of police, observations were initially carried out weekly, but were switched to once a month in the second year of the study. Field observations were used to observe a number of different types of police work in the stations. Some of these were directly related to community policing, such as observations of the planning meetings for community policing at the
stations or meetings with municipal representatives. But we also went on ride-alongs with patrol officers and investigators, and observed more general activities in the stations.

We conducted three waves of surveys of police officers in the three larger stations, one during each year of our study[1]. The surveys were directed at all officers on duty in each of the three periods, and we achieved a response rate of over 80 percent in each of the stations examined. We also conducted structured open ended interviews with the commissioner of the Israeli police, commanders of the districts and sub-districts where our stations were located, officers in the Community Policing Unit as well as commanders in the stations. During ride-alongs we also conducted informal interviews with patrol officers.

To gain a portrait of the attitudes of the community to the new program we interviewed city managers and mayors in the four study cities. As will be discussed below, a major innovation in community policing in Israel was to involve local authorities in policing issues. Previously, the Israeli National Police did not place great emphasis on the involvement of the local authorities in Israeli policing. We also conducted a survey of 350 community members who had sought service in the newly established “Merczei Sherut LeEzrach,” or Citizen Service Centers which were identified as an important component of the new service oriented community policing philosophy[2].

While we began our research in the four stations, when we observed a growing emphasis on the role of commanders in the implementation of community policing we sought to focus research attention on the larger program as it began to be implemented more generally in Israel. Accordingly, we conducted a national survey of police commanders at the end of the second year of our study, drawing responses from all commanders serving at sub-district and district levels in the country. Our response rate for the survey was 95 percent. We also conducted more intensive observations at one sub-district, in which one of the study stations is located, and which was the first to adopt the community policing approach at the sub-district level.

While we believe that we collected a broad array of data reflecting the development and implementation of community policing, because of the timing of our study we were not able to collect data on police attitudes before the initial implementation of community policing in the study stations. Our study began in 1996, while the Community Policing Unit had already begun developing training and other activities in 1995. Moreover, because of the nature of the early implementation of the program it was difficult to determine when a station would actually begin community policing activities. For example, one station that was scheduled for involvement in the program in 1996 and was considered as a study site, did not actually begin to implement community policing during the three-year study period. Accordingly, in order to observe community policing in action we identified stations that were in the early stages of the program’s implementation. However, because of this we cannot make direct comparisons of attitudes and
behaviors before community policing had begun to affect the stations and after this initial period.

Community policing in Israel: the historical context

Many aspects of the community policing philosophy are found in the early activities of the Israeli police, and can be traced directly to the realities that Israel faced in dealing with large waves of immigration in the immediate period after the state was established. In the immigrant communities the police served as an additional organization that helped them in the absorption process. Police officers were involved in language instruction, they operated community centers, and they often had the main responsibility for assisting these communities in dealing with natural or security emergencies. These roles, it should be noted, are consistent with an important element of the community policing model, which seeks to broaden the police mandate beyond crime control to other community problems (Leighton, 1991, 1994; Sparrow, 1988; Sparrow et al., 1990).

Nevertheless, by the 1960s and 1970s the country faced developments that led to a narrowing of the police role to a more traditional law enforcement approach. Facing rapid urbanization, development of a traffic and commuting culture, an increase in all types of crimes (especially those associated with illicit drugs and organized criminality), and political and social demonstrations that often evolved into violent disorders with casualties and property destruction, the police strengthened its crime control and public order orientation, and weakened its involvement in broader community problems.

A community oriented police focus, though never strong, was not completely abandoned. For example, in 1981 a Police-Community Bureau was created, and was engaged in teaching crime prevention to various groups in the community. In the 1980s the unit and role of “Neighborhood Policemen” was established to help organize neighborhood crime prevention and to observe and collect data on neighborhood problems and groups that might cause crime and disorder. Importantly however, this unit only worked in a few communities for a short time and was abandoned with a sense of failure (Weisburd et al., 1997; Yehezkeally and Shalev, 1995).

The development of the Civil Guard in 1974 also points to the active involvement of the community in the security functions of the police. Civil Guard units in many neighborhoods were organized to deploy volunteers at a level of success that is seldom reported in other countries. As a secondary consequence of the security functions of the civil guard, crime prevention activities were also undertaken. The Civil Guard force at its peak encompassed about 100,000 volunteers. It included volunteers from all walks of life, including high school students.

As this short review suggests, aspects of the community policing approach have always been present in the Israeli police philosophy, but they have played a secondary role. Such functions were weakened because of the saliency given to the security functions of the police that brought to the force leaders and
commanders from the army, and by the growth of concern with crime and subsequent professionalization of policing. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that by the 1990s there was little attention paid in the training of Israeli police to community oriented policing functions (Chakimi, 1996).

Nevertheless, a number of individual commanders began to implement aspects of community policing in the early 1990s. For example, between 1990 and 1993 the Beer Sheva police station developed a number of innovative programs that were service and community oriented and that utilized problem oriented policing techniques. In the case of spouse assault, for example, the police and Naamat (a women’s advocacy organization) cooperated in responding to problems of family violence. The police used its coercive authority after arrests to require treatment within Naamat family violence centers. An evaluation of the program showed a decrease in recidivism rates as compared to the year prior to the program (Shalev, 1993). A similar program for drug addicts was developed in cooperation with Narcotics Anonymous groups in Beer Sheva. Evaluation of this program also produced encouraging findings (Yeheskeli and Shalev, 1995).

Perhaps the best known community oriented crime prevention program developed in Israel prior to the formal establishment of community policing in Israel was initiated in 1984 by Asaf Chefetz, a sub district commander who as police commissioner in the mid 1990s would establish the Community Policing Unit. Chefetz brought police and community together to identify drug dealers and problem locations in Beit Dagon. In its final stage, the police, with cooperation from the community, completely closed off Beit Dagon to drug activity. Though an independent evaluation was not conducted, it is widely believed that drug activity was effectively reduced (Chefetz, 1996).

**The establishment of the community policing unit**

In the USA, the decay of many inner cities and the sense among citizenry that the streets had been lost to vagrants and criminals provided the backdrop for calls for community oriented policing (Weisburd and Uchida, 1993). In many places, citizens, and not the police themselves, were the predominant forces for bringing to the fore community policing programs. In contrast, the impetus for community policing in Israel did not come from citizens, but rather from the efforts of the police to develop innovative and effective new programs. In part because of the successes of earlier programs, as well as the influence of a number of police commanders whose academic training led to their contact with policing trends in the USA and Europe, a Community Policing Unit was established by the Israeli police in 1995.

The idea for the unit came from Brigadier General Dani Gimshi, who had been exposed to community policing at Harvard, as a Wexler fellow at the Kennedy School. Brigadier General Gimshi drew from his experiences in the USA in his initial efforts to establish community policing models in Israel (Gimshi, 1994). The then commissioner of police, Asaf Chefetz, was also interested in developing innovative policing models. His own experience as a
When community policing in Israel was envisioned and planned it was seen as the impetus for a total reformation of the Israeli police in structure, philosophy and action. The responsibilities of the Community Policing unit included: training police officers, citizens, public officials at the city level and employees of other community services; development of community policing projects in police stations, based on multi-agency work and problem oriented policing methods; and encouragement of an organizational culture that would support community policing within the Israel National Police (Gimshi, 1995a). The implementation of community policing was to include:

- Activities to change the values, opinions, attitudes, and job perception of police officers at all ranks of the organization;
- Activities to initiate and develop programs and organizational mechanisms to enhance cooperation between the police and groups and organizations in the broader community;
- The unit was given responsibility for implementing community policing for the Israeli National Police as a whole. In the first year of the program four stations were chosen as models for initial implementation of community policing. A plan was developed that called for the implementation of community policing in all 70 police stations in the country by the year 2003.

Community policing in Israel was defined at two separate levels. The first level emphasized the importance of change in the organizational culture of policing and in the orientation of police work. This is the “community” part of community policing in Israel, which called for a more service oriented policing that works with and for the citizen. In this context the Community Policing Unit called for the development of greater autonomy and flexibility of street level police officers, who would be the front line in the everyday contacts between the police and the public. At this early stage the Community Policing Unit argued that its main “focus should be on the field level police officer’s work, who should work from a 'statesman' point of view and not as an obedient clerk” (Gimshi, 1995a, p. 8). The second level was concerned more with changes in the strategy of policing than with the dimension of community. It emphasized problem-oriented approaches to policing (Gimshi, 1995a).

While the introduction given to community policing at community policing workshops and other meetings with local police emphasized the element of community and the importance of changing the role of street level police officers, in practice the stations were encouraged to begin community policing by taking a problem-oriented approach to specific problems. At community policing workshops, the participants were encouraged to define and develop solutions for serious problems in the community. Such problems varied from
spouse abuse to traffic problems to drug dealing. The Community Policing Unit representatives argued that finding solutions to such problems provided a first important step in building trust between police and community. The two approaches were thus presented as complementary.

**Shifting responsibilities in implementing community policing**

The responsibilities and activities of the Community Policing Unit changed during each year of our observations. At the outset a single “referant” or “advisor” was assigned from the Community Policing Unit to each of the stations that implemented community policing. However, as the program expanded the unit could not continue to provide the same degree of supervision for each station that had been provided at the outset. By January 1997, 16 stations and four districts were involved in community policing at various stages. While the size of the Community Policing Unit also grew (from 7 to 14 officers), it was obvious that the community policing “advisors” could not continue to work intensively with each station that adopted the program as pressures began to implement the program throughout the country. As a result of these pressures, the members of the Community Policing Unit began to work with the sub-district and district commanders, who were given direct responsibility for implementing community policing in the stations.

By 1998, the main efforts of the Community Policing Unit were directed at higher level police commanders. Instead of running three-day training sessions for individual stations, they sponsored training sessions for police commanders. There continued to be an emphasis on community-oriented policing and problem-oriented approaches. However, during this period a new emphasis began to overshadow other elements of community policing. The first prototype of the new approach was developed in the summer of 1997, and was titled “Policing By Objectives.” From the Community Policing Unit’s point of view, it was seen as an integral part of the implementation of community policing, but it focused not on the philosophy of community policing, but rather on how the objectives of community policing could be achieved and measured.

The initiative for the approach came from three sources. First, the Community Policing Unit sought to develop new measures to assess community policing activities in the country. Second, as part of a strategic planning process initiated in 1996, the Israeli National Police sought to identify measures of outcomes that could assess police performance more generally. Finally, one district commander who was strongly committed to community policing sought to define methods of evaluating the implementation of community policing in his district. He recognized that conventional police measurement of performance, as indicated by arrests or evaluations by supervisors, would not tell him whether the goals of community policing were being met.
While the first test of “policing by objectives” was conducted in that district, another sub-district instituted the program as part of the strategic planning process some six months later. Importantly, in this district no connection was made between community-oriented policing and policing by objectives. This fact was to have important implications for the development of community policing with the arrival of a new police commissioner, Yehuda Wilk. Shortly after his appointment in January 1998, he issued a command that all police stations in Israel adopt the “policing by objectives approach” by April of 1998 (Commissioner’s speech at the Command Staff Meeting, February 1998). It was expected that the higher levels of the police would adopt the same approach, structured according to their objectives, a year later. There was no mention of community policing in the order, and it was understood by commanders in the field that “policing by objectives” was a new program of the new police commissioner.

Soon after this, a plan for reorganizing the Community Policing Unit was implemented. The Community Policing Unit was now integrated with the Civil Guard Department to form a new Department of Community and Civil Guard (Agaf Kehilla Ve’Mishmar Ezrachi) in the Israeli police. For all practical purposes, the new structure led to the end of direct development of community policing in the field. The Community Policing Unit was no longer responsible for direct implementation of community policing. This now became the responsibility of Civil Guard officers. These police officers at national headquarters, district and sub-district levels, however, were unfamiliar with the concept and implementation of community policing and were hardly active participants in the process up until this time.

The new commander of the Community and Civil Guard Department hoped that the integration of the Civil Guard (Mishmar Ezrachi) and the Community Policing Unit would solve the problem of the lack of adequate personnel in the implementation of community policing throughout the country. In practice however, the implementation of community policing came to a halt in this period. With the exception of one district in Israel, where the commander continued to be interested in implementing community policing, community policing had little official role in practice in the field.

Outside of training in the “policing by objectives” approach which was provided by the new Community and Civil Guard Department, few training seminars or other activities related to community policing were carried out in the stations. But specific programs initiated by the Community Policing Unit were continued. For example, models for reducing family violence and developing stronger relationships with local schools continued in many stations. Nonetheless, with the exception of the community policing mini-stations, which became the main representation of community policing during this period, the efforts to develop and implement specific community policing models declined both in our study stations and in Israeli police stations more generally in the final months of our study.
Community policing in practice: study findings

In evaluating the development of community policing in Israel we have by necessity examined a broad group of phenomena using a series of distinct methods. In turn, our research has yielded a wide array of findings that cannot be summarized simply. Nonetheless, we can divide our principal findings into those that relate primarily to the role, activities and attitudes of the police and those that concern the attitudes and involvement of the community. Our main findings in each of these areas are summarized below.

The role, activities and attitudes of police officers

In our initial observations of the stations in the first year of our study, we did not find significant evidence of the penetration of community policing into the everyday activities of police officers. We did observe specific examples of police who took a more community oriented approach to citizens, or sought to develop innovative problem-solving approaches. Nonetheless, what is most striking in our observations in the field is that police officers seldom thought to involve citizens in their work, and were unlikely to analyze incidents that they responded to as part of larger problems – both central elements of community-oriented policing as defined by the Community Policing Unit. It was rare for street level police officers to initiate contacts with citizens or to engage in crime prevention rather than simple response policing. It is interesting to note that police officers in the field often defined their traditional police work as part of community policing. Many field level police officers believed that they “had been doing community policing all along.” We heard this statement in the field time and time again.

At the same time, the police officers we surveyed recognized the fact that community policing did demand change in the work of the police. Almost half of the officers surveyed in each of the three waves of the survey agreed or agreed strongly that “community policing changes police work” (see Table I), 21 percent or fewer disagreed or disagreed strongly with this view. Importantly, we do not find significant differences between the three survey waves, suggesting that such attitudes remained fairly constant across the three years of our study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
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</tr>
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<td>35.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<td>333</td>
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</table>

Table I. Community policing changes police work (by wave)
While such attitudes toward community policing remained constant, our survey illustrates the overall decline in community policing activities over time. In the first wave of our study, almost half of the police officers we surveyed told us that they were involved in community policing activities (see Table II). In the second wave of the study only 20 percent of the officers told us this, and in the final wave only 16 percent told us that they were involved in community policing programs or activities. These differences are statistically significant, and follow our field observations, which also suggested a decline in involvement in community policing over time in the study stations.

The decline in involvement in community policing over time is found both among supervisors and non-supervisors in the stations studied (see Table III). However, in each wave of the survey a much larger proportion of supervisors told us that they were involved in community policing than non-supervisors. In the first year, supervisors were about twice as likely to report involvement in community policing projects or activities. In the second and third years of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
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<th>N</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
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Table II. Are you personally involved in any community policing project? (by wave)

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<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
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<th>No (%)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>83.3</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
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<td>87.6</td>
<td>233</td>
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</table>

Table III. Are you personally involved in any community policing project – by rank (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>p &lt; 0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>11.062</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
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<td>Third</td>
<td>9.418</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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our survey, the ratios are even larger. This finding is particularly interesting given the emphasis on street level police officers in the development of community policing in other countries. While the reasons for this focus on police supervisors are complex, our field observations suggest that the Community Policing Unit quickly recognized the difficulty of empowering street level officers in the highly structured and hierarchical organizational context of the Israeli police and thus began to rely more and more on police supervisors. Moreover, as noted earlier, as the resources of the unit were strained by the expansion of the program, the “advisors” were forced more and more to rely on supervisors in the stations, sub-districts and districts. Reflecting this, in the last year our study we found that Community Policing Unit officers often referred to supervisors in the stations as “field level officers.”

A central idea of community policing is that the community play an important role in defining the problems the police are to address and the strategies they should use (Bayley, 1988; Goldstein, 1987). This aspect of community policing was also stressed by the Community Policing Unit in its publications and in its training seminars (Gimshi, 1995a, b, 1997). While we do not have data before the initial training of police officers in the study stations, our survey results suggest overall that Israeli police officers recognized this basic component of the community policing approach. For example, 66 percent of the officers surveyed in the first year of our study agreed or agreed strongly that community policing encourages the involvement of the community in crime prevention (see Table IV). In the second and third waves of the survey about 70 percent of those surveyed agreed or agreed strongly with this view. Similarly, police officers in the stations recognized that community policing should encourage the police to be concerned about improving the overall quality of life in their communities. In all three waves of the survey about three quarters of the officers agreed or agreed strongly that “community policing seeks to improve the quality of life of the community” (see Table V)[3].

While these findings suggest that police officers recognized basic elements of community policing; other items in our survey suggest that they often confused community policing with other more general goals or approaches in policing. For

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
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<tr>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Pearson chi-square</td>
<td>12.316</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>778</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV. Community policing encourages citizen involvement in crime prevention (by wave)
example, in the second and third waves we asked whether reduction in response time was an important component of community policing. More than three quarters of the officers told us it was (see Table VI). Similarly, we asked if increasing the number of arrests was an important element of community policing. Across the three waves of the survey, agreement with this item grew significantly from 39 percent to over 52 percent (see Table VII).

When we look at the role police believe the community should play in community policing, we again find strong general support for core components of the community policing approach. For example, a majority of officers in each of the three waves of the survey agreed or agreed strongly that “citizens are important partners in police work” (see Table VIII). Indeed, over time there was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>219</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>343</td>
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</table>

Table V.
Community policing seeks to improve the quality of life of the community (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>215</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>341</td>
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Table VI.
Reducing response time is an important element of community policing (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
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<td>27.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table VII.
Increasing the number of arrests is an important element of community policing (by wave)
a significant increase in support for this perspective. Similarly, more than 70 percent of the police officers surveyed in each of the three years of our survey believed that the police “should consider community needs when developing good police work” (see Table IX). These items suggest that while the activities of community policing declined over the course of our study, support for core community policing values regarding the involvement of the community did not decline, and indeed, in some cases strengthened over time.

Despite support for these perspectives, it is clear that the professional model of policing which emphasizes the primacy of police in defining the strategies of policing is still very salient among Israeli police officers. When we asked, for example, in the second and third waves of the survey whether officers agreed that the police know better than citizens “what types of police service are needed,” more than 60 percent agreed or strongly agreed (see Table X). Such attitudes were often expressed by officers in the field. As one supervisor told us in explaining why he did not need to go to the community to ask their views: “I know the problems of the city. And I can develop strategies without city officials.”

Our field observations suggest that many Israeli police officers were not convinced of the value of community policing in Israel. This is also reflected in our survey. About a quarter of those surveyed in each of the three waves of our survey told us that community policing is “a waste of time and personnel” (see

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
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<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
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<td>40.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>345</td>
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**Table VIII.**
Citizens are important partners in police work (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
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<th>Significance</th>
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<tr>
<td>37.994</td>
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<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>First</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
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<td>43.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>343</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Table IX.**
Police should consider community needs when developing good police work (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.985</td>
<td>6</td>
<td><em>p &lt; 0.090</em></td>
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</table>
A similar number of police officers agreed or strongly agreed that “community policing is not practical” (see Table XII). It is important to note in this regard, that police we spoke to often attributed the main problems of the Israeli police to a lack of resources and manpower. As one officer told us, “It all comes down to one thing, the problem is manpower.”

Despite these concerns, a clear majority of Israeli police believe that “community policing needs to be part of police work” (see Table XIII). And we found a significant increase over time in those who strongly agree that community policing programs are a necessary part of police work. In the first year of our survey, about 60 percent of the officers surveyed believed strongly that “community policing programs are necessary in police work” (see Table X).
In the third year, 70 percent of the officers surveyed strongly agreed with this statement.

Community policing at the command level
As described earlier in our report, the growing pressures to expand community policing throughout Israel led to an important change in the implementation of the project. The Community Policing Unit could no longer be expected to manage the development of community policing in all of the stations. Because of this, the responsibility for implementing community policing at the station level was shifted to the command staff of the sub-districts and the districts. As a result of this change in strategy, the Community Policing Unit began to focus its training efforts as well at the district and sub-district levels and at national headquarters.

An important question raised by this change was to what degree the community policing philosophy and approach was reflected in the attitudes of police commanders at this higher level of Israeli police organization. Given their responsibility for implementing community policing in the stations, their knowledge of and support for community policing became particularly important. We have already noted that supervisors in the stations were more active in community policing efforts. We sought to identify how the commanders at the district and sub-district levels and at national headquarters (generally referred to as command staff), who were now central to community policing, viewed the community policing program and perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
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<td>DF 8</td>
<td>Significance</td>
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Table XIII. Community policing needs to be a part of police work (by wave)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
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<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
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<td>N</td>
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Overall, command staff, as compared with police officers in the stations, are significantly less likely to see community policing as a program that “changes police work.” Of the police officers, 46 percent in the stations in the second wave of the survey believed that community policing changes the work of the police[4]. This was true for only one third of the command level officers (see Table XV). Similarly, when asked whether community policing programs are “necessary in police work” 21 percent of officers in the stations strongly agreed (see Table XVI). This was true for only 11 percent of the command staff sample.

While these findings suggest that the importance of community policing as a program was somewhat more strongly established in the study stations than at the command level, it is clear that the relevance of community per se and the utility of community policing as an idea was strongly established at the command level as well. For example, only 40 percent of the command staff agreed or agreed strongly that “police know better than citizens what police services are needed” (see Table XVII). We found in contrast that almost two thirds of the officers in the stations agreed with this item, and the difference here is statistically significant at a high threshold ($p < 0.001$). In this context, command staff officers were also very likely to agree that community policing “needs to be a part of police work.” Almost two thirds of the command staff agreed or agreed strongly with this item (see Table XVIII). This was true for

<table>
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Table XV.
Community policing changes police work – by sample

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Table XVI.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XVII.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XVIII.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XIX.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XX.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XXI.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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Table XXII.
Community policing programs are necessary in police work – by sample

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<td>33.9</td>
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about 55 percent of the officers in the stations. Following the general support for the idea that community policing should be part of police work, command staff are also significantly less likely than officers in the stations to agree that community policing is not practical. Only 13 percent of the command staff officers argued that community policing was not practical, as contrasted with more than 25 percent of the officers in the stations (see Table XIX).

In defining what community policing is, the command staff officers are significantly less likely than police officers in the stations to attribute more general goals of policing to community policing. However, they are also less likely to see active community involvement in crime prevention as part of the community policing philosophy. For example, fewer than one in five of the command staff officers thought that “increasing the number of arrests was an important component of community policing” (see Table XX). This was true for almost half of the officers surveyed in the stations. About 70 percent of the officers in the stations believed that community policing encouraged the “active involvement of the community in crime prevention” (see Table XXI). However, only 56 percent of the command level officers agreed with this item.

We think that these findings overall mirror the trends regarding police programs and philosophy as they were expressed at the command level and at the

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Table XVII. Police know better than citizens what police services are needed – by sample

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Table XVIII. Community policing needs to be a part of police work – by sample
stations during the period of our study. Overall, there has been a strong emphasis on the importance of the community as clients of police services in the Israeli police. This has been emphasized in community policing, but was also an important goal of "policing by objectives." There has clearly been success at the command staff level in emphasizing the importance of service to the community. At the same time, the command level staff were likely to be somewhat less supportive of real involvement of the community in crime prevention, reflecting in

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Table XIX. Community policing is not practical – by sample

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Table XX. Increasing the number of arrests is an important component of community policing – by sample

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Table XXI. Community policing encourages active involvement of the community in crime prevention – by sample

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Table XIX. Community policing is not practical – by sample

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Table XX. Increasing the number of arrests is an important component of community policing – by sample

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<td>3</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.001</td>
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</table>

Table XXI. Community policing encourages active involvement of the community in crime prevention – by sample
Attitudes of citizens and the local authorities

From the outset, the Community Policing Unit looked to city officials to represent the needs of the community. While in the context of US or European programs this would seem to diverge from the idea of bringing the police closer to people in the community, in Israel this represented a strong step in favor of closer community/police cooperation. As a national police force, the Israeli National Police has not traditionally looked to city officials to develop or implement policing policies (see Weisburd et al., 2001b). When the Community Policing Unit called for more cooperation with local authorities this was seen as a new and innovative approach. In a place where the municipalities did not supervise local policing, and where indeed they often had little effect on policing policies, the call for cooperation between police and the local authorities represented important progress in developing contacts between the police and the community.

Our observations and interviews suggest, in turn, that city officials looked at community policing as a means of empowerment for the municipality. In all four stations studied the police became more involved with city officials than was the case prior to the program. Some city officials looked at this as a first step in the development of a municipal police department. In only one interview did a city official emphasize the importance of giving power to local communities within the municipality as part of their community policing project. Perhaps not surprisingly, in this city there has been the least cooperation between the police and the municipality.

One strongly positive observation is that the municipalities were extremely cooperative in the development of community policing. Municipal officials contributed significant time and effort to the programs, and at times provided financial support. For example, in each of the stations we studied joint patrols were developed in which city officials and police worked together in dealing with such problems as loud noise or disorderly youths. In some areas the municipality provided patrol vehicles for these patrols. However, despite the involvement of the municipality in community policing, in community policing in Israel we observed little involvement of individual citizens or community groups with the program. It is also important to note that city officials noted a decline in cooperative efforts in the last year of our observations, following the more general decline in community policing activities we described earlier.

Attitudes of citizens that seek police service

Improvement in police service was from the outset a central component of community policing in Israel (Gimshi, 1995a, p. 6). In order to evaluate this element of community policing, in the summer of 1997 we surveyed 350 citizens who had come to the stations studied to gain police service. Most of them had come to the
station to report an incident to the police. These contacts were made with a unit in each station called the “Mercaz Sherut LeEzrach” or Citizen Service Center. These centers were established as part of the community policing initiative to improve service to citizens. They combine a broad series of police services under one roof (e.g. complaint filings, gaining forms needed for insurance, etc.).

In the past, there was no systematic approach to dealing with citizens in the stations. When people arrived at a station, they were often sent from office to office and were referred to different units for different issues, sometimes in a different location. Though hard data are not available regarding such contacts, it is generally assumed that this process was frustrating both for citizens and the police. Overall, our survey suggests that this aspect of change has been successful in improving contact with citizens. This finding is also reinforced by our field observations. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily the case that this improvement in police service has reinforced the community policing approach.

Contacts with the citizen service centers were generally positive. Citizens reported that they were seldom told by service center officers that their problems were not problems that could be addressed by the police (see Table XXII). Only 11 percent of the citizens reported that they were told this. A majority of the respondents also said that they were satisfied with the service they received, and only one in five of those surveyed said that they were not satisfied. While we have no data from before the implementation of community policing in the stations studied, responses from the National Survey of Citizen Attitudes Toward the Police conducted by the Office of the Chief Scientist in 1996 suggest that the citizen service centers may have increased citizen satisfaction. In that survey, about 55 percent of those interviewed said that service they had received from police officers at the stations was “professional” (Levinson, 1999). In contrast, 67 percent of those we studied responded that the service they received was professional, and this number is even higher if we exclude non-responses, as was done in the national survey. Excluding non-responses, 79 percent of respondents in our survey say that their treatment was professional. Of course, it may be that the stations we studied had a higher level of satisfaction in the first place, as compared with other stations in the country. We recognize this concern, but since the national data were not broken down by stations we cannot compare our data directly.

Consistent with the community policing approach, seven out of ten of the citizens interviewed agreed or strongly agreed that one should cooperate with the Israeli police (see Table XXIII). An even larger number, over 90 percent,

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table XXII. Citizen’s perception of quality of police service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Was told that police cannot address problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied with how the problem was addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received professional treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agreed that it was important for citizens to cooperate with the police in order to prevent crime. At the same time, the citizens we surveyed seldom saw the police role as expanding beyond issues of crime prevention. When we asked what were the most important aspects of the police job, 70 percent mentioned crime prevention duties. Only 20 percent spoke about reducing disorder or providing assistance and service to citizens. Interestingly, when we asked whether police do in fact respond to nuisance problems, 36 percent agreed or agreed strongly, and only 18 percent disagreed or disagreed strongly (see Table XXIV). In this regard, only 30 percent of respondents thought that the Israeli police was "so focused on crime and security that it does not have time to address other concerns."

When we turn to general awareness of community policing, we find that fewer than a third of those interviewed said that they had heard of community policing. This figure may in some sense be a very positive one, since it is seldom the case that citizens are aware to a very large degree of new police programs. Nonetheless, when we asked those who had heard of community policing what it was, most of them either could not provide an answer or listed characteristics that were not necessarily linked to community policing in Israel. For example, almost a quarter of those responding said that community policing is the Civil Guard. Importantly, the survey was conducted more than two years before the Community Policing Unit was integrated with the Civil Guard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree (%)</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Somewhat agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Israeli police is an organization that one should cooperate with&quot;</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In your opinion, should the community cooperate with the police to prevent crime?&quot;</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XXIII. Police citizen cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the Israeli police address public disorder problems</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Non-response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Israeli police is so focused on crime and security that it does not have time to address other concerns</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XXIV. The Israeli police and other problems
Discussion

When community policing was envisioned and planned in Israel more than six years ago it was seen as part of a total reformation of the Israeli police in structure, philosophy, and action. We find that this broad idea of community policing was not successfully implemented in Israel. Indeed, in this context community policing lost ground in Israel during the period of our study, and it could be argued that it was overtaken by an emphasis on other programs such as “policing by objectives.” Moreover, our study suggests that there were not fundamental changes in the work of street level police officers, though there have been important changes regarding specific aspects of community policing.

Why did the community policing program fail to become implemented as it was initially envisioned by the Israeli police? At the outset it is important to note that enacting change in police agencies is very difficult and that many programs fail to reach the goals they set at the outset. Nonetheless, organizational change in policing is not impossible, and there are a number of recent examples of innovations that have been successfully implemented (e.g. see Eck and Spelman, 1987; Silverman, 1999; Skogan and Hartlett, 1997).

We believe that there are a number of specific explanations for the problems encountered in the implementation of community policing in Israel, though as we will discuss in our conclusions these factors are not exclusive to the Israeli case. First, the goals set at the outset of the program were so varied that success under any circumstances would have been extremely difficult to achieve. The community policing program as it was defined in Israel required a remaking of the Israeli police officer in terms of philosophy and behavior; a restructuring of police work; a restructuring of management within the police; a change in the relationship between the police and local authorities; a change in the relationship between the police and the public; and a change in the priorities of police work. The program of community policing was thus nothing less than a complete metamorphosis of the Israeli National Police as it was organized at the time the program began.

It is of course nearly impossible to implement such massive change at one time. And in this regard we think it natural that any program this broad would end up prioritizing certain elements in specific contexts and times. However, we observed, even in the early implementation of community policing, a tension in regard to which of the proposed changes should be emphasized. In some cases it was the restructuring of police work in terms of a focus on problem-oriented policing which appeared to take precedence. At others it was the development of a more community-oriented police force. We think that the police in the stations were often confused as to what community policing really was. And the realities of implementing change meant that it was difficult, if not impossible, to push each aspect of change simultaneously.

These difficulties were exacerbated by the political realities of policing. Community policing could not remain in just a few pilot stations for an
extended period. This was the case both because of the desire of other stations to join the program, and the fact that the Community Policing Unit believed that the success of the program required it be implemented broadly while it received the support of the Israeli police commissioner. But in order to expand rapidly, the Community Policing Unit was forced to change its emphasis and develop new ways of managing an ever expanding program. Before the program was fully implemented and tested in the pilot stations, it was expanded to other stations. Accordingly, scarce resources for program implementation were spread thinly. Whatever contradictions and problems existed in the initial stage of the program’s development were exacerbated when it began to be expand across the country. Expansion of the program too quickly is thus a second explanation for the failure of community policing as an overall program of change in the Israeli police.

An additional explanation for the weakening of community policing as these organizational changes developed was the overall resistance of the organizational culture of the Israeli police to structural changes suggested by community policing. The Israeli National Police, like many other police agencies around the world, remains strongly committed to a military style of management which emphasizes the importance of control and the role of commanders and supervisors in managing police work. However, as noted in our introduction, community policing naturally emphasizes the role of street level police officers and encourages their autonomy. We observed in our study strong resistance to the granting of such autonomy and authority to lower ranking police officers in Israel.

Finally, we think it is important to emphasize the lack of organizational commitment to community policing from the outset. Though in its initial stages the program received the full support of the Israeli police commissioner, it was initially implemented only in stations in which the station commander and the district and sub-district commanders voluntarily agreed to be part of the program. The fact that police commanders could resist the development of community policing sent a message that organizational change was not necessarily inevitable. Moreover, the program was never to have the full weight of authority, and financial, and personnel resources that was required for a full and radical change in police organization, philosophy and actions.

While the program as a cohesive program was not implemented, some of its philosophy and approach were partially assimilated into the Israeli police. In this sense, though the program of community policing was not successfully implemented, it has in our view had specific and long lasting effects on the way the police understand their role in Israeli society and the ways in which they structure and carry out their work.

Perhaps the most significant change is in the development of a service orientation in the Israeli police. Whether we look at the survey results in the pilot stations we studied, or among the national sample of police commanders, it is clear that Israeli police at all levels now understand the importance of
providing service to the community. Just a few years ago, the idea of service was seldom raised.

It is also the case that the development of new institutions within the Israeli police that continue to be reinforced is also a legacy of the program of community policing. The Citizen Service Centers (Mercazei Sherut LeEzrach) have now been placed in all police stations in Israel. Our results suggest that this is an important innovation that does in fact influence the ways in which the public receives police service, and the ways in which the public views the police. Community policing mini-stations (Mercazei Shitur Kehiliti) also have become an important part of Israeli policing. Nearly all police stations in Israel now have such mini stations.

Beyond the idea of a service oriented policing, we also observed changes in the ways in which the police interact with the community. Community policing has served as a first step in providing local authorities with a say in what the police do in their communities. We found that local authorities were receptive and supportive of community policing, in part because it recognized that local authorities had a role to play in policing. The idea of including local authorities in decision making has become an established part of the Israeli policing philosophy.

Finally, the emphasis on problem-oriented policing as part of community policing has had important impacts upon the more general operations of policing in Israel. The problem-oriented policing models developed for schools, domestic violence and other specific problem areas continue to be implemented. The problem-oriented policing approach was also crucial to the development of other programs in the Israeli police such as “policing by objectives” and, more recently, Compstat (see Weisburd et al., 2001a). It is important to note in this regard that problem-oriented policing, like community policing more generally, has been implemented primarily at the management level. Our observations suggest that it has had much less impact on the everyday activities of policing.

Conclusions
While a case study in a specific country, we think our research has broader implications for the successful implementation of community policing. In considering the adoption of community policing, our study emphasizes the importance of recognizing at the outset the scope of the changes demanded by implementation of community policing models. We think that community policing might have had greater success in Israel if, at the outset, a more limited set of initiatives and goals had been defined, or if elements of the program had been clearly prioritized. This type of realistic appraisal of what is possible is essential in the development of a successful community policing program in any setting.

Moreover, police agencies that seek to successfully implement community policing must resist pressures to expand too quickly. While it is a reality of organizational life in many police departments that new programs become
institutionalized before they are fully developed and proven, it is clear that the pressures for expansion of the community policing program were an important part of the decline of community policing in Israel. Programs must not be fully implemented before they are shown to be ready for such expansion.

It is also important to recognize the potential conflicts between the traditional military model of police organization and the decentralization demanded by community policing initiatives (see Mastrofski, 1998; Weisburd et al., 1988; Weisburd et al., 2001). Any change, like community policing, which seeks to grant greater autonomy and authority lower down the organizational hierarchy is likely to face strong resistance within police agencies (like the Israeli police) which have strong traditions linked to the military and that continue to show a strong commitment to military styles of control. In programs that seek to change organizational structure and police behavior, the police must define new mechanisms of supervision and control that reinforce such changes (see Weisburd et al., 1988). In the development of community policing in Israel such mechanisms were never developed, and thus the program was at odds with the organizational structure that was trusted with implementing it.

Finally, to implement organizational change there must be an unambiguous commitment to that change. Accordingly, the change must be supported both by the command structure and through the provision of resources sufficient to carry out the changes proposed. A fundamental change such as that demanded by community policing requires a full measure of support from the police as an organization. As noted above, this was not the case in the original development of community policing in Israel, but must be part of any broad change such as that demanded by community policing.

Notes
1. We decided to exclude responses from the smallest station because a very small number of police officers are permanently assigned there. For example, in the first year of the study we were able to survey only 15 officers in that station.
2. Citizens were asked to complete a survey after leaving the service centers. In this case, as with the survey of police officers, we report responses only for the three larger stations. While we initially attempted to carry out the survey in the small station as well, the number of responses gained was very small (because few citizens came to the service center on an average day) and thus we discontinued our efforts.
3. The changes over time in this table are statistically significant. While, overall, there appears to be a shift toward greater agreement with the item (e.g., see the strongly agree column), this change is not linear. For example, there was a decline in the proportion of officers who “agreed” with the item over the three waves.
4. We use the second wave of the survey in the stations as a comparison because it is closest in time period to the survey of police commanders.
5. We include missing values as a valid category in this table and Table XXIV because there is a relatively large number of such responses for these questions in the survey.
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Community policing and the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

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Keywords Police, Strategy, Northern Ireland

Abstract In deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland the question of police reform cannot be divorced from broader political issues. This article looks at the connections between police reform and the political process, in the particular context of the recommendations of the Patten Report, which put forward a framework for a fundamental reform of policing in Northern Ireland. The problems encountered during the subsequent reform process – both political and institutional – are discussed. It is argued that the model of a decentralized and democratically accountable police service, based on the core principle of community policing, although not fully realized, offers a model for policing in societies which are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic.

Policing divided societies
Whatever way community policing is defined, as a philosophy or an operational concept, the practical success of any model depends upon two factors: that the police are not seen as the direct agents of state power and coercion and that the values and norms associated with a particular conception of community are widely shared. In societies which are divided on ethnic, racial or religious grounds, such prerequisites are often conspicuous by their absence. However, if such divided societies are to develop workable and democratic structures, the reform of the police and policing practice can become a central political preoccupation.

Although all of Ireland was ruled from London until 1922, and Northern Ireland still remains within the orbit of the Westminster parliament, the development of policing reflected the particular colonial status of Ireland rather than the situation in the rest of the UK (Brodgen, 1987; Ellison and Smyth, 2000; Palmer, 1988). Indeed, the model of policing developed in nineteenth century Ireland, involving a centralized force organized and trained on military lines, became a model for colonial police forces in the British Empire.

The central difference between the two types of policing in the UK and Ireland was that while there was a deliberate and sustained attempt to establish the legitimacy of the police in England by depoliticizing the nature of policing (Reiner, 2000, p. 9) the police in Ireland was faced with a population which, by and large, was hostile to colonial rule. The minimum requirement for police legitimacy, as summarized by Reiner, did not apply to Ireland as a whole prior to 1922 nor to Northern Ireland after that date:

Police legitimacy means, at a minimum, that the broad mass of the population ... accept the authority, the lawful right, of the police to act as they do, even if disagreeing with, or regretting some specific actions (Reiner, 2000, p. 9).
In divided societies the locus of political mobilisation is less a matter of class position than membership of a particular group and allegiance to the identity of that group. Group identity can be gender, ethnic, religious or racially based, or an amalgam of all these factors. Although class differences do exist in divided societies and material inequalities play an important role, people tend to experience exploitation as cultural rather than economic (Fraser, 2000). In the social science literature, divided societies, such as Northern Ireland, have been regarded as having missed the high road to modernization, thus allowing the debris of history to dominate internal political development (Alexander, 1995; Eder, 1993). Yet theories which postulate the onward march of modernisation are challenged by a global reality of conflict increasingly dominated by questions of identity and ethnicity and a resurgence of fundamentalism.

The reality of capitalism operating on a global scale has impacted negatively on the national and international prospects for economic redistribution. The increasing inability of national governments to influence economic and social developments has eroded the legitimacy of nation states and contributed to the rise of identity politics as an arena of conflict and mobilization (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1995; Smyth, 1998). The impact of globalization on social cohesion and the increasing tendency of groups to embrace identity politics adds a particular relevance to the study of conflict in divided societies such as Northern Ireland. The experience of policing there over the last three decades of internal conflict and the current efforts to reform policing structures and practices as part of a broader political settlement could well be crucial reference points for future developments in policing around the world. States are increasingly confronted by heterogeneous social entities and localized politics which emerge in response to the impact of globalization and its effects on cultural autonomy, immigration flows and local economies. Nation states, and even supra-national entities such as the European Community, can no longer depend upon universally shared conceptions of valid normative practices policed by the institutions of the state. Cultural diversity, the increased porousness of state boundaries and normative institutions, calls for flexible and decentralized systems of social control, and institutions such as the police – not famous for their ability to embrace institutional and cultural change – must rise to this challenge. It is within this context that the policing reforms now underway in Northern Ireland – a society deeply divided on ethnic grounds – have a significance which transcends the local.

**The question of legitimacy**
Democratic societies depend for their stability on the legitimacy of economic, social and cultural practices endorsed by the state and enforced, if necessary, by force. If the broad mass of the population refuses to accept the right of the state to act in a particular way, there exists the potential for a legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1976, pp. 33ff.). Historically, advanced Western societies have been successful in institutionalizing conflicts over economic distribution and other areas of material reproduction. But as Habermas and others have pointed
out, the locus of conflict in advanced societies has shifted to the “grammar and forms of life”, that is, questions of cultural domination and exclusion (Habermas, 1987). Forms of conflict which were seen as relics of past historical eras and confined to countries and regions which had stumbled on the path to modernization have resurfaced to threaten the stability of long established nation states.

Conflicts, which focus upon cultural discrimination and exclusion, have the capacity to undermine the legitimacy of state institutions and practices and challenge long established practices. In Britain, for example, two important pillars of state legitimacy, the police and the monarchy, are currently suffering from a deficit in this area. It was the challenge from politicized minority groups that fundamentally undermined the legitimacy of policing in the UK (Reiner, 2000, pp. 47ff.). The running sore of the treatment of the Irish in the UK and a number of high profile miscarriages of justice cases was less important, because of the political nature of the conflict between Irish nationalism and the UK state, than the involvement of the police as the agents of the cultural and economic exclusion of the black population.

In societies with disaffected minorities suffering from economic and cultural exclusion, the police can find themselves patrolling the crucial interface between state and citizen. This may involve a realignment of police practice from fighting crime to the enforcement of a particular political and cultural agenda. The Stephen Lawrence inquiry into the murder of a black teenager in London demonstrated how far the Metropolitan Police had embraced, formally and informally, a policing practice that ignored the concerns of the non-white population. In deeply divided societies such as Northern Ireland the practices of exclusion and discrimination are embedded in the very nature of policing itself.

In their role, perceived or otherwise, as the direct agents of state power and the enforcers of exclusionary practices, the police bear the brunt of the legitimacy deficit of the state as a whole and become a metaphor for deeper social, cultural and economic problems. For excluded groups and minorities, the reform of policing becomes a crucial test of the willingness of the state to reform its broader practices and redefine the nature of legitimacy.

Policing and political compromise

It would be impossible here to give more that the most cursory outline of the conflict which ravaged Northern Ireland for almost three decades. Deep divisions over nationality, identity and ethnicity, the result of a colonial past, fuelled an armed conflict between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – supported by its political wing, Sinn Féin – and the British state with which the Protestant majority wished to retain a political and constitutional union: the terms “Protestant” and “Unionist” are virtually synonymous. By the beginning of the 1990s it was becoming increasingly clear that there could be no clear-cut military victory for either side and secret and protracted negotiations led to the declaration of a cease-fire in 1995.
In April 1998 what came to be known as the Belfast Agreement[1] was accepted by the main political parties in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. A referendum on the agreement was held in both parts of Ireland, which demonstrated popular support for its implementation. The agreement, the result of torturous and protracted negotiations, was designed to form the basis for a political settlement, setting out complex constitutional, political and administrative structures designed to foster the participation of both nationalist and unionist communities in a devolved government and administration. Although the agreement did not deal directly with the sensitive question of policing, the centrality of the policing issue to any lasting political settlement was acknowledged. In addition, provision was made to set up a commission to investigate the problem of policing and recommend changes – short of disbandment – to the organisation and practice of the police. In the words of the agreement:

The participants recognize that Northern Ireland’s history of deep division has made it [the question of policing] highly emotive … They believe that the agreement provides the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole (Belfast Agreement, 1998, p. 22).

A commission was duly set up under the chairmanship of Chris Patten, one-time Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and last Governor of Hong Kong[2] The commission consulted widely, both internally and internationally and held a large number of public meetings across Northern Ireland. The commission published its report in September 1999 making far-reaching and radical recommendations for the reform of policing. The report, entitled *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland* (henceforth the report), clearly acknowledged the importance of reforming the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) for the successful implementation of the constitutional, political and administrative reforms put in place after the Belfast Agreement. The report also stressed the sensitivity of the policing issue and the necessity to consider it separately:

... the issue of policing is at the heart of many of the problems that politicians have been unable to solve in Northern Ireland, hence the fact that we were asked to consider the question ourselves (Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999, p. 2).

From the outset, the report acknowledged that there had been “a failure to find an acceptable democratic basis for the governance of Northern Ireland that accommodated the rights and aspirations of both unionist and nationalist communities” (p. 2). Although the report stressed the “unique” problems facing a police service in the particular social and historical circumstances of Northern Ireland, the point was also made that the challenges faced were, in general terms, common to an increasingly globalised and multi-ethnic world:

This brings us to the point made in Chapter 1, that the problems faced by the police in Northern Ireland are in a sense unique to a divided society but that many of them are general policing issues confronting police elsewhere in the world (p. 16).
Given the increasing pace of the global movement of populations and the growing assertiveness of ethnic, religious or gender based groupings within historically homogeneous societies, the problems facing Northern Ireland in dealing with the reality of a divided society have a wider resonance. The sociological reality of the RUC as "white, male and protestant"[3] may be unique, but this is less because of the particular and historically contingent combination of race, gender and religion than the identification of the police there with one particular state form and conception of legitimacy. The section dealing with policing in the Belfast Agreement was careful to put the problem within the context of what were seen as internationally acceptable norms and practices:

The participants (to the agreement) believe that it is essential that policing structures and arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan political control; accountable, both under the law and to the community it serves; representative of the society it polices, and operates within a coherent and cooperative criminal justice system, which conforms with human rights norms (p. 22).

Reforming the police: the response of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

It is a constant refrain of serving and retired police officers, as well as some academic commentators, that the RUC would like nothing better that a return to "normality", a state which allegedly existed before the onset of civil unrest in 1969. According to this version of history, there was little conflict between the police and the citizen, and whatever conflict there might have been was confined to the activities of a small minority of troublemakers associated with the IRA. The image of generally harmonious relations pervades the memoirs of Sir John Hermon who was Chief Constable of the RUC during the 1980s, a decade when the counter insurgency operation against republicanism was at its height. The Police Federation, in its 1993 Conference Report, looked forward to the day when there can be a return to "normal policing". The present Chief Constable would also share this view:

Our role has been distorted over the past 26 years by a very violent campaign . . . directed very specifically at our men and women. As the source of that distortion in the delivery of the police service is removed, then of course the police service can be enhanced and is being dramatically enhanced by us in terms of our close working relationship with the community (BBC Talkback, 16 June 1995).

Some academic commentators also share this view. It has been opined that prior to 1969 the RUC practiced a form of policing that came close to the "liberal" model current in the rest of the UK. The problem with this approach is that by focusing upon discrete events and particular examples of policing – and for each example of "normal" policing a counter example of "abnormal" policing can be produced (Ellison and Smyth, 2000) – the practice of policing is effectively dehistoricized and decontextualized. As Cain (1979) has pointed out, policing should be analyzed on the basis of its "key practice" which is located within a particular historical and political context. If there was "normal" or
even some form of community policing in Northern Ireland prior to 1969 it was contingent upon the principal role of the RUC in containing and suppressing political dissent from the minority population.

Any large bureaucratic and entrenched organisation will exhibit a tendency to resist change and reform to its structures and practices. This reluctance to embrace change was stressed by the British Inspector of Constabulary with responsibility for the RUC in his submission to a parliamentary committee in February 1998, “There has been a reluctance to take brave decisions and move forward” (Northern Ireland Select Committee, 1998). Over 30 years of civil conflict the RUC understood itself as a bulwark against anarchy and indeed was the central element in the attempt of the British state to defeat the IRA militarily (Ellison and Smyth, 2000). In the wake of the cessation of the IRA campaign, the police establishment used a number of rhetorical strategies to deflect or dilute calls for reform. A central argument put forward was that the RUC was a force engaged in normal policing in abnormal times and would fully return to its normal role as soon as there was no longer a threat from the IRA. Official documents stressed the “abnormal” nature of the conflict in the context of a normal, law abiding society:

Community strife is limited to relatively small areas of Northern Ireland. In the main it is a beautiful country in which many people born elsewhere choose to make their homes and set up business (Police Authority for Northern Ireland (PANI, 1988, p. 2)).

In his Report for 1991, the Chief Constable stressed the low crime rate in Northern Ireland:

Notwithstanding the severity and prevalence of terrorism in Northern Ireland, it is still a fact that the overall crime rate here is lower than in any police force in England and Wales (CCAP, 1991, p. 13).

The thrust of this argument is to portray the RUC as a police force which, despite being at the cutting edge of the longest running counter insurgency campaign in post war Europe, still managed not to lose sight of its normal policing role. In the words of the Chief Constable:

The outstanding issue for comment, and one largely unheralded, is that in the face of rampant terrorism the RUC has managed to deliver a normal policing service at all – which it so clearly has done (Chief Constable’s Address, Force Information Day, April 1995).

Given the particular circumstances under which the RUC operated, as interpreted by the police establishment, it was logical to conclude that the “men and women of the RUC are unequalled anywhere in the policing world” (Belfast Telegraph, 1 November 1997) and to argue that the Patten Commission would conclude that the RUC was “finest police force in the world” (Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1998).

Such arguments – invariably put forward by police forces when faced with criticism – inevitably point to the conclusion that reform of the RUC is unnecessary, or at best should be confined to small-scale organizational changes. In an interview following the IRA cease-fire of 1995, the then Chief Constable...
Constable reduced the question of reform to one of a “shifting of resources” which would not involve any structural changes (Belfast News Letter, 16 March 1995). In a number of interviews in 1997 and 1998, the present Chief Constable reiterated his fundamental opposition to change and deployed a familiar array of arguments: the quality of the RUC, the sacrifice of its members, the absence of public demand for reform and the inherent dangers of community policing (Belfast Telegraph, 1 November 1997; Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1998; Sunday Times, 26 April 1998).

Community policing
The cornerstone of current community policing strategies in England and Wales can be traced back to the report of Lord Scarman, who was charged with investigating the riots of 1980 in British cities. The Scarman Report (Scarman, 1981) recommended greater community involvement in the formulation of policing policy and police operations (Reiner, 1995). The structure to realize this aim was to be a system of consultation between police and public, provision for which was made in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984. The act postulated that police authorities, in consultation with the Chief Constable, should set up structures for the purpose of “obtaining the views of people . . . about matters concerning the policing of the area and for obtaining their cooperation with the police in preventing crime” (PACE 1984, Section 106). A convincing criticism of the new Liaison Committees (as they were to be called) was that their purpose was to be consultation only and did not involve greater accountability of the police to the public (Gordon, 1977, p. 136).

Police Liaison Committees were also established in Northern Ireland in the wake of the Scarman Report but were not a great success. The Patten Report pointed out that only 29 percent of respondents to their own public attitude survey had actually heard of the existence of CPLCs and the Commission gained the overall impression that “ordinary citizens were not in practice using, or able to use the CPLCs as forums for putting across their views” (p. 34).

Prior to the setting up of the Patten Commission, and during its deliberations the question of community policing was high on the agenda of debate on police reform. The RUC and the police authority were firmly opposed to community policing, particularly any reform that would dilute the unitary and centralized structure of the RUC. As early as 1995 the first shots were fired by the then Chief Constable who publicly dismissed any change in this direction:

I would mislead you if I suggested that community policing and local structures can deal with the policing problems of Northern Ireland (Belfast News Letter, 16 March 1995).

The current Chief Constable has deployed an array of objections to the introduction of local policing structures, including the arguments that such reforms would be “too expensive” and that such structures could fall under the control of paramilitary organisations (McGarry and O'Leary, 1999, pp. 80ff.). In 1998 he succinctly summarized his position:
RUC officers act fairly and impartially within the law to serve everyone in the community regardless of religion or creed. Alternative approaches such as “restorative justice” and “community policing” have their supporters. Great care should, however, be taken to avoid the risk that such models are abused by those with distorted concepts of justice as a means of social control (Irish Almanac, 1998, p. 267).

Support for community policing came from within the nationalist community (both nationalist political parties (Sinn Féin and the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) supported some form of two tiered policing) and from human rights organisations and academics[4]. The proposals focused upon increasing the accountability of the police to the community, community participation in policing strategies and practices at local level and the introduction of local policing structures. There is broad consensus among this particular group that two tiered policing would have the effect of both making the police more acceptable to the nationalist community and give the population in general a police force which would be accountable to local communities and capable of dealing efficiently with local policing problems. In their analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of some form of two tiered or federal policing arrangement McGarry and O’Leary (1999, p. 96) conclude:

The effect of any of the models described in this chapter should be the same: to hand more control over policing to different localities in Northern Ireland, and to create policing units with which these localities can identify. This approach has several advantages over the status quo. It would make it much more likely that Northern Ireland would have formal policing; it would satisfy the demands of local communities... for greater control over policing and it would be likely to contribute to a higher rate of Catholics and nationalists to become police officers. It is also an approach that has support among both nationalists and unionists.

The Patten Commission received a large number of submissions from serving and retired police officers stressing the effects of conflict upon “normal” policing:

Submissions from many serving and retired police officers regretted the difficulty of providing a proper community policing service with the constraints imposed on them as a result of the threats to their security… (Patten, 2001, p. 41).

Unlike the security establishment, the report does not share the view that the conflict was responsible for the dearth of community policing. The report characterizes policing in Northern Ireland as “reactive” (pp. 44-5) and “security focused” (p. 45) and rejects the notion that “normal” policing will return as soon as political violence has ceased. The commitment of the report to community policing, in principle, is total. The chapter entitled “Policing within the community” is unequivocal in its insistence that “... policing with the community should be the core function of the police service and the core function of every police station” (p. 43). The report shares the commonly held view that community policing is as much about philosophy as it is about method and stresses that “it amounts to a profound shift in police thinking and community thinking” (p. 41).

Despite the conclusion that the current organizational structure of the RUC “is a product of decades of security policing” and that the force was “driven
more by the response to security threats than to the demands of community policing or managerial efficiency”, the report came out strongly against two-tier (or indeed any form of local structures) on the basis that the establishment of locally controlled force would be inappropriate in a divided society such as Northern Ireland, and might well lead to increased division. It was also thought that local policing would not be “efficient”. In effect the report turned a central argument of the proponents of local policing on its head. The report implicitly rejects the experience of countries such as Belgium and Switzerland where territorially based police forces are an integral part of federal arrangements and designed to reduce the possibility of ethnic conflict. More importantly, the report also rejected proposals for local policing which had considerable cross-community support.

It is not clear from the report why the committee thought that local police forces would, or could, lead to increased division. However, the decision was, to a large extent, compensated by the structures of accountability recommended in the report.

The report rejected the centralized, hierarchical and specialized model of policing practiced by the RUC, implicitly making the same criticism of the Anglo-American model of policing as practiced in the UK as a whole, as well as in the Irish Republic[5]. The objective of the report was to put forward proposals and recommendations that would fundamentally alter the relationship between police and community and establish policing as a “collective responsibility” with policing as a matter for the whole community, not something that the “community leaves the police to do”. Structures should be put in place to transform the “defensive, reactive and cautious” culture of the RUC replacing it with one of openness and transparency (p. 25). By introducing structures of accountability at local and regional levels, mechanisms would be put in place to allow a constructive dialogue between police and community, making policing with the community a “core function of the police service and the core function of every police station” (p. 43).

Central to the report’s recommendations was a model of society where demands for security were to be met by the participation of the local community and agencies, both government and non-government, which would share the responsibility for crime and security. The focus was firmly on the problem of policing and how this problem could be addressed. As one member of the Commission commented, their terms of reference “made it clear that policing is, and should be, more than the police” (Shearing, The Guardian, 14 November 2001).

The report recommended two levels of accountability and participation: a Policing Board with a policing budget and extensive powers to hold the police accountable and practice oversight over their activities. By accepting the concept of the “operational responsibility” of the police the report rejected the traditional doctrine of “operational independence” under which the RUC, and police forces in the rest of the UK, carry out their business. The proposed Policing Board would have the power to call the Chief Constable to account on
all aspects of his brief including the power to investigate operational decisions and, indeed, all aspects of policing. The grounds which the Chief Constable could invoke to avoid scrutiny were strictly limited to “national security, sensitive personnel matters and cases before the courts”. The board was to negotiate the policing budget with the government and then allocate it to the Chief Constable. Powers were also envisaged to allow the board to monitor police performance against the allocated budget. The board would hold public meetings, make its minutes available and receive a monthly report from the Chief Constable at a meeting open to the public.

Local accountability and responsibility was to be achieved by establishing district and community policing arrangements. These local arrangements were a vital part of the recommendations, given the reluctance of the Commission to countenance any form of tiered policing.

A crucial objective of the local policing arrangements recommended in the report was to encourage a move from reactive to problem-solving policing. At local level, community partnerships and liaison committees were to be put in place to achieve this as well as achieving transparency through monthly public meetings between the District Policing Partnership Boards (DPPB) and the local police commander. The local boards would also have the power to buy in extra policing to address their own local problems. This proposal was intended to go some way towards establishing democratic control of public safety and to allow economically deprived communities to address their own particular policing problems.

In general the report took the view that community policing was to be the core principle running through all their recommendations. Other sections of the report dealt with training, human rights and new management structures designed to re-orientate policing away from a reactive security focused practice towards an accountable system embedded in local communities.

Responses to the Patten Report
The response to the Patten Report was predictable, given the deep divisions in Northern Irish society. On the nationalist side, the report was broadly welcomed although some still called for the total abolition of the RUC. Both the nationalist political parties, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, as well as the Irish government[6], indicated their support for the proposals and their desire that they be implemented in full (Irish Times, 1 June; 13 October 2000).

The unionists’ political parties focused on the recommendation that the symbols and name of the RUC should be changed to reflect the nature of the substantive reforms contained in the report. The subsequent heated debate on the name and symbolism of the new police service deflected attention away from issues such as the community policing proposals contained in the report. The unionist emphasis on the changes recommended to the name and symbolism of the RUC crystallized and condensed a more fundamental, if publicly unarticulated, rejection of the divided society model which underpinned the recommendations of the report. The debate was immediately
polarized around an issue which had little to do with the concrete reform proposals put forward and had everything to do with the question of the ownership of the police in a divided society.

The legal status of the report was one of recommendations made to government, which could be rejected, accepted or amended before the enactment of legislation on the future shape of policing. The government response was contained in the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill which was published in May 2000. The Bill was heavily criticized by all shades of nationalist opinion, the Irish and US governments, human rights organisations and the UN (Irish Times, 1 June; 10 January; 22 November 2000). The Bill was seen as undermining or totally disregarding the report’s recommendations in a number of important areas particularly those concerning human rights, accountability, local control and the symbolism of the new service (Hillyard and Tomlinson, 2000; O’Leary, 2000). Despite an intensive and acrimonious debate the Police Act eventually passed by the London parliament in November 2000 was not seen as addressing the concerns of those who had criticized the legislation. Patten’s proposals on issues such as symbolism, accountability and human rights were seen as having been diluted to an unacceptable degree (Irish News, 19 February 2001). An independent member of the Commission, the criminologist Clifford Shearing, was scathing in his criticism of the government’s changes to the report. He wrote (The Guardian, 14 November 2000) that the legislation rejected the “core principle “of the report that “policing is a matter for the whole community, not something that the community leaves the police to do”. He went on to write that “the core elements of the Patten commission’s Report have been undermined everywhere . . . The Patten report has not been cherry picked – it has been gutted”.

The fate of community policing

Central to the conception of community policing contained in the report were the recommendations on decentralization and accountability. Patten proposed that local policing be the core of the new policing arrangements. District Policing Partnership Boards would have a direct input into policing arrangements, have the power to raise money to provide extra policing services, and involve the police with other agencies to resolve problems. These provisions were written out of the legislation. The powers of the local boards to influence a local policing plan were curtailed, the provision for raising finance disappeared, and the idea of a multi agency approach was excised.

Patten’s recommendations on accountability were designed to dismantle the existing centralized and hierarchical model of policing and make policing a matter for society as a whole. The proposed Policing Board would have the role of negotiating the structure and practice of policing in consultation with other agencies and the public. Policing policy would be managed by the police, but they in turn would be accountable to the board. The legislation would seem to strengthen the powers of both the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Chief Constable, allowing the latter to refuse, on a number of grounds,
reasonable requests from the board for information. The powers of the board to initiate inquiries into police malpractice or incompetence recommended in the report were removed. The powers of the board to negotiate a policing budget with government and oversee this budget were returned to the Chief Constable. Patten’s recommendations about transparency and openness have were not realized in the legislation. There was no provision for public access to DPPB meetings or the minutes of the meetings. The police are under no obligation to provide information, as the report recommended, unless it was in the public interest to hold it back.

The rejection of the nationalist political parties and the Irish government, coupled with widespread criticism from other sources, led to intensive negotiations with the British government to revise the Act to bring it back into line with the Patten Report. These negotiations began in the immediate wake of the publication of the Police Act in November 2000 despite the initial insistence of the British government that they were not prepared to amend the Act (Irish Times, 19 January 2001). Serious negotiations between the Northern Ireland political parties and the British government began on 23 January 2001. On the previous day, the Chief Constable signaled that he had “no problem” with Sinn Féin demands for greater powers of accountability and scrutiny (Irish Times, 23 January 2001). Negotiations continued until the summer and culminated with the publication of an updated implementation plan in August entitled “The Community and the Police Service” (generally referred to as the “Implementation Plan”).

The implementation plan clarified and elaborated on a number of issues, which had caused disquiet and promised amendments to the Police Act in particularly contentious areas. Crucially, the implementation plan proposed to amend the Police Act in the contentious areas of community policing, accountability and the powers of the Policing Board and the District Policing Partnerships.

The implementation plan promises to “amend the Police Act to clarify that policing with the community is to be a core function of the police service and its officers” (Recommendation 44) although some may argue that this amendment still falls short of Patten’s unambiguous recommendation that “policing within the community should be the (our italics) core function of the police service and the core function of every police station”.

On the thorny issue of accountability, the implementation plan goes some way towards restoring the proposals of the Patten Report. The autonomy and ability of the Policing Board, as envisaged by Patten, were severely curtailed in the Act, allowing the Chief Constable to invoke a number of clauses to block inquiries into police practices (Section 59, Police Act). Some of these clauses will be removed, but it remains to be seen how this will be framed in the amending legislation. The power of the DPPBs to raise finance for extra policing has been restored. However, Patten’s recommendation that “community partnerships” are an essential part of everyday policing and local problem solving, a recommendation which is not contained in the Police Act, reappears in a very
diluted form in the implementation plan, which talks vaguely of “consultation with community representatives” (Recommendation 49).

The response to the implementation plan was mixed. Sinn Féin rejected it outright on two main grounds: that it did not fully implement the Patten Report in a number of areas, and that the detail of the amendments to the Police Act were not forthcoming (Sinn Féin press release: Response to the Revised Implementation Plan on Policing, August 2001; Irish Times, 25 August 2001). The other elements of the nationalist constituency, the SDLP, the Irish government and the Catholic Church welcomed the implementation plan (Irish Times, 20/21 August 2001). As a consequence of its positive response to the plan, the SDLP agreed to nominate members to the Policing Board. On the unionist side, the Ulster Unionist Party has reserved its position but is expected to nominate members to the new board in the near future, thus allowing the reform process to proceed.

Conclusion
In situations such as Northern Ireland, attempts to reform the police inevitably involve a political dimension and the debate on policing becomes part of a wider political discourse on political reform. Questions of identity also intrude as symbolic issues such as the name and insignia of the new police service dominate the debate. Yet on the question of community policing and accountability, public opinion was clearly in favour of the report’s recommendations[7]. The resistance to reforms in this area came from the RUC itself, the Police Authority, and probably from within the security establishment in the Northern Ireland Office. The Irish government, given that its own police force lacks democratic structures of accountability, was never likely to openly press for the implementation of the community policing aspects of the report.

The ending of the 30-year military confrontation in Northern Ireland presented a unique opportunity not just to reform a police force which was clearly ill-suited to operating in a post-conflict situation, but to address policing issues of broader consequence to a rapidly changing and globalised world.

Although the radical proposals of the Patten Report on community policing were severely diluted in the Police Act and have not been fully restored in the implementation plan, the current proposals – which still await amending legislation – will put structures in place to facilitate community policing structures and practices which have to potential to both transform the nature of policing in Northern Ireland and act as a model for multi-ethnic and culturally diverse societies elsewhere.

Notes
1. The Agreement came about as a result of political negotiations between the local political parties and the two governments in the wake of the cease-fire of 1995. It was designed to set up structures of devolved government and administration. The referendums both sides of the border removed the territorial claim to Northern Ireland from the Irish constitution and made a United Ireland subject to the consent of the population of Northern Ireland.
2. There were eight members of the commission including two police officers, two academic criminologists, a former civil servant, a representative of the business community and a barrister.

3. This description of the RUC is that of the Chief Constable. In an interview he said “policing has tended to be a white, male preserve internationally, and in Northern Ireland a white, male, protestant preserve” (Belfast Telegraph, 1 November 1997).


5. The Garda Siochana in the Irish republic are a centralized unitary force. Although (generally) unarmed, the force retains many of the structures and procedures of its predecessor the colonial Royal Irish Constabulary.

6. The Irish government has called consistently for the “full implementation” of the Patten Report. Although this presumably includes the recommendations on accountability and community policing, these are not ideas that have much resonance with the police hierarchy in the Republic. Investigations into Garda activities (there are three currently ongoing) are invariably carried out internally. On the question of accountability the Garda Commissioner commented recently that the force was “subject to political, financial, community academic and media accountability, as well as accountability to the law. The members of the force are subject to the criminal and civil law of the state” (Sunday Tribune, 2001).

7. Although Unionists did not openly support these recommendations, their criticism was restricted to rejecting ex-political prisoners as suitable recruitment material. The British Prime Minister was quick to reassure them on this point (Irish Times, 12 May 1998)

References and further reading
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Community policing in the Caribbean

Context, community and police capability

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Keywords Trinidad and Tobago, Police, Strategy

Abstract Examines community policing as a relatively new policing feature in the Caribbean. Compares the key expectations of such policies with the officers’ understanding of what such policing means to them. The community policing policy is then assessed against the background of public opinion. Data are then derived from two levels of community policing officers to assess the extent to which the climate in the police service organisation is facilitative for such a new policy of policing. Specific “internal organisation factors” are examined – organisational readiness, individual learning ability and team spiritedness – which will in turn serve as benchmarks for continuous improvement. These data would be useful for increasing community support, enhancing the human resource capability and improving the operations of the organisation and officers themselves, all critical for effective community policing within the region.

Introduction
In 1993, the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), a regional body comprising 24 police jurisdictions, adopted community policing as a policy for these 24 Caribbean states[1]. However, in a 2000 position paper, the ACCP noted that, while some Caribbean states have begun implementing community policing, others have taken either “a luke-warm approach, or have not as yet addressed the issue in any deliberate way” (Guy, 2000).

The turn towards community policing in the Caribbean has rested not only on its intrinsic merits, but on two other related factors:

(1) An admission that “traditional law enforcement” approaches are not working well.

(2) Mainly because of its widely expressed civic purpose and required community partnerships, community policing carries great popular and political appeal.

The Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) defined community policing in the following way:

Community policing is, in essence, a collaboration between the police and the community that seeks to identify and solve community problems. In this way, the police are no longer the sole

The author wishes to thank Mr Hilton Guy, Commissioner of Police, Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and President, Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) for kindly assisting him in gathering information from the police service, much of which is of course being used to help improve the community policing thrust in the police service.
Given the relatively recent though varied implementation of community policing in the Caribbean, the ACCP at its 2001 Annual Executive Meeting established a Caribbean Task Force on Community Policing with the overall objectives of gathering a further understanding of the complexities of community policing and improving its implementation across the Caribbean. Two major sets of issues were noted for attention: the community context of community policing and the internal readiness of the police organisation to deliver the programme (Deosaran, 2000d).

In terms of both policy and practice, community policing has become a very popular option for cities in North America, Europe, Australia and many parts of Eastern and South-East Asia. In some instances, for example in China, community policing became a mode of formalising a lot of what had already existed in terms of community partnerships and services (see for example, Peak and Glensor, 1999; Trojanowicz et al., 1998).

An examination of crime and community policing in the Caribbean is important for other countries to consider – especially the USA, Canada, the UK and Europe – since it is becoming clearer that economic and technological globalisation also carries transnational currents of criminal activities, for example, drug trafficking, customs and immigration scams, transnational terrorism, commercial frauds, tourist crimes, etc.

The increasing flows of economic investment and business traffic between the Caribbean and North America bring into focus the relationship between investment confidence and security and crime, the latter being important in terms of both official crime rates and the fear of crime. The region’s economic attractiveness and its general reliance on tourism, therefore, make safety and security critical matters.

As indicated earlier, while all Caribbean countries have indeed accepted community policing as a policy, the degree of implementation varies from one country to another. Most of the smaller islands have an ambiguous combination of public relations, police patrols and charity acts as community policing programmes. Such variation is not entirely due to a lack of will by the police organisation itself. Take the case of Jamaica. With its very high crime rate and violence, police manpower and public expectations demand that law enforcement become a highly visible priority, leaving little or no time to engage in developing crime prevention or community-inspired programmes.

In fact, the private sector in Jamaica has threatened to mount an all-out campaign against the Government if the Government does not do something quickly to reduce the levels of crime, violence and murders in that country, meaning that short-term law enforcement response should be a top priority. Of course, it is still possible in such a context to utilise such high fear and stringent pressures over serious crime to initiate and integrate the wider parameters of community policing. One of the major obstacles here, however, is that the
statistics on the serious crime rate are still used as the most compelling criterion for judging police performance and government action.

Trinidad and Tobago, with a population of 1.3 million and the most industrialized of these states, remains the most advanced in developing community policing[2]. This advancement was reflected, in 1996, in the joint announcement by the police service and the Government, stating that the restructuring of the service and the provisions of additional resources will support community policing, mainly patrol vehicles and increased manpower. No other Caribbean state has made such commitments to community policing. Even so, related matters such as community response, police conduct and organizational readiness appear to require substantial attention for the effective implementation of community policing (Deosaran, 2000d; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, 2001a).

In adopting the ACCP policy, the Trinidad and Tobago Commissioner of Police himself has therefore begun in 2001 an “immersion programme” within the service, that is, for example, by implementing a series of community policing sensitization seminars for police officers of all ranks. One of the major objectives of such seminars is to help remove the operational lines that tend to separate traditional law enforcement from community policing. While it is too early to measure the results from these and other related training programmes, it is clear that this country is ahead of other Caribbean states in the commitment and implementing of community policing.

Objectives

As such, we wish to take the opportunity in this paper to:

1. Examine the context in which community policing is being implemented in Trinidad and Tobago. This context will be dealt with in two parts: first, public complaints against the police, and second, public awareness and involvement in community policing.

2. Assess the extent to which the police service possesses the organisational readiness to propel the community policing programme.

3. Assess the extent to which the assigned community policing officers themselves possess the learning ability for implementing community policing.

4. Assess the extent to which the community policing officers themselves possess the team spiritedness and inter-personal skills required for effective community policing.

The first objective, the context, seeks to assess the degree of public acceptance for community policing, and in the particular case of public complaints, how police misconduct and the consequent civic protests can become an obstacle to a programme which rests so much on civic acceptance. The other three objectives are essentially human resource issues, that is, the internal capabilities of the police service to drive community policing.
The data from our research on these issues can therefore be useful for increasing community support and enhancing the human resource capability of the organisation and officers themselves. In particular, civic acceptance is the communal platform upon which community policing will find its positive manifestations. Without civic readiness and support, the police will likely be tempted to resort to traditional law enforcement.

Generally, the following ultimate objectives of community policing have been adopted across the Caribbean (e.g. Deosaran, 2000b; Guy, 2000; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, 2001a):

- To reduce violence.
- To reduce crime.
- To reduce the fear of crime.
- To reduce community decay.

These ultimate objectives carry with them a number of well-known mediating factors, for example, the role of community partnerships and inter-agency coordination. These objectives, however, lead to several serious questions: for example, what really does “reducing community decay” mean, even it implies some partnerships with both the community and other social agencies? Can community policing really reduce social decay, considering that a lot of such decay emerges from or is sustained by structural conditions of life (for example, poverty, fragmented families, etc.)? Such questions, as fundamental as they are, have not as yet fully entered the community policing debate in the Caribbean. Much of the enthusiasm is still generally directed to the attractiveness of and expectations from the concept of community policing itself.

Not only has community policing as a concept and practice largely remained “nebulous and at the rhetorical level,” but it has been restrained by several internal organisational factors as well (Rosenbaum and Lurigio, 1994, pp. 1-4). This paper seeks to look at some specific “internal organization factors.” Our data from these four related objectives can serve as benchmarks for continuous improvement.

Even in the countries which had a relatively longer time in implementing community policing, it has become quite apparent that while the concept is quite an attractive one, it requires not only additional physical resources, but organisational and manpower readiness, and equally important – a civic community base upon which to integrate the practice of community policing. Such elements of organisational and civic readiness are now quite critical for community policing programmes in the Caribbean.

We now turn to a consideration of the issues noted earlier and the data collected on each.

**Context: citizens’ complaints**
The number and kinds of citizens’ complaints against the police do have implications for the level of public confidence in the police. Usually accompanied by graphic newspaper details, such complaints include the use of force by the
police. In particular, excessive use of force, including deadly force, causes deep distress within the citizenry. Such distress, particularly in the areas where the use of force was unjustifiably used, would tend to subvert or block the community policing mission. We therefore use such use of force complaints to provide a context in which community policing is being attempted.

In 1993, the country’s Parliament passed an Act (No. 17 of 1993, proclaimed in October 16, 1995) which established a Police Complaints Authority (PCA). This authority has so far produced four annual reports – 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. There is also a Police Complaints Division, which is part of the police administration, serving to receive and process public complaints for eventual submission to the Complaints Authority. Then there is the Police Service Commission, which looks after matters of discipline and promotions. With regard to the Complaints Division, there are several administrative and procedural problems here; a major one, as pointed out by the Complaints Authority, being the fairness of the division’s investigations into the allegations against the police.

There is as yet no dedicated manual on the use of force in this jurisdiction. References to use of force do appear in several places, for example, in the Standing Orders, beat and patrol (Trinidad and Tobago Police Services, 1960) where it is stated: “Arrest only when a warning or proceedings by summons will not meet the case and, if an arrest is necessary, use no more force than is required to apprehend the prisoner or in self-defense” (p. 30). It is very interesting to note, however, that in the new Standing Orders, beat and patrol, (Trinidad and Tobago Police services, 2001), no such condition about the “use of force” is stated. It has been omitted. What we do have in the new Standing Orders are such “guidelines” as: “If it becomes necessary to use force when entering a building to arrest a person for whom a First Instance Warrant has been issued, the arresting officer must have the warrant in his possession” (p. 98). In terms of strict statute, the Criminal Law Act (Chap 10:04, Section 4, 1979) also states:

(1) “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.”

(2) Subsection (1) shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose.

Before recalling the official complaints data from the PCA, we cite some examples of media reports which have incensed the public in recent years, and which have tremendous implications for the community policing thrust in the region.

In February 2001, two police officers in Trinidad were charged with manslaughter in connection with the shooting death of a 38-year old labourer. As reported, eyewitnesses said that the man was shot as he tried to evade the police who then, with brandished guns, prevented fellow residents from going
to his assistance (Newsday, 8 February 2001, p. 64). This incident produced persistent tensions between residents and the police.

In Trinidad and Tobago again, in March 2001, the court awarded a labourer US$10,000 as a result of being beaten (kicked and cuffed) by two police officers while he was watching residents’ protest against the vehicular death of youth. In evidence, the man said the police asked him to move but he did not, since, as he explained, he “was living there.” The officer got angry, pushed him, handcuffed and arrested him, then took him to the police station where two officers “kicked and cuffed him.” Another, citizen, who suffered a similar beating on that same day, was also awarded US$7,000 by the court (Trinidad Express, 24 March 2001, p. 24).

Early in 2000, an officer in Trinidad shot and killed a young woman who the police claimed had entered the station cursing and threatening the officer as a result of the police arresting a relative. An inquest was ordered into this death and the officer subsequently charged for murder (Trinidad Express, 3 October 2001, p. 8). In April 2001, five students complained that the police “ran them down and beat them up” as they were fleeing from the scene where two groups of students were fighting. Two of the boys received fractures and cuts. Their father further claimed that when he went to make a complaint at the station, he was “chased away and threatened by the police” (Trinidad Guardian, 7 April 2001, p. 3). Around that same time (28 April 2001), a mother complained to the Commissioner of Police that an officer had badly beaten her 21-year-old son who “was just liming” when the officer suddenly came up and started to “search his pockets.” The mother added that when the boy questioned the officer, the officer retaliated violently. The police gave no official response to these claims.

A labourer in Trinidad was awarded US$22,000 in April this year after he was unlawfully arrested and shot by a police officer. In evidence, the man claimed that the officer, without properly identifying himself, had falsely accused him of having a weapon and assaulting the officer. The man further claimed that the officer had previously threatened to shoot him (Trinidad Express, 27 April 2001, p. 10).

The police have suggested that the public look at “the other side” as well. By “this other side,” they usually mean that their lives are sometimes also in danger too. Among the instances they cite is this one. In April 2001, they had a shoot-out with three heavily-armed men, all wanted for several robberies and shootings. In the police confrontation, the three men were killed (Trinidad Express, 7 April 2001, p. 3). The police defended their actions by saying that they had to shoot in order “to defend themselves.”

Such instances of police force have attracted strong protests from some sections of the community. Apart from the inherent dangers in such use of force, and whatever justification the police provide, such instances have helped to undermine the level of public confidence which the police in Trinidad and Tobago, and the rest of the Caribbean, now urgently need for implementing community policing programmes.
Referring to the police killing of the three wanted men, one newspaper editorial said:

The shoot-out between police and bandits in south Trinidad which has left three men dead has precipitated some suggestions that this was an execution by the police rather than a response to armed provocation. No matter how bad the crime situation in the country, the road to extra-judicial killings by the law enforcement authorities, or vigilantism of any kind, is not one we should contemplate. The service is attempting to "clean up" its public profile and has enough problems with reports of "rogue officers" and an overworked Police Complaints Authority (Trinidad Express, 10 April 2001, p. 10).

In a more general way, the Secretary of the Trinidad and Tobago Prisons Association called upon the Government and police service “to state their policy regarding the use of force by police officers.” He added: “We are seeing more and more people here being killed by the police during police actions” (Trinidad Express, 6 June 2001, p. 12). This call was repeated by several other, non-governmental, organisations and citizens’ letters to newspaper editors.

Indeed, during the last two years, there has been a piling up of such charges of undue use of force by the Trinidad and Tobago police against citizens. As indicated above, many of them are taken to the courts, where the victims have been compensated. Even without final adjudication, the graphic reporting of such use of force incidents and the widespread public distress over them do not make for an accommodating community policing climate.

The police service is at present trying to beef up its internal auditing and management of use of force, that is, in circumstances where public protest is not necessarily made. (Some other Caribbean states, however, for example, Jamaica, have issued a Code of Conduct for Police-Citizen Relations.) At present, there are no reliable internal police records categorized so as to indicate the quantity, quality, and variations in the police use of force. The two major sources are now: media reports and the data from the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). From the viewpoint of the general public, media reports with photographs usually provide situational details, which lead to tentative judgements about the unjustified use of force. Very rarely do the police, facing such media reports, provide contemporaneous accounts of their own. Their public response usually comes when called upon to do so by either the PCA or the courts.

Related to the insufficiency of internal investigations is the following comment by the body empowered “to exercise disciplinary control over the police,” the Police Service Commission (1999, p. 13):

It is not unusual for an investigating officer to be appointed long after the alleged commission of an act of police misconduct. When an investigating officer is appointed his report is frequently submitted outside the regulatory time frame of thirty (30) days. The failure of investigating officers to complete their investigations within the prescribed time has resulted in the discontinuation of such matters.

Notwithstanding this, the Police Service Commission in its 1999 report expressed regret that 18 officers who have been found convicted for a range of serious harmful and violent acts were allowed to remain working in the service. Among such offences are: manslaughter, causing grievous bodily harm,
attempted murder and malicious damage (1999, p. 16). The Commission noted, however, that after a conviction in court, the matter would still have to go through “the disciplinary process of tribunals.” An amendment has been proposed so that the guilty officer will be dismissed without a further tribunal.

A particular squatting incident culminated in a violent insurrection in 1990 when an armed group of Jamaat al Muslimeen attacked the nation’s Parliament and held the Prime Minister and several other parliamentarians and citizens hostage. Without going into the juridical aspects of this matter, the relevant point is that the rise in certain visible forms of lawlessness and youth crime in particular helped increase public concerns over crime and their accompanying appeals for police action and strict law enforcement.

At the same time, questions were and are still being raised over the use of police force and the kind of training and disciplinary controls that govern the police. Apart from the juridical implications of use of force incidents, the public at large therefore seems to endure a kind of love-hate relationship with the police use of force. This is the classical convergence of conflicting public demands on one hand, and use of force by police on the other hand.

As public and political pressures for the police “to do something” about crime increased, it is quite possible that a psychological climate of “hard policing,” if not direct force, has been created in recent years. But while these pressures were built up, we have had the 1996 policy declaration that community policing for the service is a top priority for policing in the country. This means, among other things, problem-solving policing, community partnerships to prevent crime and build public confidence, and in effect, a friendlier police face.

Official complaints
To provide a further context for understanding the prevalence and range of “use of force” incidents, we will now review the data compiled by the PCA, and then refer to selected media reports as a means of providing a basis for further research. In terms of the police use of force, three related circumstances are important to note in the jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago, especially since these bear strong similarity with other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, for example, Jamaica. The first circumstance is the high public fear of crime that lends itself to a relatively high tolerance of the police use of force against fleeing or suspected offenders. Repeated nationwide surveys have revealed that 60 percent of the population has a high fear of crime and victimisation. That is, for example, a high fear of being physically attacked in their homes, or in the streets.

Related to this public fear is the widespread public concern over the escalating rise in “serious crime and violent robberies,” a concern underlined and often instigated by graphic media reports. For the year 2000, the number of serious crimes in this country stood at 17,132, minor crimes and minor offences at 15,640 and 20,872 respectively. The second circumstance is the use of deadly force, that is, fatal shootings by the police. In 2000, there were seven allegations of fatal shootings by the police. Up to October 2001, there were five such allegations.
The third circumstance is that the PCA collects data on a wide range of other complaints against the police, that is, excluding fatal shootings. The average number of such public complaints for the last four years (1997-2000) is 1,460. Among these complaints are charges of battery, criminal damage, having a gun drawn, and harassment – all of which cause great public distress and are important to note in the context of a service striving to implement community policing.

In the last two years (1999-2000), there have been 16 widely publicised incidents of excessive use of force that aroused widespread condemnation. Among these are alleged police attacks against journalists, “police brutality” against businessmen and prisoners, and against crime suspects. There were also some media stories about fatal shootings by the police. All this is apart from the numerous official complaints filed with the Police Complains Authority.

Reacting to the 1996-97 report of the Police Complaints Authority, the Trinidad Guardian, 1 June 1998, p. 8 put out this forceful editorial:

Trinidad and Tobago is not a police state, at least not yet. But the report of the Police Complaints Authority, which was laid in Parliament on Friday, seems to suggest that too many police officers seem to think it is one. The report reads like a commentary on the concentration camp activities of Nazi Germany or the situation in South Africa at the height of apartheid when human rights were denied sections of the citizenry.

The editorial added:

This Government has responded by giving crime a high place on its agenda. Indeed it could be argued that Mr Panday’s party won the last general election largely because of its promise to deal with the crime spiral.

In a court case of January 2000 over allegations of police brutality, the High Court judge awarded the applicant US$2,000 for damages. The State agreed that three police officers had indeed beat the 42-year-old man with a gun-butt, then “tied him to a railing, and kicked him on his chest.” The three officers had wrongly identified him as a crime suspect. In evidence, the beaten 42-year-old man said one of three officers pulled out his gun and threatened him saying “If you only breathe too hard, I will pull the trigger.” The man was charged for “resisting arrest and using obscene language.” However, in court, he said that he had never been told why he was arrested nor was he informed of his right to communicate with a lawyer.

In February 2001, three youths showed scars to illustrate police beatings when they were questioned for a crime, which they claimed they did not commit (TnT Mirror, 16 February 2001, p. 9). Around that same time, a 14-year-old boy also showed bruises, which he alleged came from the police who unlawfully snatched him from his grandfather’s home. In December 2000, an 18-year-old youth was rushed to the hospital suffering from wounds allegedly inflicted by several police officers. In his subsequent statement to the media and the police station, the youth said that one officer “aimed his loaded gun in my face, while another burst both sides of my head with his gun butt.” The boy told the media: “At first, the officer at the station did not want to take the complaint. He told me to come back. Eventually, at my persistence, he jotted
down something in the station’s diary.” The police had been called to quell a confrontation between two groups of boys. The battered youth and his mother filed a complaint with the Police Complaints Authority.

Such regular accounts of police beatings do suggest, on their own, a disturbing tendency of undue use of force by the police. The police have the implicit practice of not publicly telling “their side of the story,” a practice no doubt inspired by the victims’ stated intention to “take the matter to court.” But it will certainly help if some explanation or some form of internal adjudication or review can be quickly and publicly announced by the police to help convince the public that such matters deserve serious and quick attention by a service whose stated mission is “to serve and protect.”

What about the peculiar but disturbing situation where police officers just stand by, and allow other officers to inflict physical abuse upon civilians? That is, police tolerance of excessive physical force. On the second day of the country’s two-day carnival celebrations in February 2001, a member of a wrecking crew accompanied by a police officer allegedly jumped out of his vehicle and cuffed a doctor who was taking pictures of an altercation between another citizen and the wrecking crew.

According to the newspaper report, the police officer just looked on even while the wrecking crew member allegedly had a knife. But whatever the merits of the allegation, the relevant point here is the quick and ready manner in which the senior police authorities subsequently defended both the wrecking crew and the police officer on the scene. They were just doing their job, the senior officer said, since that was a “no-parking zone.”

In an angry editorial the next day, the *Trinidad Express* (1 March 2001, p. 16) newspaper asked: “Are members of wrecking crews being encouraged in such attitude by the police officers who accompany them? How could the police do nothing about a civilian actually brandishing a weapon?”

This brings up a related issue in police force. That is, the level of tolerance within the police service and the officers’ ready disposition to defend such force by their peers in open view of the community. Such incidents do not help drive community partnerships with the police, especially for small communities such as those typically found in Caribbean states.

*Complaints Authority*

The Police Complaints Authority, in its annual reports, provides a reasonable estimate of the use of force. The Authority uses 24 different categories for complaints against the police. Our treatment of the use of force by the police includes excessive physical or deadly force, but also threats, related acts of intimidation, and the illegal use of authority.

This broadened categorisation is useful for two purposes. First, it provides the extended range of police behaviour that upsets the public. Second, while the use of deadly force, no matter how infrequent, is a severe violation of civil rights and the very right to life without due process, it is a relatively narrow range of police behaviour. As such, it does not provide a full landscape of
police-civilian encounters, which on one side reveal the range of public concerns, and on the other hand, also reveal the range of instances of police misconduct that may well be a stone’s throw from deadly force.

This second point is extremely relevant to the kind of public confidence and civilian partnerships, which the police service is now striving to build for implementing its community policing programmes. These broadened instances of police misconduct, including the use of excessive force, cannot be discounted. The use of deadly force is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for assessing the democratic, protective, and service-oriented role of the police service.

In this context, we selected nine of the 24 categories used by the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) with “gun drawn without cause” as the most serious. (While the PCA has no data on fatal shootings by the police, we estimate from media reports that there were seven such alleged shootings in 2000 and six for the first ten months in 2001.)

Table I shows these nine categories for the four-year period, 1997-2000. Battery, criminal damage and drawing a gun by officers – three severe forms of force – comprise 34 percent of the nine categories of use of force. When we add “harassment” as another type of force, that is, psychological force, these four categories comprise 64 per cent of the nine categories used in Table I. But the story does not end here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gun drawn without cause</td>
<td>Drawing gun unnecessarily</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>Damaging/destroying property</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Any use of force which can range from a mere jostling to severe beating</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Threatening behaviour</td>
<td>Using abusive or obscene language</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Harassment</td>
<td>Repeated verbal attacks and threats to incarcerate or shoot</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Illegal entry</td>
<td>Entering premises without any warrant</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>False imprisonment</td>
<td>Illegally incarcerating persons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
<td>Obtaining money/benefits through force or threats</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Unlawful arrest</td>
<td>Wrongful arrest</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>880</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>3,490</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total for all complaints (24)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,405</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>5,842</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table I.** Complaints received on police use of force: police-civilian encounters (1997-2000)
The Police Complaints Division within the police service has expressed significant differences with the categories and decisions of the Complaints Authority. For example, the division does not take too kindly to the practice of filing “cross-charges” by citizens. In fact, the division has alleged that many of the complaints about “police brutality” were unfounded. This is especially so, it claimed, when many citizens decide “not to pursue the complaint.” On the other hand, the authority has expressed concern over the apparent tendency for a system that has officers unduly defending other officers. Several modifications are being considered for a “more coordinated approach” between the authority and the division.

Context: to what extent is the public aware of, or, involved in, community policing?

Such awareness and involvement are key psychological and sociological pillars of an effective community policing programme. It is such community features that will help facilitate crime prevention partnerships with the police. To the extent that such features exist, to that extent will the immersion of community policing in the community materialise effectively and construct the two-way process required.

Seven questions were asked in 1999 of a randomly selected sample of 450 household heads across Trinidad and Tobago, a country with 1.2 million people and 274,000 households (census data used from Central Statistical Office, Port-of-Spain). The proportion of males and females were 46 percent and 54 percent respectively. The sample proportions for ethnicity were similar to the national distribution, that is, Afro-Trinidadians 44 percent, Indo-Trinidadians 40 percent, Mixed 15 percent, and Chinese, Syrians, Whites 1 percent.

In terms of educational level, 29 percent of the sample had up to a primary education, 44 percent secondary, 15 percent technical/vocational and 11 percent university level education. Those without any formal schooling amounted to 1 percent. In terms of occupational background, 41 percent had lower/working class jobs, 28 percent middle class and 3 percent upper class/professional jobs. Retired/pensioners, unemployed, students and housewives amounted to 12 percent, 5 percent, 4 percent and 7 percent respectively. All these distributions bore similarity with those obtained for the national population.

The police service in Trinidad and Tobago, with 6,000 officers, has complete jurisdiction over the entire country. It is headed by a Commissioner of Police who, with two executives comprising a Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners, manages the service.

Questions and results

Given the need in this paper to provide a general picture of citizens’ awareness and involvement in community policing, only the overall totals will be presented for each question.
Q1. Would you be willing to work with the police in any community policing activity or project in your district? A total of 71 percent said “yes,” 17 percent “no,” and 12 percent “can’t say.”

Q2. Based on your experiences with or observations of the police, how would you describe the behaviour of the police? A total of 70 percent said the police were “helpful,” 15 percent said “not helpful,” and another 15 percent said “can’t say.”

Q3. How satisfied are you with the way the police are handling crime in your district? A total of 63 percent said “very satisfied” or “satisfied,” with 25 percent “unsatisfied” or “very unsatisfied,” and 12 percent “can’t say.”

Q4. Do you think your district is patrolled sufficiently by the police (i.e. foot or vehicle patrols)? Of the sample, 51 percent said “no,” and 40 percent said “yes,” with 9 percent “can’t say.”

Q5. Do you know if there is a community policing unit which serves your district? A total of 36 percent said “yes,” 38 percent “no,” and 26 percent “can’t say.”

Q6. How much do you know about what community policing is? A total of 75 percent said “not much” or “nothing at all” while 25 percent said “much” or “very much.”

Q7. During the last year, have you even been involved in, or invited to any kind of community policing activity in your district? A total of 90 percent said “no,” and 9 percent “yes” (1 percent gave no answer).

Figure 1. Percentage of respondents giving positive responses to seven questions relating to community policing (from national sample n = 450)
Discussion

In the first place, there is an obvious gap between the favourable police impressions held by the public (70 percent) and their willingness to cooperate in community policing activities (71 percent) on one hand, and their knowledge of (24 percent) or involvement (9 percent) in any community policing activity on the other hand. As Figure 1 suggests, public willingness and readiness have not been effectively utilised by the community policing programme. The vast majority of citizens in the sample held quite a favourable opinion of the police, but when asked specifically about community policing they expressed a deep lack of knowledge and involvement in community policing activity. Obviously there is a significant “activity gap.”

Favourable community sentiments towards the police in general terms are reasonably there. However, given community policing reliance on community support, partnership and involvement, the above results suggest that a lot of work has to be done in selling the programme to the community and drawing residents into effective coalitions. This 70 percent satisfaction level with the police is enigmatic, given our analysis of use of force in an earlier section. We can view it in at least two ways:

(1) that public temper flares up but lasts temporarily during the use of force incident.; and

(2) the 70 percent figure could have been higher if such use of force incidents did not occur.

Of course, we should also note that in this community survey, we did not ask specific questions about citizens’ feelings regarding use of force.

The police organisation and its officers

The following three issues were dealt with by the application of three separate questionnaires to officers in July 2000 in the community policing programme. The first questionnaire, as described below, dealt with the organisational readiness of the police service. The second dealt with the learning ability of the officers themselves, and the third with the degree of team spirit within the police organisation as seen by these community policing officers. The constables were those in the field, in the front-line of the community policing programme. The middle managers were their first level supervisors, that is, the corporals, sergeants and inspectors.

For the sample, 42 of the 100 constables in the community policing programme were randomly selected; 25 of the 42 middle managers (corporals, sergeants and inspectors) in the programme were also randomly selected. In all three cases, the data for the front-line constables and the middle managers are reported separately.
Organisational readiness: to what extent does the police service possess the organisational capability to propel the community policing programme?

Garvin (1993, p. 34) stated: “A learning organisation is an organisation skilled at creating, acquiring and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new knowledge”. In this paper, organisational readiness or capability is seen in terms of how ideas are managed, how the flow of decision making runs, organisational flexibility, systems for improvement, diffusion of success, etc. It is essentially how the officers see management structure and behaviour as being both democratic and facilitative. In other words, to what extent is it seen as a learning, flexible organisation?

A 25-item scale was administered to both the constables and the middle managers. Two examples of the items used are:

1. Decisions about making change in this organisation have required approval at too many managerial levels.
2. Risk taking has been discouraged and creative ideas ignored due to an emphasis on finding and punishing errors.

Their responses were given on a scale of 1 (rarely the case) to 10 (usually the case). The mean and standard deviation for each group are constables: $x = 7.4$, $sd = 1.37$; middle managers: $x = 6.6$, $sd = 1.37$. The difference between the two groups is significant ($t = 2.15; p < 0.05$). Apart from this statistical conclusion, however, it is important to note the relatively high mean for constables on this ten-point scale (see Table II).

Learning ability: to what extent do the officers within community policing possess the learning ability to propel the community policing programme?

This measure seeks to find out the degree of information exchange, morale, disposition to learn and even experiment with ideas among the community policing officers so as to help promote a relatively new programme as community policing.

The Commissioner of Police has called for a “total transformation of officers” within the organisation in order to accommodate and implement community policing. By such transformation, he meant the officers’ capacity to learn, adapt, build confidence and facilitate personal change effectively. The concept of “learning ability,” as espoused by Senge (1990), is central to this expectation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean*</th>
<th>Std deviation</th>
<th>Std error mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front-line officers (constables)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle management (corporals, sergeants, inspectors)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Independent samples t-test; $t = 2.15; p < 0.05$
In these terms, it is important to know how the community policing officers view the state of inter-personal readiness and supporting processes within their organisation. Does it facilitate initiative, boost individual morale and professional self-confidence? To obtain the relevant data, we applied a 20-item scale to the front-line constables and the middle managers in the community policing programme. Two examples of items in the scale are:

(1) People in the organisation are free to speak their minds about what they have learned. There are no threats or consequences for disagreeing or dissenting and no fear of them.

(2) Multiple viewpoints are open, productive debates are encouraged and cultivated in the organisation.

Their responses were made on a scale of 1 = rarely the case, to 10 = usually the case. The mean and standard deviation for both groups, constables and middle managers are constables: $x = 5.4$, $sd = 1.56$; middle managers: $x = 6.2$, $sd = 1.34$. Using a $t$-test for the difference between the means, we found a significant difference between these two groups ($t = 2.05; p < 0.05$). The scores for both groups with this scale suggest an average level of learning ability in the organisation. For management purposes, however, these results will be looked at another way at a later stage in this paper (see Table III).

Team spirit: to what extent do the community policing officers possess the team spiritedness and inter-personal skills required for effective community policing?

What about the degree of trust and mutual respect, acceptance and sharing among the officers themselves? In other words, to what extent is there a basis for teamwork and departmental cohesion? These are the matters dealt with in this section.

Community policing needs not only a unity of community purpose, but a facilitative degree of camaraderie, trust, and mutual respect among the officers involved, in short, a team spirit. We administered a five-item scale to these same constables and middle-managers to assess such team spirit. Two examples of the items used are:

(1) My fellow officers feel accepted and understood by each other.

(2) There is a lot of give and take among my fellow officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>Mean*</th>
<th>Std deviation</th>
<th>Std error mean</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front-line officers (constables)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle management (corporals, sergeants, inspectors)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III. Learning ability

Notes: *Independent samples $t$-test; $t = 2.05; p < 0.05$
Once again, answers to the questions went from 1 = rarely the case, to 10 = usually the case.

The mean and standard deviation for each group are shown in Table IV. The difference is significant ($p < 0.01$), that is, the middle managers experienced a better feeling than the constables on the matter of team spiritedness and mutual respect. Overall, though, the results here appear quite average for a police organisation aiming to have a consolidated force for effective community policing.

**Further analysis**

What all this means is that the police service is quite “average” in terms of the three human resource capacities measured. For each capacity – organisational ability, learning ability and team spirit – the calculated mean is around 5 and 6 within a 1 to 10 possible range: the exception being the mean of 7.4 for constables in the organisational readiness scale. For team spirit, however, middle managers score significantly higher than constables (6.44 vs 5.16, $p < 0.01$).

But such global statistical differences will not mean much for treating with individual officers, especially if individual improvements and benchmarks are specifically required and targeted. In other words, it will be more helpful if we can construct the scores within particular ranges for each scale so as to show which particular officer lies within a high risk or a low risk point. For example, with organizational readiness:

- 1.0 to 3.9 – Low risk condition, sustain capacity and perhaps requiring very few reforms
- 4.0 to 6.9 – Moderate risk condition, requiring some reform in particular areas
- 7.0 to 10.0 – High risk condition, requiring full and urgent attention

For learning ability and team spiritedness the level of risk are in reverse order.

Such cut-off points within each capacity measured will help provide a quantitative basis for quality improvement interventions and benchmarking measures in the drive towards continuous improvement both for the organisation and in the individual officers themselves. We therefore examined the exact score distributions for each capacity measured and made the cut-off points accordingly, as illustrated in Table V.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std deviation</th>
<th>Std error mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Front-line officers (constables)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle management (corporals, sergeants, inspectors)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** *Independent samples $t$-test; $t = 3.181; p < 0.01$
Organisational readiness
Using the above criteria, 0 percent of the constables fell within the high risk condition, 48 percent moderate risk and 52 percent low risk condition. For the middle managers, 5 percent fell within the high risk condition, 45 percent moderate risk and 50 percent low risk condition.

Learning ability
Again, using the above cut-off points as the criteria, 22 percent of the constables fell within the high risk condition, 61 percent within the moderate risk condition and 17 percent within the low risk condition. The comparative figures for the middle managers are: 4 percent high risk, 65 percent moderate risk, and 31 percent low risk. Note that a much higher proportion of constables than middle managers fell within the high risk range.

Team spirit
For constables, 26 percent fell within the high risk condition, 55 percent moderate risk and 19 percent low risk condition. For middle managers, 4 percent fell within the high risk condition, 58 percent moderate risk, and 38 percent low risk condition.

Summary and conclusions
The data on official complaints of use of force, linked to widespread public concern, remain a matter of concern if an effective community policing programme is to be implemented in the various communities. Even while we note the 70 percent public satisfaction level and the apparent “love-hate” relationship between civilians and the police, the police should still review its use of force pattern. In our view, effective police-community partnerships require a public satisfaction level of at least 80 percent. Notwithstanding this, the 70 percent level in the face of such disturbing use of force incidents remains a matter for further research and understanding.
From the nationwide survey on the community’s perception of the community policing initiatives by the police service, it appears that much more work needs also to be done in terms of keeping the public better informed of the programme and, as well, getting them involved for the required civic partnerships. The community, it is felt, is being left too far behind, even though they have relatively good impressions of the police service as a whole.

Generally the three human resource capabilities measured show relatively low means. Much more work needs to be done to have these scores raised over time. It means that some quality interventions and benchmarking procedures should be quickly undertaken, using the baseline data in this paper, or something similar, as a possible start. This need is particularly important for the front-line constables.

Among the specific elements of the organisational readiness scale are fast track decision making, problem identification, reward structure, flexibility and programme support. In these terms, the means for both groups, constables (7.4) and middle managers (6.6) are at best, somewhat satisfactory, though the middle managers fall a bit behind the constables. In addition, with the cut-off criterion used, none of the constables or middle managers fell within the high-risk condition. The scale used for measuring organisational readiness can also help tell us the extent to which the organisation and especially its top managers are democratic in their relationships with officers under their command.

Dealing with the role which organisational readiness has to play in community policing, Oliver (2000, p. 211) said:

If a police agency attempts to implement community policing while retaining the traditional para-military structure, chain of command, procedures and continues to utilise an authoritarian style of top-down management, community policing will be destined to fail.

He added:

Because community policing is a philosophy and is value driven, hence driving the changes in the way police conduct their business and relate with the community, so too should these values drive change in the way management conducts their business and relates with the line officers.

In this respect, and given the above results, the police organisation has some work to do in democratising its management-officer relationships.

For individual learning ability in the organisation (i.e. learning readiness), however, it is disturbing to find so many of its officers falling within the high risk (1.0 to 3.9) condition, with constables especially at 22 percent and middle managers at 4 percent. Among the specific elements of this scale are opportunities for self-improvement and programme experimentation, sharing of ideas, problem-solving opportunities, participatory decision-making and performance recognition. The results, especially for the front-line constables, suggest that these areas need systematic attention for improvement and building confidence among such officers.

All in all, however, when combined with what the statistical tests revealed (i.e. the $t$-test), the qualitative cut-off points indicate that the police service is a
rather stable, but average service in the three capacities measured. For benchmarking purposes, and for the kind of organisational transformation required for effective community policing, however, higher targets should be set and backed up by appropriate quality interventions.

By and large, effective community policing programmes should be matched and supported by strategic human resource development within the police service itself. These results suggest that both for the community and for the internal needs of the service itself, more work needs to be done, and firmly supported by a benchmarking method for quantifying the improvements expected over time.

Notes
1. The 24 Caribbean states to which we refer are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda*, Aruba, The Bahamas*, Barbados*, Belize*, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Curacao, Dominica*, French Antilles, Grenada*, Guyana*, Jamaica*, Montserrat*, St Kitts and Nevis*, St Lucia*, St Maarten, St Vincent and the Grenadines*, Suriname*, Trinidad and Tobago*, Turks and Caicos Islands and US Virgin Islands. Fourteen of these Caribbean states which are marked with an asterisk comprise members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
2. The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, just 11 miles from the mainland of Venezuela, is the southern most island of the Commonwealth Caribbean. A twin island state of almost 1.3 million persons, it has a combined area of 1,980 sq. miles. Trinidad and Tobago gained political independence in August, 1962 with a Westminster form of parliamentary democracy. Trinidad and Tobago is recognised as one of the most multiracial countries in the Commonwealth with its population comprising those of African descent 40 percent; East Indian descent 40 percent; mixed 18 percent and 2 percent Syrians, Chinese, White/Caucasian etc. Per capita income is US$5,000. Administratively, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, made up of approximately 6,000 officers, is divided into nine police divisions headed by the Commissioner of Police, whose office and central administrative staff are located in the capital city of Port-of-Spain. Briefly, the service falls under the civilian authority of the Ministry of National Security and Cabinet, with a Police Service Commission responsible for finalising matters such as promotions and discipline. Expansions in such areas as housing developments, secondary schools, illegal practices of squatting, vending and Ph-taxis, all became focal points for sharpened citizen-police confrontations. As the leading industrial and manufacturing country within Caricom, Trinidad and Tobago experiences an estimated poverty rate of 30 percent (households), marked socio-economic inequalities and an unemployment rate which has fluctuated between 20 and 12 percent over the last 20 years.

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Teamwork – not making the dream work

Community policing in Poland

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Keywords Police, Strategy, Empowerment, Perception, Poland

Abstract In January of 1999, following the philosophy of community oriented policing, the Polish National Police restructured its organization. This article presents results of two phases out of a larger research project conducted with the Polish police and community members representing diverse environments including college students, politicians, and media representatives. Our results represent an analysis of over 2,000 questionnaires distributed to the members of the Polish police and contrasted against data collected from hundreds of questionnaires answered by college students in three cities. The questionnaire was designed to measure the degree of understanding of the role of the police in a democratic society, as perceived by both the public and the police. Some of the main principles of community-oriented – problem-solving policing are revisited in the questionnaire, providing a baseline for discussion about the feasibility of implementation of a philosophical paradigm in real-life environments, when the actors involved have no clear concept about the roles they are supposed to play.

Introduction

The police have disappeared from the streets of Poland. A foot or motor patrol is a rare sight. Searching for the reasons, one might look at the bureaucracy, corruption, and new forms of organized crime (including new drug markets) (Haberfeld, 1997).

The idea behind this research project is based on two main paradigms: the existence of a legitimate desire to change the basic orientation of a police force in a democratic society, to reflect a more profound concern with the needs of the community, and the feasibility of the implementation of such a desire.

The researchers designed an empirical instrument, in the form of a questionnaire (see the survey instrument in the Appendix) in an attempt to measure the degree of understanding of the concepts included in the philosophy of community oriented policing (COP). The questionnaire was distributed to the concerned parties: the police and the public. During the first stage of the research the public was represented by college students from three universities. The themes presented in...
The authors feel that it is important to present findings from these two phases prior to the completion of the entire project, as the data point to some interesting and, hopefully, meaningful themes. Our research findings are presented in the context of the historical changes that took place in Poland, within the Polish police specifically, prior to the implementation of their version of COP. A short discussion about the nature of this philosophy, as it is reflected in the US literature, precedes these developments, and provides some basis for comparison between the approaches taken by the two countries. Since the Polish police models many of its new concepts on US policing, it appears that this comparison is not only valid, but necessary.

Even more important, however, is the opportunity to compare and contrast the experiences of two nations, and the impact those experiences might have on future developments in the field of COP. These developments can be equally meaningful for the Polish and US law enforcement and, even more so, for the communities they police.

Community-oriented policing
The first antecedents of community policing can be traced to what is referred to in the literature as Judicial Activism, 1961-1966. The second period can be identified between the years of 1967 and 1973, with the formation of a number of commissions, foundations, and programs. The commissions were formed in response to the urban riots and Vietnam protests. The commissions’ findings opened the door for researchers to analyze police departments’ practices, and led to the formation of the Police Foundation and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (Oliver, 1998). From there on, a third period, with a number of programs, experiments and research studies followed, including the Neighborhood Team Policing, the Neighborhood Foot Patrol, The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the RAND study of Detectives, the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, and a number of other studies by PERF, Police Foundation, and some notable police scholars (Swanson et al., 1998).

In the early 1980s, the notion of community policing emerged in the USA as the dominant direction in thinking about policing. It was designed to reunite the police with the community. It is a philosophy, not a specific tactic: a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by involving the same officer in the same community on a long-term basis. There is no single program to describe community policing. It has been applied in various forms by police agencies in the USA and abroad and differs according to community needs, politics, and resources available. Community policing goes far beyond being a mere police-community relations program and attempts to
address crime control through a working partnership with the community (Peak and Glensor, 1999). This new relationship, based on mutual trust, also suggests that the police serve as a catalyst and challenge people to accept their share of the responsibility for solving their individual problems, as well as their share of the responsibility for the overall quality of life in the community (Trojanowicz et al., 1998). The new philosophy, however, still lacks some serious, in-depth evaluation. Rosenbaum et al. (1994) observe that the identification of key factors that affect the creation and implementation of community-policing innovations has eluded systematic study. Literature focusing on community-policing innovations in the USA suggest that two major dimensions of organizational change have been considered by US policing scholars (e.g. Kelling and Moore, 1988; Goldstein, 1990; Huber et al., 1993; Rosenbaum and Lurigio, 1994). These two dimensions are externally focused and internally focused innovations. External innovations include the reorientation of police operation and crime prevention activities, and the internal innovations primarily involve changes in police management (Zhao et al., 1999). Poland affords us with an opportunity to study, in a systematic manner, both the external and internal innovations, as they are introduced simultaneously, on a national level.

Community-oriented policing as one of the newest inventions of the Polish police

On 27 March 1995, Andrzej Milczanowski, Minister of Internal Affairs, in charge of the police, declared that a new plan called the Safe City would soon be introduced. The basic idea of this strategy was to increase the effectiveness of public policing by securing cooperation with local communities, organizations, and institutions. The new strategy stressed the change in attitude as far as police evaluation was concerned, as the best police officer was considered the one who could show the highest number of arrests in his jurisdiction. In accordance with the new philosophy, today, the best police officer is the one who has the least number of crimes committed in his jurisdiction (Haberfeld, 1997).

In 1997, we surveyed this force, distributing 2,000 questionnaires in five major districts and collecting the data, within one week, as part of a larger study, Measuring Police Integrity. To our great surprise we found a tremendous degree of cooperation, despite the fact that this was the first national study of the newly restructured force. This open approach clearly illustrated a willingness to adhere to the basic tenets of community oriented policing.

On 1 January 1999, the Polish police, facing growing criticism of its performance, introduced a new organizational structure, which differed significantly from the one introduced at its inception in 1990. The new force was to be divided into 16 voivodeships or province commands, 329 district commands and 2,000 police stations. This new structure was supposed to reflect the administrative division of the local government, but was primarily introduced to bring police officers closer to the public. More police officers were to be deployed to the districts and the police stations, and more police officers were to be allocated to work on the streets.
According to the Chief, General Jan Michna, the new goal of the force was “to become a tool in the hands of the public”. Commanding officers, for both provinces and districts, were to be elected through a contest. Local politicians would exercise their input into the nomination, both at the province and district levels, through a joint decision-making process with the Chief of Police. A revolutionary concept was introduced in the budget area. Until then, the budget allocated for the police had come from the central government directly to Headquarters and through headquarters was allocated to specific forces throughout the country. Beginning with 2000, the general headquarters were to be allocated a budget sufficient for its operations only. The voivodeships were to receive their funding from the heads of the voivodeships (the voivodeships were to receive adequate amounts secured for the operations of the police units, based on the assessment received from the Chief of Police, this money was to come from the state budget). The district commands were to get the money from heads of the districts in the form of “goal donations”. The money was to be under the public’s control, since both voivodeship and district commands would be accountable for budget allocations to the heads of the respective areas. The self-governing councils were vested with a significant input into police planning and operations. For example, the ability to influence and determine the number of lines available to a given police station, demand from the local Chief of Police to improve the level of service delivery, or to resolve a local conflict.

The Polish version of community oriented policing at its onset did not have a translation in the Polish language. The English term, community policing, has been used commonly, and the operational strategies and suggestions were based mainly on the American literature and research, skewed towards the realities of life in Poland. “Operation Zero” was coined as a new term, associated with the first experimental steps of community oriented policing. A number of clearly defined operational strategies and concepts were introduced internally to guide the actual, practical, implementation of the philosophy. Those clearly defined steps were primarily structural in nature (like redeployment of foot patrol), and lacked conceptual approaches by, for example, ignoring such critically important areas as proper recruitment, selection, training, evaluations, and assessment. Finally, the other external variable seemed to be ignored as well, the desires and needs of the community they were out to police (Haberfeld and Walancik, 1998). Unlike the testimonial and empirical research performed in the USA, prior to the introduction of COP, no serious, scientific attempt has been made to assess the needs of the Polish public. Regardless of the validity of the research performed in the USA and the interpretation of the findings as they related to the need to implement the community oriented policing philosophy, such research projects were, indeed, undertaken. However, the general public in Poland was not exposed to the same treatment. Therefore, the assumptions have been made, the public was informed, and so was the police, but the message was never delivered in a clear and easily understood manner. In essence, US history repeated itself in Poland: the philosophy of COP was introduced and became many things to many people.

However, for Poland and its police force the semblance had a much more profound impact, due to the centralized nature of the national force. The team
work or the partnership between the police and the public was introduced to both parts of the team in the most superficial way. One does not need to ponder too long to realize that any successful implementation of any new idea or philosophy needs to be grounded in a clear understanding of the concepts involved. To make the dream work, one needs to comprehend its nature, otherwise it will turn into a nightmare.

**What can we learn from the developments in COP in Poland?**

The role and power of the police in producing change depends fundamentally on two contextual (to the police) aspects: the nature and dynamics of the state for which they work and the nature and dynamics of the society in which they exist and work (Marenin, 1996). What happens to the roles, functions, and activities of the police during major societal changes, such as are now occurring in Poland, is a fascinating experiment which can foster our understanding of the nature of policing in a modern democratic society.

The study in Poland represents a microcosm of what is happening to the idea of policing in a contemporary democratic state, regardless of its geographic location on the map. The demise of the Communist regime freed the police from direct political control, yet they are still enmeshed in the reconstruction of new and diverse social orders. The newly created administrative division of the Polish government, the self-governing bodies, with the tremendous power to influence the policies, procedures, and priorities of the police on a local level, present a formidable challenge to the recently restructured organization.

The statement that citizen participation in the law enforcement process is crucial to its effectiveness leaves little to argue with. Community control of the justice system is not a new or radical concept in Western democracies; this is not the case in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, today the feeling that responsibility and accountability for planning, decision, and action regarding the criminal justice system should be returned to the hands of the community is widespread. There are, however, quite a number of problems with “community control”. The resistance to community control is expressed by both the community members and professionals. The recognition of the usefulness of citizen involvement or community control is not universally accepted either by the average citizen or by the professionals employed in the criminal justice system. By its very nature, community control is reactive.

It is only when conditions become unacceptable that citizens are roused from apathy and are motivated to devote time, imagination, and energy to a particular cause (Mayhall et al., 1995). In Poland, the situation right now is clearly reactive, not necessarily due to the unacceptable conditions but predominantly due to the new responsibilities superimposed by the reorganization of the central and local governments. The initially reactive mode, presumably accompanied by a certain degree of enthusiasm and genuine belief in change, might soon give way to the mundane, and this is precisely the moment that this research endeavor aimed to capture. The concept of control over law enforcement becomes problematic when the reactive mode is replaced by a proactive necessity, and lack of clear consensus as to what constitutes the
appropriate degree of control is the crucial topic to be studied. Historically, not enough control over a given police organization resulted in isolation of the police from the public. Too much control (especially during the historical era of policing in the USA) resulted in egregious outbursts of corruption. What is, therefore, the appropriate degree of control? It seems that nobody in the USA has the answer; maybe we can find the answer in Poland. Maybe, while observing community-police interactions, in a country which centrally imposed (and in a sense superficially imposed) the appropriate control, we will be able to shed some light on this complex social phenomenon.

There is, of course, another side that opposes community control. Many studies indicate that the three components of the justice system, the police, courts, and corrections, are reluctant to involve citizens in their operations. Many employees view such participation as an attempt to minimize their professional expertise (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994). In addition, there is a natural suspicion of outsiders on the part of any organization. They may be more resistant to community input than members of other organizations, because of the fragmentation of their services into separate local units, their method of recruitment and promotion, and their degree of isolation from the general public as well as from one another (Mayhall et al., 1995). The way police institutions act or react is definitely influenced by what may be called the local institutional culture. The habits are strongly affected by the informal norms, attitudes, expectations, practices, and procedures of the local systems. It is not easy to change those patterns just by imposing a new law or implementing some new administrative strategies (Feltes, 1999). The newly introduced concept of electing the district chiefs of police through an open contest, with the general public’s input, creates a unique opportunity to elicit and analyze the views of all the parties involved in the process. The different ideas as to who is the best chief of police from the standpoint of the community/local politicians, and the law enforcement organization itself, can provide a fascinating insight into understanding the idea of police in a democratic society.

Many of the studies of community policing in the USA have been at the level of simple observation of departments implementing community policing, e.g. surveys completed by COP chiefs, the community, etc. to discover how the organization has implemented community policing and the community response to the change (Stevens, 2001; Thurman et al., 2001).

There are no comparative studies that examine either the change process or the effectiveness of the purportedly new systems. A study of Poland, a nation driven by a serious need to change and one that is illustrative of the extremes of change, could provide structured paradigms to accomplish these objectives.

One of the premises upon which the authors built their hypotheses related to implementation of the ideas of COP in any given country was a possibility that the concept of COP was introduced in the USA quite ahead of its time, to the unsuspecting and not necessarily ready public. It was introduced prior to a thorough and serious analysis of what the public really wants from its police force. Do they really want COP? If they do, then what are the opinions, perceptions, and expectations regarding this philosophy, and are they the same
for the public and the police? Do they want the same thing? Do they feel that the concepts and tenets of COP are feasible and beneficial? Does the public, or the police for that matter, want to be “empowered”? Is there compatibility between the needs and desires of the public and the needs and desires of the ones who police them? The authors firmly believe that the studies and research projects conducted in the late 1970s and 1980s did not clearly capture and identify the compatibility of the needs and desires of the police organizations with those they police. It appears that almost two decades after the idea of COP was introduced in the USA, we are still seeking the answers to those questions.

The answers to the aforementioned questions might be found in a place far away from home. In a place where the philosophy of COP has been literally forced on the entire nation through its adoption by a national police force. Maybe, a close look at the trials and errors of the Polish people will help us understand better, and from a different perspective, one of no choice (over there it is already a fact; we in the USA still have a choice). It is possible that this look at their experimentation and modes of adaptation will help us find our own solutions and customized approach. An insight into another nation’s struggle to adjust to the philosophy of COP is not just a fascinating experiment in social science, it is first and foremost a valuable lesson to be learned in how to improve, what to innovate, who to target, and what to avoid. Should we start with the politicians, the community, the media, the police – or, maybe not necessarily in that order? We in the USA started with the police; maybe this was a mistake. This is precisely why one should care about what is going on in Poland.

In the USA we do not have all the answers about the transformation to community policing, how to institute the changes, or even how to study them. A study conducted in a nation with a highly obvious process of change may benefit our work here in the USA.

**Methodology and research subjects**

To address the basic questions raised in the article, we decided to conduct the study through a number of phases. First we distributed a set of questionnaires to a representative sample of police officers. Simultaneously, the same questionnaire was distributed to 500 college students who, for the purpose of this study, represented one segment of the research community. This phase was followed by a series of interviews (phase II) with representatives of various interest groups in Poland, including community members, local politicians, and media representatives. Phase III included distribution of the second set of questionnaires, followed by phase IV, another series of in-depth interviews. Data presented in this article represent analysis of the data collected from phases I and III as phases II and IV have been completed only partially. We would like to include one additional focus group to complete our original design. Phase V is scheduled to be completed during 2002 and will include another set of in-depth interviews as well as a new survey instrument based on the analysis of the collected data, and the recent political changes in Poland, which include the resignation of the Chief of Police and a new set of priorities outlined by the newly appointed Chief.
Phase I: first set of questionnaires distributed to police officers and students

A basic survey instrument was distributed to about 2,000 sworn police officers in four administrative districts. The new administrative division of Poland comprises 16 districts. The sites were selected with the cooperation of the Polish National Police, the Research Unit located at the headquarters in Warsaw. The sites for the project were identified based on the geographic location, the size of the local police departments, and the overall willingness to participate in a research experiment. The questions for the survey were designed and structured around the following topics/themes:

1. Demographics of the respondent – it is of crucial importance to be able to discern the differences in perceptions based on the following variables:
   - age;
   - length of service;
   - rank;
   - educational level;
   - training history (which training center, how long, and when, plus additional on-the-job training).

2. The role of the police during the communist regime.

3. The role of the police in a newly established democracy.

4. The role of the police in a democratic society. It is pertinent to be able to identify the differences between the role of the police in a state in which the democratic principles are fully established and the role of the police in a newly created democracy, a democracy still has to struggle with baggage from the past, and the sometimes unruly enthusiasm and desire to experience the ultimate freedom.

5. Definition and understanding of the term “community oriented policing”.

6. Definition and understanding of the term “community”.

7. Individual desire to implement the philosophy of COP – on a daily basis.

8. Perceptions/opinion about the overall desire of the police administration to implement COP.

The data from the collected questionnaires were analyzed and, based on the results, discussion questions for the focus groups were designed. Simultaneously, 400 questionnaires were distributed to students (a version of the questionnaire distributed to the sworn officers was modified to customize a different subject/respondent population) at the universities of Warsaw, Krakow, and Bialystok.

Phase III: second set of questionnaires distributed to police officers

A second set of questionnaires was distributed to sworn police officers. The second set was distributed over a year-and-a-half after the first set was collected, and in addition to the same questions as the first one, included a number of practical scenarios based on some of the tenets of COP. (The
Analysis
One of the prerequisites for successful implementation of any theoretical concept is complete understanding of the concept. Ideally, both parties involved in such an experiment (the police and the public) achieve the same level of understanding of any given concept, but this appears to be unrealistic, a close consensus would suffice. We have analyzed 1,619 questionnaires filled in by the police officers and 253 questionnaires filled by the students that were collected during the first phase of this project, between October 1999 and April 2000, and 404 questionnaires that were collected during the third stage of the project, between July and August 2001. The number of questionnaires analyzed represents the numbers of questionnaires that were found valid for statistical analysis. The following analysis of those data compares and contrasts data collected from three sets of questionnaires: the first officer survey, students, and the second officer survey. In our discussion of the results we are concentrating on the findings that point to lack of understanding or/and lack of information regarding the concept of COP, as well as on the incompatibility in understanding of those concepts.

Summary of the survey results
The following are some things to note relating to the results of the survey data. The reader is advised to refer to the tables and to the actual survey (see Appendix) for additional details. To determine if there was a statistically meaningful difference in the results, we use a difference of 0.5 or greater.

Questions 1 and 2. The role of police force and police officer in a democratic society
Although officers in both the first and second samples did not differ significantly on the roles of a police force (question 1) and officer (question 2) in a democratic society, there were differences in how important certain roles were within the student sample. In both questions “enforcing the law” and “providing services” showed the greatest differences in responses between officers and students (see Tables I and II).

Question 3. The role of the police during the communist regime
Much as with questions 1 and 2, officers in the first and second samples did not differ significantly on any of the roles. The differences occurred between officers and students in relation to “preventing crime”, “preserving the peace” and “protecting civil rights and liberties”. Officers consistently rated them more important (0.5 or greater) than did students (see Table III).

Question 4. Police officer’s role in a democratic society
This question was only asked of police officers, and the differences appear in ranking of the role the police officer plays in a democratic society. While preventing crime appeared to be the most significant role one could play in a
democratic police nation, officers in the second survey ranked preserving peace as the number one priority (see Table IV).

**Question 5. Have you ever heard the term community policing?**
A startling 55.6 percent of officers in the first survey have never heard about the term community policing, with an even more surprising 61.1 percent of officers in the second survey providing the same answer. An overwhelming majority of students, 81.9 percent, have never heard the term either. In the second survey, 62.6 percent of those who said “yes” heard the term in the media, while only 33 percent heard it during training, specialized training, informally within the department or during a meeting (see Table V).

**Question 7. Definition of the term “community oriented policing”**
Officers in the second sample felt that the definition “an old philosophy of policing under a new name” was more correct (2.93) than officers in the first (3.43) and student (4.27) samples. The same pattern is evident in the definition “an old
tactical approach to policing under a new disguise”. Officers in the second sample (2.93) felt it more correct than those in the first (3.50) and student (4.44) samples.

Officers in both samples and students felt that community policing was both a new philosophy and new tactical approach towards policing. Within a particular sample there were significant differences between these definitions (0.5 or greater) and the others (old philosophy and old tactical approach) (see Table VI).

**Question 8. The accuracy of characteristics that best define the term “community oriented policing”**

There were two areas to note. The first is the “empowerment of the police officers in their initiatives/generalization”. Both the first and second officer samples came out the same but the difference to note is that the students did not view this as strong a characteristic as the officers (2.39 vs 1.79). The second major difference is with the characteristic of “empowerment of the citizens in their input into police work-scale”. Police officers in the first sample felt this

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<th>1st officer sample</th>
<th>2nd officer sample</th>
<th>Student sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To enforce the laws</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To prevent crimes</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve and protect the government</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To preserve the peace</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide services</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To protect civil rights and civil liberties</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>3.50</td>
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**Table III.**

**Question 3. Please rate, according to your opinion – what is the role of a police officer in a communist regime?**

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>To enforce the laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>To prevent crimes</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
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<tr>
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<td>To preserve the peace</td>
<td>1.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>To provide services</td>
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<td>1.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>To protect civil rights and civil liberties</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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**Table IV.**

**Question 4. Please rate, according to your opinion – what is your role as a police officer in a democratic society?**

Notes: Ratings on a five-point scale, with 1 = most important; 5 = least important

Bold = most important within sample;
was a more accurate description than students (1.76 vs 2.26). The second sample of officers fell in between the first and student samples.

Using 3 as the median between either being accurate or not accurate, officers in both samples felt that all the characteristics listed in this question were accurate (less than a mean of 3) except for “customer orientation in service delivery”, which received a mean of 3.26 in the first sample and 3.42 in the second sample. Using the same evaluation method, the students sampled felt that all the characteristics were accurate except the “customer orientation” like their officer counterparts (see Table VII).

**Question 13. Connotations for the term “community”**

There was a significant difference in the responses between the first and second officer samples with respect to the “area you police” (second, 1.77 vs first, 3.59). The second officer sample thought it most appropriate, with a mean difference of 1.82. There were significant differences with “population”. The student sample felt it most appropriate (1.51), with over a 0.5 difference with the first officer sample (2.86) and second officer sample (3.40). With respect to “religion”, officers in the second officer sample thought it more appropriate (1.40) than those in the first sample (4.04) and students (3.64). Students felt that “citizenry” played a more appropriate role than officers in the first (2.98) and second (3.90) samples, noting that the first officer sample placed a higher value than their second sample counterparts. Officers in the second sample felt

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 1,619) (%)</td>
<td>(n = 404) (%)</td>
<td>(n = 253) (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table V.**

Question 5. Have you ever heard the term community policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st officer sample</th>
<th>2nd officer sample</th>
<th>Student sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new philosophy of policing</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new tactical approach to policing</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An old philosophy of policing under a new name</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An old tactical approach to policing under a new guise</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table VI.**

Question 7. How do you feel about the correctness of the following definitions of the term community oriented policing?

**Note:** Ratings on a five-point scale, with 1 = correct; 5 = not correct.
“political affiliation” was more appropriate (1.82) than officers in the first sample (3.74) and students (4.40). Finally, officers in the first sample felt that “professional affiliation” played a more appropriate role (3.42) than those in the second sample (4.07) or students (3.79). Officers in the first sample felt that the “citizens of your country” was the most accurate definition, while the second sample of officers felt that “religious affiliation” was most accurate. Students rated “population” as the most appropriate (see Table VIII).

**Question 14. The overall desire of the police administration to implement community oriented policing**

With respect to the overall desire of the police administration to implement Community Oriented Policing, the second sample of officers felt the desire was stronger (2.18) than the first sample (3.25) (a mean difference of 1.07) and students (3.84). Time may be the reason, and change between the first and second officer samples (see Table IX).
Question 15. Personal desire to be part of the implementation of the community oriented policing

Unlike Question 14, there were no significant differences with the first and second officer samples with respect to their own personal desire to implement community oriented policing. However, there was a significant difference between both samples of officers and students. Students (4.29) were the least willing to implement community oriented policing, compared to both samples (3.50 and 3.68) (see Table X).

Summary and discussion

One of the goals of our research was to identify initial obstacles to the successful implementation of community policing. The departure point was based on an assumption that the Polish police and the community they police are not necessarily ready for this far-fetched transformation. After all, this force underwent a profound transformation during the last decade (Haberfeld, 1997; Kutnjak-Ivkovich and Haberfeld, 2000), one that is yet to be evaluated in terms of its success. To become fully democratic, beyond rhetoric orientation, a police force is in need of very pragmatic means. Without proper and adequate resources, both financial and human, it is almost impossible to achieve the desired goal. Prior to becoming “a tool in the hands of the public”, one needs to assess whether the public wants such a tool, and if so, would they know how to...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table VIII.</th>
<th>1st officer sample (n = 1,619)</th>
<th>2nd officer sample (n = 404)</th>
<th>Student sample (n = 253)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area you police</td>
<td>3.59 1.57</td>
<td>1.77 1.01</td>
<td>1.51 0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The population of a given city/township, etc.</td>
<td>2.86 1.76</td>
<td>3.40 1.54</td>
<td>1.51 0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>4.04 1.38</td>
<td>1.40 0.64</td>
<td>3.64 1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender affiliation</td>
<td>3.41 1.72</td>
<td>3.63 1.65</td>
<td>4.56 0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>4.29 1.19</td>
<td>3.93 1.45</td>
<td>4.27 1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of your country</td>
<td>2.98 1.66</td>
<td>3.90 1.39</td>
<td>2.01 1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliation</td>
<td>3.74 1.36</td>
<td>1.82 1.13</td>
<td>4.40 0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional affiliation</td>
<td>3.42 1.27</td>
<td>4.07 1.33</td>
<td>3.79 1.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings on a five-point scale, with 1 = most appropriate; 5 = least appropriate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IX.</th>
<th>1st officer sample (n = 1,619)</th>
<th>2nd officer sample (n = 404)</th>
<th>Student sample (n = 253)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of desire</td>
<td>3.25 1.21</td>
<td>2.18 1.37</td>
<td>3.84 0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ratings on a five-point scale, with 1 = very strong desire; 5 = not strong at all
use it in a way that will not turn the clock back, and instead of changing will
impede the desired transformation.

One idiosyncrasy regarding the results of the survey that needs to be
addressed is an answer to a simple question: if you have never heard the term
community oriented policing, how can you answer, in a valid manner, the
questions related to understanding of the term? The answer to the question is
quite simple and relates to the way the questionnaires were distributed. We
have explained and informed respondents that the questionnaire was
designed to measure their understanding of the new approach to policing,
which has been endorsed by the chief of the Polish police. Therefore, despite
the fact that many of our respondents had not heard about the term COP *per
se*, they were aware of changes in orientation, philosophy, and organization of
their police force. Unfortunately, this awareness did not necessarily translate
into clear understanding, or any type of consensus. While we do not want to
overplay the importance of these particular findings, it appears that it is
important to introduce the parties involved into a coined term, since the term
carries a profound message regarding the reorientation of the mode of
policing. Police forces around the world change their names to reflect this
orientation[1]; therefore, it appears that there is some validity to the term.
Maybe it can, indeed, motivate and inspire the parties involved in this joint
venture.

However, what seems to be of real importance and will affect the direction
of our research in the future, and should also affect the direction of research in
the USA, is the lack of desire to implement the philosophy of COP. This lack
of desire is pretty apparent with respect to all the parties involved: police
organizations, police officers, and students. While there are differences in the
perception of the role of a police officer in a democratic society, definitions,
and interpretations of the term related to the philosophy, the most important
finding seems to be lack of desire to take part in the implementation process.

What is, therefore, the remedy or the first step in an attempt to change this
unconstructive attitude? A number of steps come to mind, and they should be
followed in this exact order: define, explain, survey, analyze, evaluate, design a
plan, train. Leaving fluid definitions open to interpretation, one cannot elicit
any serious commitment. Clear understanding is the fundamental base to a
successful implementation of any plan that, of course, cannot be executed
successfully without proper training of the people involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st officer sample (n = 1,619)</th>
<th>2nd officer sample (n = 404)</th>
<th>Student sample (n = 253)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table X.** Question 15. What is your personal desire to be part of the implementation of community oriented policing?

**Note:** Ratings on a five-point scale, with 1 = very strong desire; 5 = not strong at all
As for the future, what we are trying to deduce from the in-depth interviews are some helpful solutions to the following issues:

- The common or, not so common, desire of the actors involved with regard to police orientation and deployment.
- The major obstacles to an involved commitment.
- How to tackle the obstacles.
- How to mobilize the media.
- How to mobilize the politicians.

Similar to the US reality, these questions will be asked too late, after the implementation has already taken place. However, future longitudinal studies exploring the aforementioned questions and related dimensions will help to outline the correct path to a successful implementation of the tenets of COP, in Poland and in other countries struggling with the same or similar concepts and desires. Of course, pending the confirmation that this is what the team’s dream is all about.

Note
1. For example Metro Toronto in Canada changed its name to Toronto Police Services a few years ago, the same is happening for the Royal Ulster Constabulary, changing its name in 2001 to Northern Ireland Police Services.

References and further reading

**Appendix. Survey instrument**

Please pay attention to the differences in questions – your opinions about the role of the police as an organization, a police officer as a role player in the organization, and finally your perception of yourself as a police officer.

First page – introduction – explanation
Second page – instructions
Third page and on – the questions:

(1) Please rate, according to your opinion – what is the role of a police force in a democratic society?
   A. to enforce the laws most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   B. to prevent crimes most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   C. to serve and protect the government most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   D. to preserve the peace most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   E. to provide services most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
   G. other – explain (using the same scale) – 1-2-3-4-5 ____________________________

(2) Please rate, according to your opinion – what is the role of a police officer in a democratic society?
   A. to enforce the laws most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
(3) Please rate, according to your opinion – what was the role of the police during the communist regime?
A. to enforce the laws most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
B. to prevent crimes most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
C. to serve and protect the government most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
D. to preserve the peace most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
E. to provide services most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
G. other – explain (using the same scale) – 1-2-3-4-5 ____________________________

(4) Please rate, according to your opinion – what is your role as a police officer in a democratic society?
A. to enforce the laws most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
B. to prevent crimes most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
C. to serve and protect the government most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
D. to preserve the peace most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
E. to provide services most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
F. to protect civil rights and civil liberties most important 1-2-3-4-5 least important
G. other – explain (using the same scale) – 1-2-3-4-5 ____________________________

(5) Have you ever heard the term community oriented policing?
• yes
• no

(6) If yes – when and where? (If no, proceed to question number 8)
• during the academy training
• during the in-service training
• during a specialized training
• informally – within the police department
• formally – within the police department
• during a meeting
• in the media
• from somebody in the community
• other – explain.
(7) If yes, how do you feel about the correctness of the following definitions of the term community oriented policing?

A. a new philosophy of policing correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
B. a new tactical approach to policing correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
C. an old philosophy of policing under a new name correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct
D. an old tactical approach to policing under a new disguise correct 1-2-3-4-5 not correct

(8) Please rate, according to your opinion – the accuracy of the following characteristics that best define the term of community oriented policing?

A. problem solving approach to crime very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
B. decentralization of the command structure very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
C. cooperation with the public/community in crime prevention and solving very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
D. empowerment of the police officers in their initiatives/generalization very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
E. empowerment of the citizens in their input into police work-scale very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
F. joint accountability for public safety between the police and the public very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
G. partnership with the public in solving crime problems very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
H. customer orientation in service delivery (police towards the public) very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
I. reorientation of foot patrol very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
J. police are the public and the public are the police very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
K. proactive policing very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate
K. other – explain _________________________________ very accurate 1-2-3-4-5 not accurate

(9) Have you ever received any training in community oriented policing?

- yes
- no

(10) If yes – where?

- Legionowo
- Szczyno
- Slupsk
- Szczecin
- Pula
- Poznan
- Lodz
- Wroclaw
- Opole
- Katowice
(11) If yes – when? (ex. 3/99) _____/_____ month/year
(12) If yes – how long?
• ______(days)
• ______(weeks)
(13) The word “community” connotes various definitions. Following are a number of characteristics that could serve as the appropriate translation of this term. Please rank each characteristic according to your understanding of the term community.
   A. geographic community that you police – most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   B. the population of a given city/township/etc. most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   C. religious affiliation? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   D. gender affiliation? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   E. age? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   F. citizens of your country? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   G. political affiliation? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   H. professional affiliation? most appropriate 1-2-3-4-5 least appropriate
   I. other – explain (using the same scale): 1-2-3-4-5

(14) What is your opinion about the overall desire of the police administration to implement community oriented policing in Poland?
   Very strong desire 1-2-3-4-5 Not strong at all
(15) What is your personal desire to be part of the implementation of the community oriented Policing?
   Very strong desire 1-2-3-4-5 not strong at all
(16) Age – between:
   • 20-25
   • 26-30
   • 31-35
   • 36-40
   • 41-45
   • 46-50
   • 51-55
   • 56-60
   • over 60
(17) How many years have you been a police officer?
   • Less than 1
   • 1-2
   • 3-5
Community policing in Poland

(18) What is your rank?
- posterunkowy
- starszy posterunkowy
- sierzant
- starszy sierzant
- sierzant sztabowy
- młodszy aspirant
- aspirant
- starszy aspirant
- aspirant sztabowy
- podkomisarz
- komisarz
- nadkomisarz
- podinzpektor
- młodszy inspektor
- inspector
- nadinspektor

(19) Which of the following best describes your current assignment?
- prevention
- criminal investigations
- logistics

(20) Are you a supervisor or non-supervisor?
- non supervisor
- supervisor (unit supervisor, group supervisor)

(21) What is the level of your education?
- less than 12 years
- high school
- higher education
- advanced degree

(22) Where did you receive your basic police training?
- Szczyno
- Legionowo
- Slupsk
- Szczecin
- Pila
(23) Do you live in the area of your service?
   • yes
   • no

(24) If not, why not? (explain)

(25) If you have any comments, after completion of this questionnaire, please share them with us.

Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire
Keeping up appearances?
A community’s perspective on community policing and the local governance of crime

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Criminology Department, University of Brussels, Belgium

Keywords Belgium, Focus groups, Police, Local plan, Networking

Abstract Summarises and discusses findings of roundtable discussions on the opinions of the citizens of two Belgian (Flemish) cities about the policing and security policy in their cities. Citizens question the organisational and cultural readiness of their local police forces for the full-scale development of community policing. In practice, problem-oriented policing tends to dominate, whereby it is the police who define the problems to be tackled. Despite decentralisation of policy and participation procedures, the public complains about the lack of citizen democracy in government. Problems of transparency and participation are related to the plethora of projects and initiatives which have been launched by different authorities at different policy levels. Finally, the consensual vision of community policing is discussed since geographically decentralised policing and the encouragement of community involvement will logically confront the police with ever diverging socio-economic and cultural interests in the neighbourhood.

Introduction

Much has been said and written about community policing: what it is or is not, what it should be and what it not should be, whether it is a goal or an outcome, and last but not least, whether it has “succeeded” or “failed”. In this article, however, we consider community policing not so much as a clear cut program which has to meet well defined goals, but rather as a process (of change) in organisations and among people which produces numerous outcomes and dilemmas. Most people agree now that genuine “full” implementation of community policing requires a massive organisational and cultural change. Inevitably such implementation will take time, and therefore evaluation should be seen more as “monitoring” whether or not the current changes bring the process to its ideal conceptualisation and not whether it has merely “succeeded” or “failed” (Friedmann, 2001, p. 2). Since community policing is still in its conceptualisation phase (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 4) there is likely to be more than one theoretical and practical model possible. What is important here is to identify what (changing) social and political context favours the development of particular community policing models, e.g. “problem-oriented policing”, “community-oriented policing”, “ecological community policing” (such as “broken windows policing”), etc.

At this point, however, intellectual modesty is required since we have more questions than answers to offer and our priority remains a better understanding of the overall process of change. Unpretentiousness is also required considering that our research is conducted in a small European
country (Belgium), that started incorporating community-based policing on an official basis (with governmental support) only since the mid-1990s, and which has, moreover, no long tradition in independent research in policing. Consequently, there has never been substantial financial input to monitor and to evaluate the ongoing process at full-scale. Nevertheless, one of the ways to get a better understanding of the process of change and, in particular, of its outcome and dilemmas is to listen to the experiences and opinions of those who have to “endure” the program, i.e. the community.

In the spring of 1999, we conducted research on the opinions of the citizens of two Belgian (Flemish) cities, Antwerp and Mechelen, about the policing and security policy in their cities. Antwerp is, with approximately 500,000 inhabitants, the largest city of Flanders and is most renowned for its international harbour, diamond trade and its famous painters during the Golden Age, such as Rubens, Jordaens and Van Dijck. Mechelen reached its zenith as capital of The Netherlands and as a centre of culture during the regency of Margaret of Austria.

Today it is a smallish city of 75,000 inhabitants situated about 30km south of Antwerp. Both cities suffer from serious crime, a problem that receives increasing attention in the media and that to a large extent also sets the local political agenda. The Flemish extreme right wing political party, the “Flemish front” (compared with the English “national front” or the French “front national”), thrives on this theme and has become the largest political formation in both cities. In Antwerp all other political parties formed a coalition to bar this racist party from government. In Mechelen the situation is hardly any better. In an effort to deal with the problem of crime and disorder the municipal authorities in both cities established a number of preventive and repressive projects, first within the police and later also via newly created agencies or new departments within existing municipal departments. These projects endorse the principles of community policing. Since the 1990s community policing has been practised by the Antwerp police as a form of a decentralised and neighbourhood-oriented kind of team policing. This resulted in a number of consecutive reorganisations throughout the entire service, which with its 2,000 sworn officers is the largest police force in the country. A more modest and partially geographical decentralisation was also undertaken in Mechelen.

Since 1993 this process has been boosted in both cities by numerous investments in crime prevention projects, which in turn are supported by federal funding from the Ministry of the Interior in form of the so-called “security contracts”. These contracts cover a number of projects, which usually consist of two main strategies. First, the opportunities for crimes are reduced by more control on the street and better protection of private and public property. A number of “neighbourhood watchmen” are recruited to intensify social control. Furthermore, better integration of groups considered “at risk” (young, unemployed, ethnic minority) is expected to reduce criminality. Social workers are concerned with this, paying particular attention to the improved treatment of drug addicts. “Security contract” became the collective term for
Keeping up appearances?

This multi-faceted program. These “contracts” are in objectives, scope and organisation comparable to initiatives elsewhere in Europe such as the “Safer Cities Program” in the UK (Tilley, 1993; Crawford and Jones, 1996), the “Kommunale Kriminalprävention” in Germany (Gramckow, 1994) or the “Contrats de sécurité” in France.

Judicial measures focus on fast, effective curbing of street crime. Offenders caught in *fragrant délit* are brought to court (relatively) immediately. Furthermore, the magistrates are encouraged to impose alternative sanctions such as community service, which seems more effective than imprisonment. This should also deal with the problem of prison overcrowding.

Finally, both cities started ambitious programs for urban development. Streets, squares and public housing are “refurnished”. Public participation is sought for the urban development and the local security policy.

What started initially as the incorporation of community policing became later a comprehensive multi-agency policy which envisages co-operation and co-ordination between the police, the totality of the prevention projects and other local authority services. Ever since, community policing has to be understood in relation to what Crawford (1997) described as the “local governance of crime”. Needless to say, the co-ordination and integration of this multitude of measures into one coherent policy represents a genuine challenge. Such a policy has to be applied on many different fronts simultaneously.

Moreover, given the pressure of extreme right wing parties, this policy has to produce rapid and convincing results. For these reasons it is very interesting to examine the way in which this broad policy for the local governance of crime is developed and implemented. Part of the research has focused on citizens’ observations and appreciation of such a policy. For that purpose we interviewed a sample of directly involved policy makers and local inhabitants. This article briefly summarises and discusses the results of this research. What follows are the opinions of the participants, which do not necessarily coincide with the author’s opinion.

The smooth functioning of the judicial system and its adjustment to this local governance of crime policy are crucial to the success of the latter. Unfortunately, this issue goes beyond the scope of this article.

**Questioning citizens, social workers and local policy makers about community policing and the local governance of crime**

**Methodology**

Opinions and appreciation of the local governance of crime was obtained using the methodology of focus group interviews (Vaughn *et al.*, 1996). Focus group interviews can be described as organised group discussions that evolve around a single theme. In view of the fact that many policy measures are focused geographically on the improvement of security and living conditions in so-called “problematic neighbourhoods” (high crime areas), we selected our participants from the same areas. For roundtable interviews we selected two separate subgroups. On the one hand, we carried out focused interviews with
residents (actively involved in neighbourhood organisations), social and community workers, and representatives of immigrant organisations. These will be referred to in this paper as the “residents group”. This resulted in a roundtable discussion with 19 participants in Antwerp and with ten participants in Mechelen. On the other hand, we organised focus group interviews with representatives from the police, the magistrate, the prevention initiatives of the “security contracts” and other municipal departments. They will be described as the “policy group”. This resulted in a roundtable discussion with 17 participants in Antwerp and with ten participants in Mechelen.

The purpose of the separation of the “residents group” and the “policy group” was to prevent members of the policy group, more experienced in participating in public meetings, from dominating the meetings. Nevertheless, the policy group was confronted with the data collected from the residents group. Each interview session consisted of two rounds. In the first instance, we collected information on the neighbourhood, its problems and the application of local policy in relation to these problems. Furthermore, we asked about which of these problems gave rise to security issues and criminality. Finally, we asked residents about their knowledge on the policy measures taken by the police, the justice department, the municipality and other relevant agencies to deal with these problems. Did our participants have any knowledge about whether or not these policy measures were applied to particular target groups or areas in their neighbourhood? Since community policing and city renewal programs both seek consultation and participation with the residents we enquired about how they were given a say in the development and execution of the policy measures.

The second round of interviews dealt with the opinion and appreciation held by our participants in relation to the policy. At the policy table we also asked about how they believed the residents appreciated the executed policy.

Neighbourhood problems
Although crime is an important factor, it appeared that personal conflict, including intimidation and harassment, was a main reason for feeling unsafe and Unheimlich in the neighbourhood. Daily nuisance caused by unpleasantness elicited considerable peevishness. According to the residents, there is a low level of respect for norms and values in the neighbourhood. In particular, there seems to be very little regard for people and for their environment. This is amplified by the lack of action from the authority in response to the lack of decent behaviour. According to the residents, intimidating youths gangs are partly responsible for this nuisance. There is a well known though smallish group of youngsters who spoil the neighbourhood. On the other hand, pensioners tend to be intolerant and even racist vis-à-vis mostly north African children and adolescents.

The degradation of the streets and demolition and vandalism of public infrastructure also causes a great deal of nuisance and stress. Furthermore, a lack of appropriate play- and meeting-grounds for children and adolescents elicits conflicts. In particular, playgrounds situated inappropriately, such as a
football field in front of a social housing complex (night disturbance, broken windows, etc.) provokes peevishness. Finally, aggressive driving and speeding causes anger and fear in the neighbourhood.

For the residents group, poverty and youth-unemployment, in particular among migrants, explains a great deal of frustration and subsequent inappropriate behaviour. Unemployment, poor housing conditions and an ever-diminishing quality of education are identified as major and fundamental problems for the neighbourhood and its residents.

Finally, participants of both cities hesitated to indicate a clear hierarchy among the problems mentioned above. It is the combination and concentration of problems in one neighbourhood which causes (feelings of) insecurity. Especially the ongoing discussion on insecurity, e.g. in the media, reinforces the image of unsafe neighbourhoods. This stigmatises the entire neighbourhood and eventually results in a “white exodus” and a subsequent collapse of the community’s cohesion and a cycle of decay. Groceries, pubs, schools and other facilities disappear.

Another interesting observation was that residents and policy makers did not always identify the same kind of problems as causing insecurity. In Antwerp only ten of a total of 31 problems were identified by both residents and policymakers. In Mechelen 11 problems were mentioned by all participants. Residents and social workers pay more attention to problems of infrastructure and impoverishment; policy makers tend to focus on problems of communication and criminality. In other words, the image one has of a neighbourhood depends on one’s position and role in the neighbourhood.

The next section discusses the opinions on the local governance of crime held by the most relevant actors in this policy, i.e. the police and the municipal departments and other social agencies.

*Police and policing*

The discussion resulted in a comprehensive list of remarks and criticisms regarding daily police practice and its management.

Most of all, residents in both cities and policy makers in Antwerp criticised (1999) the lack of a coherent vision by police top management and local authorities concerning police and security policy. Despite the official discourse of a neighbourhood oriented police service, community policing remains underdeveloped. A lack of training and supervision seems to be the main reason for that. The willingness to invest and take action in the neighbourhood depends almost entirely upon each individual constable. This is also the case for the newly created neighbourhood policing teams, which consist mainly of recently qualified policemen, “fresh” from the police academy. They lack coaching and supervision, they are used “stop-gaps” backing up regular patrols whenever unpredicted incidents or events occur. In such a climate, community policing has serious difficulties winning the hearts and minds of the officers. Not surprisingly, up to 20 percent of the new recruits wish to leave the service or demand a transfer to another department.
Residents in Mechelen highlighted the difficulties in exchanging information among the neighbourhood patrols and the rest of the police service. It appears here also that, at least according to the residents, neighbourhood constables operate quite isolated from the rest of the force and they lack any additional training or coaching. In both cities the mere presence or patrol of police cars is thought as insufficient. Direct contact and interaction is wanted, preferably with constables on foot. Their long lasting presence and contact with the neighbourhood would render large-scale interventions unnecessary when problems get out of hand.

With regard to the improvement of relations with the police, residents experienced the openness of the police towards the public as selective. It appears that more attention is afforded to those with political influence in the neighbourhood or who simply shout the loudest. In contrast, the marginal groups, such as ethnic minorities and youngsters, have no impact on policymaking. The relationship between the police and ethnic minorities remains particularly problematic. Local initiatives to improve this situation, such as a football game between the police and the immigrant community, were even, according to local policymakers, discouraged by the municipality for fear of reactions from the extreme right parties. Residents also noticed that their complaints on police malpractice and corruption did not lead to any policy reaction. Such incidents are interpreted as proof for the municipality’s indifference to neighbourhood problems as well as their lack of strategy to overcome them.

Finally, many complaints were about the problems of nuisance and rudeness in the neighbourhood. Groups of youths hanging out in public squares are partly responsible for this nuisance. They sometimes intimidate the neighbours and vandalise the infrastructure. Although residents do not ask for particularly strong action against them, the present absence of any coherent reaction is also unsatisfactory. This absence is due to uncertainties about who should handle such problems. In the scope of the already mentioned “security contracts” numerous new and uniformed “supervision” functions were created such as the “auxiliary police” (pale blue uniform), the “neighbourhood supervisors” (in green uniform), the “city wardens” (in purple uniform) and “the park supervisors” (in green uniform of course). They are all supposed to patrol the street and help people whenever necessary. Contrary to their police colleagues, they do not have any coercive authority. Only the auxiliary police have limited police functions, i.e. for traffic and parking control. Consequently, it has been quite unclear from the outset how these supervisors should deal with public refusals to comply with their orders, for example disturbing the peace, dumping waste, loitering, intimidating passers-by, etc. Their only “weapon” consists merely of their “power of persuasion”. For political reasons, however, the new “watchmen” had to be seen on the street as soon as possible to demonstrate efficient local government handling of street security. Subsequently, these supervisors received almost no training in handling conflicts and settling disputes. Moreover, they were recruited from the
Keeping up appearances?

uneducated and long unemployed, who have limited social skills. When things get out of hand the police are eventually brought in to exercise their coercive authority, which they tend to do with very little enthusiasm as they do not see such nuisance as police work. In the end, residents feel let down both by the police and by the new uniforms when they report mischievous behaviour or breaches of peace. They are afraid of reprisals and some withdraw from public action. This affects their trust and confidence in the government. With the establishment of the new security functions, the local authorities created, according to the neighbours, a most ambiguous and incoherent policy, which has proven highly inefficient and ineffective.

Establishing a multi-agency approach

With the local governance of crime, police and other security functions are part of a wider policy that focuses on administrative and social measures for the urban renewal of “high crime” neighbourhoods. This body of measures has introduced a number of public and private organisations and social agencies to the neighbourhood, along with the stated policy goal allowing neighbours to participate in the development of this urban renewal.

At our focus group interviews, residents and local policy makers were asked to give their reactions and opinions on this ambitious program. First of all, given the diversity of projects and agents, structuring the collected data proved to be quite difficult. The residents group in Antwerp identified 13 different urban renewal projects for their neighbourhood whereas the policy group identified 31 initiatives. In other words, there were even more projects than the neighbourhood had imagined. In Mechelen resident and policy groups identified the same number of initiatives, i.e. ten. In Antwerp, people seem to have lost the general overview. The development of the program lacks vision and coherence and as a result project co-ordination is highly problematic. Top-down municipal initiatives are developed without any knowledge of the local situation which results in “collateral damage” when they collide with existing bottom-up initiatives. New neighbourhood facilities are opened in spite of existing infrastructure and networking of local residents. On the other hand, places that lack such a bottom up grown network are neglected by municipal policy.

According to our focus group participants, too many projects have too little continuity. Given the number of projects, each with different objectives, financing and timing, much energy is consumed by the overall co-ordination. Keeping track of projects has become a full-time activity. It appears that this top-down policy leads to “tutelage” and wastes money. Given the slow progress of the projects, tangible results do not follow.

A lot of controversy arose in relation to the participation of the public in this program. Public hearings and other consultation mechanisms gave rise to great expectations, which were unfortunately not fulfilled. The authorities confused consultation of the residents with mere briefings of the public about decisions taken by politicians and civil servants in gatherings preceding the hearings.
Genuine consultation is nonexistent, and the greatest influence on the policy agenda is exercised by those most familiar with “political channels” or the use of the media. Not to be underestimated, in this context, is the increasing impact extreme right wing parties have on local security policy by coaching and infiltrating certain local community organisations who are subsequently manoeuvred into demanding harsh “law and order” measures. In contrast, youngsters and migrants have little access to policy while sometimes being held responsible for anything that goes wrong in the neighbourhood. Some citizens complain that they are only consulted if it suits the agenda of the local politician. In this scope, “active citizens” willing to contribute to the urban renewal felt they were being used whenever the local authorities were eager to sell their policy to the “silent majority” of passive but sceptical citizens; active residents feel trapped between the municipality and the docile citizens. On the other hand, the policy table noticed that on many occasions only a minority of residents come to public hearings. This may be because their participation appears to have little impact on policies.

Finally, we asked about any effects on the developing policy. Again, it proved very difficult to obtain a clear picture. For some, and in particular for local policymakers, the renewal of streets and public squares facilitated social control. Loitering youths and mischievous behaviour disappeared (temporarily). For others, in particular for residents actively involved in community groups, such changes were due to better communication and negotiations with the youngsters, including discussing alternative behaviour. Joint activities such as barbecues and music festivals were seen as more important to the local social network and the atmosphere on the street than a mere change of the street infrastructure. The most positive input came from a hesitating but yet tangible “gentrification” of the neighbourhood. Thanks to relatively cheap housing, new and young middle class families find their way to the neighbourhood, renovating their houses, and attracting new facilities. In particular, cultural activities such as theatre and concerts allow for a better atmosphere in the neighbourhood. For most residents this is of more importance than any top-down policy.

Insecurity in the city reconsidered

With the roundtable discussions we have tried to get a better understanding of how local inhabitants and local policy makers experience and assess a top-down initiated local governance of crime (including community policing). Despite their limitations, focus group interviews provided some valuable information about the problems, resistances and bottlenecks of such a policy.

The focus groups confirm that criminality constitutes a part of the social problems that threaten security and liveability in the city and which demand an appropriate policy. Residents and local policy makers identify the main problem as one of “social disorganisation”, caused by the impoverishment of communication and mutual contact, combined with a lack of clear norms and values for appropriate behaviour, a negative image of the neighbourhood and,
last but not least, a lack of perspective for economically and culturally deprived groups. The lack of contact and communication appears to be a major problem. Active contact often results in quarrelling, efforts to understand each others’ viewpoint is very limited, and social isolation and endless complaining appear the only alternative for many.

By the same token, communication between the local authorities and the public is also unsatisfactory. Despite decentralisation of policy and participation procedures, the public complain about the lack of citizen democracy in government (Bennett, 1998, p. 120; Skogan, 1998, p. 89). Especially, the low participation level of minorities and other vulnerable groups is striking. Our research results seem to correspond with similar findings in the USA (Skogan, 1990), the UK (Bennett, 1998) and Canada (Murphy, 1993). The deployment of countless initiatives in the neighbourhood is most confusing for the residents, who subsequently oppose them. Even local policy makers acknowledge the present problem of co-ordination. According to the residents, this decentralised multi-agency approach has failed to produce any lasting results.

Instead of a local governance of crime there is perhaps simply a need for better local government which stops the degradation of the neighbourhood and improves the quality of life. This requires a more integrated, co-ordinated and accountable policy by the city. Criminality is a part of the problem but not the most important one. Therefore, community policing has to be embedded in a wider community government (Mastrofski, 1998, p. 180). Our findings underline the direct relationship between the quality and democratic content of local government and the quality and democratic content of (community) policing. The development of a broad and accountable local governance proves to be quite difficult. Some of the problems deserve further discussion, outlined below.

Data collected by the roundtable discussions are hereby supplemented by data obtained through several years of field research in numerous Belgian police forces, including Antwerp and Mechelen. In Antwerp, in particular, since 1992 we have conducted consecutive and long-lasting direct observations of local criminal policy, police (re)organisation and police work on the ground (reported in e.g. Van den Broeck, 1993; Van den Broeck, 1995; Van den Broeck, 1998; Van den Broeck and Eliaerts, 1994; Van den Broeck and Eliaerts, 1997a, b). Furthermore, as a consultant of the ongoing reorganisation process in several districts of the Antwerp police force we were able to observe the decision-making process at top levels of police and municipality. In the course of this consultancy project we conducted numerous interviews on site with all levels of police management (reported in Van den Broeck, 1997).

The growing pains of community policing
In both cities the police tried to apply the philosophy of community policing. A number of organisational reforms have been established, of which geographical decentralisation is the most important one. The smaller police force of
Mechelen contented itself with a more modest reorganisation, whereby the neighbourhood police was reinforced and new support departments were created. The police force of Antwerp, however, is in its third consecutive and fully fledged reorganisation in ten years. Its geographical decentralisation affected not only the neighbourhood constabulary but the intervention police. Rapid response to emergency calls is organised separately for each geographical sector. This should increase the patrol officers’ commitment to a given area or neighbourhood. On the other hand, all new recruits start their career in the neighbourhood foot patrol teams which address specific types of crime (phenomena) and targets.

Despite these innovations, residents in both cities observe that most policing remains embedded in a traditional crime-fighting style with little interest for the local situation. Apparently it depends on the willingness of the individual constable whether or not a more community-oriented policing style is practised. Tange (2000, p. 270) confirms this is also largely the case for the Brussels police. Here again, the critical question which needs to be addressed is why community policing, however defined, is so difficult to develop and to implement, especially external accountability towards the public. Most implementation and development problems are well documented in international literature (e.g. Rosenbaum, 1994) but within the scope of this article we cannot review all explanations. Only a few remarks which may explain the vivid reactions of the public are addressed here[1].

First, there seems to be a problem of public perception. This is related to the way community policing is organised. Within the forces of Antwerp and Mechelen, as in most other Belgian police forces, community policing is interpreted to be the development of a special neighbourhood constabulary. The intervention police by contrast is usually not involved in community policing reforms. Community policing and intervention departments (911) are incompatible, it is argued; officers who respond to emergency calls do not have much time left to get involved in community policing. This argument cuts ice. As a result, community policing becomes a new “specialisation” within the existing police force. The public, however, does not make any distinction between the departments. And since they have most contact with the intervention department, whose members outnumber the neighbourhood constables, the traditional crime-fighting policing style of the 911 department continues to determine the public image of the police. As a result, for every neighbourhood police officer who genuinely wants to incorporate community policing there are far more constables preferring to continue the traditional crime-fighting pattern. In the end, the citizen does not know what kind of behaviour or policing style to expect from their local police service.

Even when top management decides to incorporate community policing in the intervention department many organisational and cultural obstacles have to be overcome. An often forgotten and underestimated obstacle to reforms is the work schedule, which has a tremendous impact on the potential to incorporate a community policing operating mode. In many Belgian police
forces the intervention department works round the clock by means of two shifts of 12 hours each. After having performed two subsequent shifts, officers have three days off. Since this system results in more evening, night and weekend work it is far better paid than a day shift at the neighbourhood constabulary. As a consequence, no one is willing to give up this financial advantage and the police unions refuse any change to this system. In Antwerp police unions have successfully resisted the implementation of a different work schedule, which eventually proved to be an essential prerequisite to introducing community policing working principles at the intervention department. This important (problematic) role of the police unions in the implementation process of community policing and their ability in fostering or hindering change is often, with the exception of, for example, Brodeur (1998, p. 217), underestimated in the body of international research. For the endorsement of community policing such a work schedule is a considerable obstacle, since a constable who spends less than half of the working hours in the neighbourhood simply cannot establish long-lasting contact with the public.

On the other hand, the neighbourhood constabulary, once relieved from intervention tasks, can address and solve problems in lieu of handling mere incidents. But residents still tend to criticise police performances. Perhaps it is the orientation of community policing which is at stake. Most neighbourhood projects in Belgium are developed within the framework of a problem-oriented policing philosophy. The issue here is who defines the problems to be tackled. Usually this appears to be solely a police matter and police tend to define their policy on the (rather narrow) basis of crime statistics. Prime concerns of the public such as interpersonal conflicts and incivilities will not be identified via these criminality figures, nor via the afore-described public hearings organised by the municipality and the police. As a consequence, problems such as burglaries will be given priority for the problem-oriented policing teams. Although residents recognise the detrimental effects of this criminality, it is not obviously a core problem which has to be tackled. Due to what Skogan (1990) characterises as “the over-professionalisation” of themselves and their (crime-fighting) mission, police departments lack the ability to analyse citizen-provided data (Mastrofski, 1998: 178) and as a consequence, systematically overlook many pressing community concerns because they lie outside of their narrowly defined mandate.

Furthermore, the police are not keen on dealing with interpersonal conflicts and other problems of conviviality. First, these exert pressure on their impartiality, since most disputed settlements tend to be interpreted as favourable to one of the parties. Second, settling disputes is a frustrating business, since they cannot be resolved within the narrow time limit an intervention department usually has while other emergency calls are waiting to be handled. Finally, the willingness and ability to address problems of neighbourhood nuisance and incivilities are also a matter of police culture. The traditional crime-fighting culture does not regard problems between people as real police work but as social work. Most senior officers managing the new
neighbourhood teams come from the 911 intervention department and are tried and tested in the traditional crime-fighting culture. For all these reasons an exclusively crime-centred approach continues to dominate the present policy, also within the neighbourhood policing teams. However, this approach fails to meet the expectations of the residents we interviewed at our roundtable discussions. The result is a compromise of the (democratic) legitimisation of the community policing policy.

Basically, from their experiences with different departments and levels of the police forces, i.e. the intervention department and the neighbourhood constabulary, citizens in both cities question the “organisational readiness” of their local police forces which implies that “the agency has in place the structure, policies, procedures, knowledge and officer skills needed to deliver a new set of police services and a new approach to crime prevention and control” (Rosenbaum, 1994, p. 350).

Furthermore, and as a consequence of the latter, it is highly questionable whether the community can fully express its needs and demands, and whether these will subsequently be taken into account within the present “community policing” policy. The decentralisation of the police organisation and the decision-making process for defining its policy did not result automatically in more community participation (Grinc, 1994; Skogan, 1990; Murphy, 1993; Bennett, 1998). Furthermore, more community participation did not automatically result in a more democratic decision-making process. Simply putting residents of a patrol sector together does not necessarily produce groups of individuals with shared values (Stone and Ward, 2000, p. 25).

Community policing principles reconsidered
This questions some of the underlying principles of community policing. According to Trojanowics and Bucqueroux (1990) the community policing concept can be considered as “oscillating” between two poles or pillars (or rather between Scylla and Charibdis?), i.e. problem-oriented and community-oriented policing (POP and COP). Community policing is supposed to derive from a balanced mix of the two components. In practice, however, one of the two poles, that is problem-oriented policing, tends to dominate, whereby it is the police who defines the problems to be tackled.

“Scientific research” is not a vehicle for promoting one’s own (normative and ideological) truth. Social sciences have to contribute to a better understanding, a “Verstehen”, of society and must help to explain the consequences of policy options for society. The explanations we try to give in this article are in the first place descriptions of human behaviour and their intended and unintended consequences. The objective of our research is not to find the ultimate arguments for choosing between a POP or COP-oriented policing policy. Rather we wish to indicate some of the consequences such a policy option may have for the neighbourhood and its residents.

One of the interesting comparisons between POP and COP (or more accurately between POP and community policing) can be found in Brodeurs’
own contribution to his unsurpassed textbook “How to Recognize Good Policing”, entitled “tailor-made policing” (Brodeur, 1998). He analyses pros and cons of both philosophies at a conceptual level. He concludes that community policing is more than POP subject to become victim of the “means over ends” syndrome, since it can only display effects on attitudes toward the quality of police service instead of presenting results on the quality of the police work itself. Furthermore, according to Brodeur, POP is credited since it is not tied to the existence of a community, nor is it addressed to a particular group of police persons.

Although these arguments cut ice, our research results give reason to believe that some of the negative consequences of POP remained underexposed in Brodeur’s excellent analysis. Brodeur admits that Goldstein generally appears to reserve a greater role for the police than for the community in setting the general objectives (Brodeur, 1998, p. 41). Our research results stress the fact that in this respect it appears that POP reinforces, on the one hand, the image that the police can manage policing on its own and, on the other hand, it confirms the community in a passive role. Therefore POP continues to rely on formal social control agents (the police). Community contribution to neighbourhood safety remains underdeveloped and, hence, this approach inspires or supports very little informal social control.

In contrast, COP, or the “community-oriented policing pillar”, can be understood as explicitly based on informal social control. This informal control is constituted and promoted through informal networks (constituted by neighbourhood residents), that focus not merely on criminality or insecurity but also pay attention to safeguarding or repairing the social cohesion of the neighbourhood. This definition of COP policy is designed to foster a longer term impact on police performance. Socio-psychological research by Lerner (1975, 1980), for example, indicates that citizens seek confirmation for the idea that they live in a society which aspires to social justice (cf. “just world theory”) and evil is punished. Support of (law-abiding) citizens, thereby, appears to be more important than a strong stand towards delinquents. Exactly this was expressed by the residents at the focus group interviews.

Consequently, policing has a strong symbolic function. COP, in theory and as a generic goal, emphasises this kind of public support and self-organisation, rendering participation, open consultation mechanisms and feedback more important. On the other hand, POP often delivers better immediate results in fighting crime than COP; this was confirmed by the meta-evaluation research of Sherman et al. (1997) in the USA. Given the “moral panic” in both Antwerp and Mechelen and its exploitation by the extreme right wing parties, the pressure on the police to produce quick and convincing results (via POP) increases. Nevertheless, that apparent value of POP may well diminish over time when considered from the perspectives of legitimacy and accountability. A COP-component may therefore be required as a catalyst in order to transform community policing, which is in reality dominated by a POP strategy, into an accountable and democratically legitimated practice. This expresses perhaps
the difference between an “inclusive” and “exclusive” form of community policing policy. From this perspective COP can be considered as a “moral compass”, indispensable to keeping POP-strategies on a democratic and accountable course. This bears resemblance to what Muir, more than 20 years ago, described on an operational level as the “good cop”; “Intellectually, he has to grasp the nature of human suffering. Morally, he has to resolve the contradiction of achieving just ends with coercive means” (Muir, 1977, pp. 3-4, in Reiner, 1998, p. 66). Reiner continues from this perspective: “Moral understanding may be integrated, that is, able to accommodate the exercise of coercion within an overall moral code” (Reiner, 1998, p. 66) In the end, “good policing” (cf. Brodeur, 1998) can only be exercised by (morally) “good cops”. It is our experience that this can only be achieved when constables are able to integrate the (moral) COP principles as outlined above in their daily (problem-oriented) police work. This requires considerable changes in the actual police culture, which are often neglected in the “internally focused” POP projects. Metcalfe (2001, pp. 223-4) takes the same position when he explains that POP projects in some British police forces were largely unsuccessful because they failed to integrate cultural changes, necessary to start a critical debate about what POP really meant. As a result POP was considered just another “procedure” to improve operational police work.

The relation between the public and the local authorities, and the growing-pains of multi-agency

Local governance of crime tackles problems not only through the police but also via the establishing of a broader multi-agency network which makes appeals to the public for participation. However, residents at the focus group interviews disapproved of these provisions for participation and subsequently assessed their relationship with the government as most ambivalent. This ambivalent relationship is constituted by the diversity in demands and expectations which residents have towards their neighbourhood and by the policy reaction of the local authorities regarding these demands and expectations. Our focus groups identified “passive” and “active” residents. The former want to avoid any trouble and withdraw from the public forum. Some of them can be described as “complainers” who, for several reasons, are always dissatisfied and become intolerant towards all and everything. On the other hand, there is a growing group of “active” residents who want to contribute and have a say in the renaissance and renewal of their neighbourhood.

Passive residents and “complainers” are perhaps a part of discontented and anxious people who believe things get out of their control with the advent of the “global economy”. They have growing difficulties earning a stable income and a reasonable standard of living, which increases the fear for social exclusion and poverty. This “existential” anxiety is reinforced by the crumbling of existing social networks in the neighbourhood. Networks previously established by the church, sport-clubs, scouting etc., disappear because of tendency to individualisation, which is also partly due to demographic changes
such as an increasingly aging population and the increase of singles households. Hence, the social disorganisation of the neighbourhood is not only geographical, but also takes place on the level of social interaction and integration between people. “Complainers” suffer most from this disorganisation from which they cannot escape. To quote Onslow (cf. Keeping up appearances ...), they are “fully surrounded by no fun” ... For the “complainers”, it is up to “others”, in particular the public authority, to find solutions for everything that goes wrong in the neighbourhood. Such disappointment and discontent is easily exploited by extreme right wing parties, which thrive on fear and anxiety. As a result, those most in need of mutual solidarity and social progress become easy prey for parties envisaging exactly the opposite.

On the other hand a group of “active citizens”, some of whom collaborated with our focus group, are also critical of their working relationship with the government and with other agencies involved in the multi-agency networking. Apparently, this is due to the ambivalent signals they receive from the multi-agency network regarding their participation. Furthermore, the opacity of the network is criticised. As a part of urban renewal numerous “new” professions such as “urban managers”, urban developers”, shopping mall developers”, etc. have been created. The local governance of crime, in particular the “security contracts”, also prompted a number of new “co-ordination functions” in many crime prevention projects, victim aid services, drug aid programs, etc. Finally, the overall co-ordination of the programs on an intermediate policy level introduced new professional personnel. At least the local governance of crime and the urban renewal projects created a considerable number of new jobs! The omnipresence of criminologists in these functions is also striking (see below).

The advantage appears to be that innovative plans and strategies are being developed with more professionalism and know-how. But, as a consequence this policy becomes embedded in a technocratic discourse, which is neither understood nor appreciated by the residents, e.g. at public hearings on a decentralised level discussing policy decisions (cf. Skogan in Brodeur, 1998b, p. 216). Especially those promoting the idea of “social engineering”, such as urban planners and civil engineers, use technocratic discourse while presenting their policy plans. Perhaps this illustrates and exposes the serious difficulties local government agents and civil servants have with genuine consultation and heightens their discomfort with “true human interactions”[2]. Maybe they regard the citizen as an annoying obstacle which has to be bypassed and neutralised. Mere decentralisation does not eliminate or “magic away” the existing “autocratic” and top-down management and leadership styles in the municipal apparatus. Subsequently, the possibility of intervention at these meetings is seen as fairly low. The result is that many of these public hearings or other police-community meetings become merely sounding boards for police or municipality views (Bennett, 1994). Problems of transparency and participation are furthermore related to the “plethora” of projects and initiatives which have been launched by different authorities. Each project and agency
has its own objectives, timing, financing and often originates from different policy levels. Horizontal networks have to be established for overall coordination and integration. The implementation of this "integrated" policy through a "kaleidoscope" of policy agencies becomes a highly complex, not to say complicated matter. Subsequently, it is difficult for the residents, for example, to perceive a direct link between political decisions and their implementation on the ground. For the residents affected by this policy it becomes unclear where and when policy decisions are made and what mechanisms of control and accountability there are.

The policy network for the local governance of crime becomes a jumble, a Babylonian confusion of tongues, which fails to bridge the (communication) gap between the citizen and the government and which does not produce any lasting results. Promising to honour democratic participation and self-regulation of the citizenry, free of paternalist and bureaucratic tutelage, the new multi-agency networks seem to turn out to provide less participation and more diffused regulation. Crawford (1997) described such networks as "quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations" which fit in a wider process of "downsizing the state". This converges with a displacement from a (vertical) governing, e.g. through employment policy, to a (horizontalised) governance (Painter and Goodwin, 1995). According to Virta (2001) and Stenson (1993), (community) policing becomes hereby the technology through which this "post-Keynesian" (cf. O'Malley and Palmer, 1996) government or governance takes place. Consequently, criminality, instead of, for example, unemployment, becomes a major criterion in the allocation of financial resources to the neighbourhood. Hence, insecurity in the neighbourhood becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: it has to be unsafe since it receives policy attention. Subsequently, politicians get (re-)elected when expressing the "moral panic" of the (Belgian) worried middle class electorate, which means that the issue of insecurity is overemphasised. The media help to produce this stigma of insecurity. Finally, the advent of criminologists and other professionals in the Belgian multi-agency networks and their growing dominance on the policy agenda reinforce the idea that priority should be given to fighting crime and insecurity (see also McLaughlin, 1992). Even our own focus group interviews, unintentionally, reinforce this image. Research is done in a political context from which one cannot escape.

This growing importance of criminality as part of the policy framework inevitably affects the priorities in the Belgian multi-agency approach and the position of the police in the network. Crucial to the idea of networks is whether it promotes an "inclusive" or "exclusive/exclusionary" policy (Virta, 2001)[3]. In Gent (Belgium), examples can be found of local multi-agency networks in social housing blocks which, for example, try to diminish incidents of youth hanging-out by organising leisure activities or helping with homework after school. Such activities serve other goals than e.g. organising citizen patrols or simply putting new locks at the entrances to keep youth from entering the social housing complexes. In the case of Gent, the willingness of the police to accept
and even encourage social workers and other social agencies to participate in the network has been crucial in the orientation of the network toward an inclusive policy which is not exclusively crime centred. In Antwerp, by contrast, some police officials and policy makers (i.e. the mayor) promote neighbourhood or block watch organisations, which sometimes thrive on a crime-centred and exclusive discourse of barring outsiders from the neighbourhood. The latter is of course not that surprising given the political and social pressure in this city from extreme right wing parties.

Finally, how does a crime-centred policy affect target groups such as youngsters, when policy attention or financial resources, for example for a playground or basketball facilities, only ever go hand in hand with the prevention of crime? When in Brussels theatre projects were co-financed for the sake of crime prevention, a number of participants withdrew because they did not want to be associated with crime. Consequently, social and community workers indicate they have to work within a framework whose principal goals they often do not endorse (Crawford and Jones, 1996). On the other hand, police and related agencies will tend to dominate, even unintentionally, the multi-agency networks. It is doubtful this will render police work more social, but social work may become like police work (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996).

Perhaps of greater importance is the fact that these “poorer” neighbourhoods, of which major internal socio-economic and cultural contrasts are an integral part, are confronted with diverging interests that are incompatible with the consensual vision of community policing. Participation and accountability sound appropriate and “politically correct”, but the question remains whether or not consent can be found for a policing policy that can implement and maintain equitable justice for all. After all, socio-economic and cultural contradictions become more tangible on the community and neighbourhood level. Decentralised policing and the encouragement of community involvement logically will confront the police with these ever-diverging interests, especially when socio-economic and cultural contradictions lead to spatial segregation.

**Which future for community policing?**

This remark introduces our last point of discussion[4]. The concept of community policing has been developed during the last two decades as a reaction to the failing professional policing model. However, community policing was only beginning to get actual support in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large-scale police reforms were postponed until the mid-1990s. Arendt’s (1978) distinction between a phenomenon’s *Ursprung* and its *Anfang* might be useful here. During the two decades when community policing gained momentum, Western society underwent substantial changes. Economic globalisation entailed a deregulation of the labour market increasing its flexibility. Such globalisation, not to say fragmentation, involves essential aspects of post-modern society. In Belgium, this process coincided with 20 years of continuous and drastic public budget cuts (to limit the gigantic public deficit). This resulted, unfortunately, perhaps unintentionally, in an increasing
dualisation in a number of neighbourhoods. As we have illustrated, this process did not fail to impact on the neighbourhoods where “society’s redundancies” (cf. Ralf Dahrendorf’s 1/3-2/3 society) are concentrated.

This altered social context also changed the meaning of community policing and its consensus model is coming under pressure. The current social context offers little opportunity for consensus. Belgium’s different political parties can only be in power (even at local level) if they form coalition governments (cf. proportional representation), and they rarely reach consensus on policy. Each responds to the problems of the so called “dualised risk society” from a different social vision. In practice, this does not usually result in a coherent policy, but rather in a contradictory one. The lack of clarity on the level of governance, as was described in this article, may thus be explained. The context of the “dualised risk society” may also explain the difficult relation with ethnic minorities, and the abrupt launch of projects targeting, for example, a hardcore of young delinquent gangs. Finally, this context helps explain the discrepancy between the relatively low level of crime in Belgium (with the exception of traffic insecurity), and the growing fear of crime (Dijksterhuis and Nijboer, 1990). Belgian citizens who are (still) relatively well off are particularly prone to serious distortion.

In a so called “risk society”, POP may be seen as a more realistic approach. COP would then likely be restricted to the better neighbourhoods only, or serve, in any case, the dominant, more affluent or more highly educated groups. For Stenson (1993, p. 385), this may result in a greater pressure on the police to align with proactive initiatives from well-organised groups who have their own regulatory agenda. In this scenario, community policing is reduced to an exclusive co-operation deal between a limited sample of “law-abiding” citizens and the police. Moreover, in that respect community policing will come to defend only very specific interests. For example, in more affluent neighbourhoods neighbourhood-watch initiatives supported or directed by the police will easily transform into a practice of barring outsiders. This may induce a “Matthew-effect”: community policing will be implemented where it is least needed while those in most need of appropriate protection and support will get, for example, “zero-tolerance” policing. This final question highlights that further choices will have to be made for the policy of “community policing” in the light of the changing social context. Will this mean that community policing simply becomes an adaptation of the globalised risk society’s social control function, i.e. the “exclusive” form of community policing, or, quite the reverse, could it be made into an instrument that somehow tempers the adverse effects of such a society, i.e. the “inclusive” form of community policing?

Postscript
At the beginning of 2001 a new chief of police was installed in Antwerp. This resulted in a policy shift. The intervention department and the neighbourhood constabulary will be integrated and furthermore be decentralised into numerous beat teams responsible for all of the daily police work in their sector.
The new beat teams will receive extra training in community policing, whereby the significance of the COP component will be emphasised. Meanwhile, the municipal authorities announced that efforts will be made to increase public participation in the decision-making process. In other words, a reorientation of security policy is possible. However, these stated goals still have to be realised at ground level. Furthermore, the question remains whether such policy shifts can still have any significant impact on present political and social developments.

Notes

1. A more elaborate overview of explanations and examples of structural and cultural resistance to community policing in Belgium can be found in e.g. Eliaerts et al., 1993; Van den Broeck, 1993; Van den Broeck and Eliaerts, 1994; Van den Broeck and Easton, 1997a, b; Van den Broeck, 1998; Smeets and Strebelle, 2000; Hendrickx et al., 2000; Tange, 2000; Easton, 2001; Van den Broeck, 2001. For the development of a local governance of crime in Belgium and its relation to community policing, e.g. Van den Broeck, 1995; Cartuyvels, 1996; Hebberecht, 1998; Van Campenhoudt, 2000.

2. And police officers usually “sat mute at the back, unless called upon”, exactly as Skogan describe the beat meetings in Chicago (1998, p. 104).

3. And further elaborated by her in this issue of Policing.


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Van den Broeck, T. (1997), “Van complexe organisaties met simpele jobs naar simpele organisaties met complexe jobs, enkele bedenkingen bij de reorganisatie van de politie Antwerpen” (in English: “From complex organisations with simple jobs to simple organisations with complex jobs, assessing the police reorganisation process”), paper presented at the Opening of the Academic Year of the Antwerp Police Academy, 14 November.


Local security management
Policing through networks

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Abstract Anglo-American community policing has been implemented in Finland since 1996 but there has been a long tradition of the community policing style, called the village police, since the 1960s. The police enjoy a great deal of public confidence, the welfare society has been stable, with no significant social divisions and rather low crime, and therefore there have been no urgent needs or pressures for policing reform. Both the adoption and the implementation of the community policing strategy have been a part of wider public sector modernization, including the service orientation, improved efficiency and responsibility. This paper is based on two process evaluation studies; "The implementation of community policing in Finland – a management of change approach" (2000) and "Local security networks and safety planning – a case of Tampere" (2001). The implementation process has been one of learning by doing. There was a shift in thinking and practice in 1999 when community policing was seen more as a dynamic development process and means rather than a model and a goal, as before. Community policing policy in Finland prioritizes strategic partnerships, networks and local safety planning, and it is re-named as local policing or local security management. A process evaluation of local networking and safety planning (Tampere) shows that several factors contribute to the successful process of partnership formation, networking and collaboration.

Introduction
Community policing has been implemented in Finland systematically since 1996. A few area-based neighbourhood policing initiatives and experimental projects were adopted since 1978, but they were not very successful. "The new wave" of community policing came to Finland in the briefcase of a police officer who visited in San Diego and imported the ideas of more systematic, proactive and holistic approach to policing – and Goldsteins' book Problem-Oriented Policing (1990) – and who was in charge of the implementation of these ideas in the Ministry of Interior. Similar new principles were introduced after police managers’ visits in The Netherlands, Belgium and the UK. The whole package was at first adopted as such; it included changing the policing philosophy, policing practice and organization. The model was based on the problem-oriented approach, and the main principles were crime prevention, proactive policing and multi-agency cooperation.

In the last few years a whole new language of partnerships has emerged in the policing field. In contrast to a reliance upon autonomous bureaucracies, networks of diverse interest groups have become the dominant ethic with a greater emphasis upon the more holistic approach to social problems (Crawford, 1997, p. 25). Security networks can be seen as an outcome of community policing policies, as is the case in Finland. Networking is, however, challenging conventional wisdom about the role of the police in society; it generates complexity. Partnership has opened up political spaces for new
primary definers to articulate a strategy for urban, social and political regeneration. Strategic challenges to urban governance, debates about crime, insecurity and social anxiety are central to the contemporary struggle over notions of public as well as private interests (Coleman and Sim, 2000, pp. 632-4).

Local policing is being increasingly enmeshed in complex networks of relationships and interests. This is also true in centralized police organisations, as in Finland. Community policing has placed new obligations on the police to cooperate in the development and implementation of local crime prevention and security strategies. As one of the main players the police have been required to develop mutual priorities with other agencies as well as local communities (McLaughlin and Murji, 2001) The formation of partnerships and networking have been the main objectives of community policing in Finland since 1999. The purpose of networking is local safety planning, local policies and strategies and their implementation, updating (continuity) and development, i.e. locally shared responsibility of security.

It has been argued that community policing research has tended to be a series of stories of organizational rearrangements and reforms without connections to wider socio-political developments (Crawford, 1997, p. 5). The contextual and ethnocentric character of policing is an important factor in analyses of the significance and success of the reforms. Community policing needs to be understood in terms of local and national exigencies, e.g. whether the political culture (and within that, the specific police culture) of the particular society provides for an acceptance of state police officers conducting activities outside more general public order and crime-related functions (Brogden, 1999, p. 167). If we look at the community policing philosophies, policies, plans and programmes in Western countries all we easily see is an Anglo-American façade that looks the same everywhere. To avoid this façade in research, it is necessary to look behind the formal statements, and to investigate changes in policing philosophy, policing practices and police organizations in each country. A change in the name of policing philosophy with no change in ways of thinking, institutions and working methods is no change at all (Virta, 2001a).

The power of community policing is that it wraps the police in the powerful good images of community, cooperation and crime prevention; one cannot take issue with its extremely good aspirations. It evokes powerful positive images that tend to insulate the strategy, and the police operating within that strategy, from critical analysis (Barlow and Hickman Barlow, 1999, p. 667). Community policing needs to be evaluated, however, on the same scale as other policing initiatives, i.e. its distributional and political aspects should be taken into account, too. Networks are usually seen to be a way to organize multi-agency cooperation in community policing strategies. Consequently, networking is seen as a method, as a structural matter in a policy domain. But if networks are to explain policy outcomes, then the characteristics of networks themselves should be the primary explanatory element. They appear, though, at present more useful at the metaphorical level; networks matter, but to answer how needs more serious investigation (Peters, 1998, p. 25).
The implementation of community policing – learning by doing

Background

There is a long tradition of a close relationship between the police and the public in Finland. There is also a tradition of a community policing style of policing, called “the village police” in 1960s. A policeman lived in his or her own district and knew the residents. Community policing of foreign origin was not initiated until 1978, and in 1981 the Ministry of Interior issued official instructions on the matter. In 1987 there were 160 community officers in 40 different police districts (2 percent of the entire police force). The new point was that community policing was regarded as part of the preventive activity of the police. Main reasons for implementation failures of initiatives were lack of resources and resistance among the staff; community policing was regarded as non-police work (Mantila, 1987, p. 172).

Over the past few decades, Finnish society has undergone changes similar to those in many other European countries. Still, the police enjoy a great deal of public confidence and the welfare society has been rather low crime, peaceful and non pluralistic. Over a couple of decades this confidence on the part of the people has been stable: in 2000, 88 percent of people had a great deal of confidence in the police. Comparative numbers are Denmark 86, Norway 81, the UK 71, Spain 66, Portugal 39, and the average in Europe is 56 percent (source: European Trusted Brand, Annual Report of the Finnish Police, 2000). Therefore, there was no urgent need for community policing reform. Consequently, the policy was based on community development in the first place, not on defence. Graham and Bennett have classified community crime prevention initiatives as developmental and defensible. Defensible community policing strategies, for instance neighbourhood watches, tend to appear when there are serious problems to tackle (Graham and Bennett, 1995).

Why, then, was a community policing strategy initiated in Finland? A number of surveys made by police in the name of improvement of service since 1990 showed that the social need for policing reform existed. Police were the first authority in Finland to start the Quality of Services programme in 1993. People wanted the police to be more visible and more foot patrols were wanted on the streets. Local authorities and political decision makers expected more and better quality cooperation with the police (e.g. Virta, 1990; Korander, 1994). Community policing was seen as an answer to these increasing demands.

Methodologically, the process evaluation of the implementation of community policing in Finland is qualitative, based on content analysis of administration documents in 1995-2000 and on interviews of 47 senior police officers (middle managers) who were in charge of the implementation during the period all over the country, in police districts of various size. An approach to implementation is the management of change.

Structuring in community policing, 1996-1998

If innovative changes that challenge the principles, philosophy, structure and values of policing are to succeed, they must become the operating philosophy of
the organization. Commitment to change is a necessary condition for implementation and institutionalization. In this sense the starting point was a bit problematic in Finland, because there were no strong inside or outside pressures or demands for reform. Police managers had difficulties stressing the importance of change. When one of the most important reasons for the adoption of community policing in many countries has been the need to improve or even rebuild the relationship between the police and the public, Finnish community policing lacked that mission due to the existing trust and good relations; there was no need to build or rebuild support and legitimacy. Education is also a critical point at the beginning of the process, and in Finland the police education and training lacked community policing knowledge for several years.

However, even when police managers are fully committed to the process, external changes such as demographic shifts, racial conflict, or high levels of unemployment may create barriers to the implementation. There are also other social and economic factors over which police executives and local authorities have little control (Gardarelli et al., 1998). In practice, in 1996 three main means in implementation of community policing were a local security management model (in few big cities; a strategic, holistic approach based on multi-agency cooperation), a problem-oriented program model (in small cities and the countryside; short time schedules, few participants, mostly youth projects) and a neighbourhood policing model (in cities; area-based, contacts with the public made easy by personal mobile phones, foot patrols, bicycles, etc.).

The delivery of community policing at the operational level included foot patrols, community consultations, visits in schools and area beat officers. There were many variations throughout the country in intensity and volume of community policing initiatives, depending on local activity. One reason was lack of resources, because there were (and still are) no additional financial or personnel resources for community policing in the police budgets. In 1996-1998, the main principles of the community policing model involved problem-oriented policing (with strong emphasis on crime analysis), community crime prevention, area- and team-based policing, decentralization, professionalization (increasing the discretion of the problem-solving practitioners), democratization (seeking more public input and striking partnerships with non-police agencies) and service integration. The main reason for some implementation failures during these years was the lack of prioritizing. All the aspects of the community policing model were to be implemented, all of them were seen as important and inevitable. The lesson to be learnt was that management of change is critical to success. The lack of planning, prioritizing and coordination, training and education led to unwillingness to change.

The management of change was unsuccessful partly for general reasons (no additional resources for community policing, no strong pressures for reforms) and partly because of local failure factors. Locally, common reasons for implementation failures, slow development or non-implementation were as follows:
• community policing was introduced as a new task (with no additional resources);
• perspectives on the change in management level was too general and arguments too weak for effective implementation;
• staff had to rethink and reorient to the police work without proper training and education;
• a heavy burden of expectations on what the initiatives might achieve were placed on the staff; and
• the views and opinions of the staff were not taken account at the beginning of the implementation process.

Consequently, at the end of 1998 there was a bifurcation between community policing and conventional policing in practice. And there were façades too. Some police districts had statements in their annual reports and strategies (“Everything we do is community policing”) but had no specific community policing initiatives. The Ministry of Interior published An Outline of Community Policing Model in 1998 (MOI, 1998), with some common, very broadly defined principles and examples of local initiatives. The goal was a safe living environment, but no specific means were offered (“Do it yourself locally, by prioritizing”).

From a model to a strategy
There was a shift in thinking about community policing in 1999. It was seen more and more as a dynamic development process and means, not as a static model and a goal as such. It was understood also more as an alternative or complement to conventional policing and not as competitive as before. Organizational readiness and institutional capacity for sustaining a community policing change grew up. The focus shifted from the operational level to include the management level. There were parallel administrative and management reforms: the Quality of Service project (adopted in 1993) continued to develop quality of police services and the “Management by results” steering system (from 1995 on) was to be implemented. The need to reconcile all these reforms was inevitable but did not succeed until 2001. One problem in Finland has been measuring the results of police work. The lack of crime prevention measures has had a negative impact during the community policing implementation process as well.

To identify the changes in policing since 1996 requires a look at each of the main elements of community policing: philosophy, practice and organizational structures. Most effective changes were seen at the philosophical level, in thinking about police, community orientation and customer orientation. There were changes also in operational strategies and tactics, and a strong emphasis on the development of crime analysis, problem solving and crime prevention. However, changes in organizational structures have been less effective; in fact, there have been very few efforts at organizational reforms (decentralization) locally.
Although all the dimensions of community policing philosophy were seen as equally important, there was a strategy formulation going at the top level of administration and the result was a strategy that prioritised certain goals and objectives. From 1999 on, the main strategy of community policing has been local partnership building and networking. Main objectives are policy making (local security/safety plans), problem identification (citizen surveys, crime analysis) and problem solving. The role of the individual police officer should be planner, problem solver, community organizer and information exchange link, that of knowledge worker. At the same time, community policing was renamed and repositioned as “basic police work” (i.e. local problem-oriented policing) which in turn is a part of local security management and governance (Strategy 1999: *Paikallisella Turvallisuusyhteistyöllä Tulosta. Good Results Through Local Cooperation*) (MOI, 1999).

To sum up, the implementation process has been the one of doing and learning. Now there is a coherent strategy, supportive measures to be built (e.g., strategic planning education and balanced evaluation; a model based on the balanced scorecard) and knowledge management system (crime analysis, information exchange, evaluation) that are preconditions for successful operational community policing. The balanced scorecard is developed by Kaplan and Norton for the business environment (Kaplan and Norton, 2001), but it is widely used in the public sector, and in police organizations in Europe (e.g. in the UK, Germany and Sweden)[1].

The problem still is that once renamed as just local policing, we can no longer see even the façade of community policing. The annual report of the Finnish police (2000) has no word about community policing or local networking. If community policing basically is what the police in Finland has done traditionally for decades, how does the current development make a difference?

**Safety planning and local security networks**

What is new, however, is the more systematic, strategic approach to local policing. Neighbourhood policing efforts have been rare (no mini-stations or cop-shops, very few community constables), but the same effect is hoped to be gained through networking and getting to know local residents on a novel basis (i.e. common formulation of plans, problem identification and solving).

The partnership formation for the co-production of security has been in most cases a police initiative, mainly because police have the crime prevention and security expertise needed in the first phase of the process. Partnerships vary in size and type. Local coalitions may include representatives from governmental agencies, municipalities, private businesses, voluntary organizations and churches. The main aim of networking is to set the objectives and make a local (or regional) safety plan (strategy of security, policing plan, crime prevention plan; the name depends on the specific focus defined in a policy-making process at the local level). At the end of September 2001, 203 cities and municipalities had some kind of safety plan. In many cases, small municipalities had made
There are 448 cities and municipalities in Finland and all plans should be available to the end of the year.

The purpose of the planning process and networking is to build a continuing system of local security management, to share responsibility of security and crime prevention in communities, and to gain synergy advantages. The management of networks is, however, very challenging to the police, because police play an important role by creating and facilitating partnerships and because every community and its problems are unique. Compared to traditional police work, the management of networks is very much a means of managing and steering expectations.

Building the local security network – a case of Tampere

Tampere is the second biggest city in Finland, with approximately 193,000 inhabitants. The local police initiative process of partnership formation started in 1997. It was a part of the development of community policing in the city police department, focused on problem solving and multi-agency cooperation. The first main goal was to make a safety plan for the city and to connect the security issues to the broader urban development program. Political leaders of the city supported the initiative and insisted that the prevention of social exclusion should include the plan. A positive, supportive political environment has been viewed by police chiefs as the most important factor in their ability to implement community policing and crucial to the long-term success of the programme (Gardarelli et al., 1998) and it had a critical role in Tampere, too.

The coalition of the planning network (17 persons) consisted of the social and health authorities, the representatives of school, environmental and technical and employment sectors, business, church, NGOs (Tampere 2000 network) and the police. The formulation of the strategy at the beginning of the process included the following aims: to decrease and prevent disorder, petty crimes and social exclusion; to initiate surveys and joint projects; to support local activities and information flow; to coordinate parallel initiatives; to find a common view about security matters; and to build models for cooperation and collaboration, i.e. networks.

The evaluation of the networking and strategy making process in Tampere is based on documents collected from the first meeting of the planning group in 1997 to the end of the year 2000, interviews of the participants of the group, and the continuous monitoring of the process.

Identification and positioning

Members of the working group had to find out their own roles and positions in relation to security and crime prevention issues: they had to identify themselves as actors in the security field. It was not an easy process. The concept of security, first presented by the police to the rest of the group, was crime related. However, all other members had different kinds of standpoints, and consequently, after several discussions and meetings, the compromise was a very broad concept of security which included almost all aspects of everyday life.
Next steps in the process were defining common goals, coordinating parallel initiatives, collecting information, setting priorities and mapping the chances for collaboration. The social prevention-oriented approach dominated the discourse and planning during 1998 and traffic and business interests remained rather separate domains. The practical solution in working methods, to divide the security field into sub-processes and to define the main “owners” of each, was successful. There were 15 processes, three of them owned by the police (car thefts, violence in the streets, fear of crime). The first version of the safety plan for the city was completed at the end of 1999.

Monitoring and evaluation of the process was seen to be important, because the success or failure of planning and cooperation could have impacts on the implementation and further networking, and to the effects and outcome of the whole partnership idea of prevention of crime, fear of crime and increasing security. Evaluation was also important for learning through the process so that the process could correct its direction and steer itself if necessary.

**Findings**

As a network, the planning group was effective and coherent enough for the security policy making. Information exchange and knowledge sharing worked well and all members also found the process beneficial to their own fields. The synergy advantage was significant especially, among the police, social authorities, church and environmental planning authorities (architecture, buildings, parking places). Commitment of the police to the planning was seen to be good but on a narrow personnel basis, because only the deputy chief of the Tampere City Police Department participated in the strategy making process.

The consensus about the goals, priorities and security was achieved rather easily, partly because of conflict avoidance techniques used as early as in partnership coalition formation. The police made decisions selecting the participants, and chose the most important traditional partners (e.g. social authorities) and the most cooperative partners (e.g. church). The party-politicization of the process was intentionally avoided by the police, and the representatives of local political decision makers were not invited. It has been argued that the core participants of policing networks tend to be drawn from a narrow set of groups and institutions who have frequent and high quality interaction on all matters related to the policy issue (McLeay, 1998, p. 127) and this was the case in Finland, too.

There were no struggles over the discourses of security, and all members agreed that their interests were taken into account equally during the process. The major problems were the schedule and the amount of work. It was difficult to find enough time for meetings, and participation activity was rather low at the end of the year 1999 (only four to six members at present in meetings). However, the strategy was almost finished, and a lot of exchange could be done by e-mail. The amount of work was seen to be a problem at the beginning of the process, e.g. social authorities used 20-30 hours per month (in addition to their
regular jobs) gathering information and coordinating security-related projects (youth, probation, drugs).

The business sector was alienated from the process after the first year, mainly because of the strong emphasis put on social prevention. The representatives of business found the process not very beneficial for their purposes. Shoplifting is still one part of the crime prevention program in the Safer Tampere strategy, but a minor one. The business sector is used to organizing its own security matters differently, through surveillance cameras, private security agencies etc. in Finland.

As a policy-making network, partnership is also a power-related construction. It has been argued that differential power relations encompass the relative capacity of organizations and actors, drawing upon material and human resources, to achieve desired outcomes. In multi-agency crime prevention power is often exercised through the power to define; to set agendas, direct resources and determine the contours of policy (Crawford, 1997, p. 133). In this sense, inter-organizational, the power relations changed during the process towards a balance. In the beginning the process was police dominated, the police gathered basic information and police knowledge dominated the discourse of security. The result, the Safer Tampere strategy (2000), though, has a very social preventive ethos, and a balance among interests.

Local security network – responsibility and empowerment
The original policy network continues its work as a steering group for the implementation of the strategy. The implementation was reconciled with the urban neighbourhood development program and they have an office with a six-person staff. Area based networking started in 2000 and neighbourhood networks were built on existing structures, only in two areas the security networks are new. Area-based security surveys offered basic information about the problems of each area. Members of the neighbourhood networks are mainly social agencies and health authorities, representatives of schools and voluntary organizations (e.g. residence associations). The role of the police is mainly as an expert and an information exchange link. Each of the five area networks has its own structures and working methods. Crime prevention and security education, as well as teamwork training, were organized during 2000 into five one-day courses for each area. The main purpose of the networking is to make plans at the neighbourhood level and act together for a peaceful, crimeless and safe environment. In Tampere, the strategy is inclusive in nature and welfare-oriented. Responsibility of the area authorities and associations and empowerment of residents are crucial aspects of networking.

Conclusions
The question most often asked by foreign policemen and researchers has been “why?” when I have discussed Finnish community policing. It is a good reason to stress the contextual and ethnocentric character of policing. One explanation for the adoption of community policing in Finland has been, of course, the
transnational trafficking of policemen and policing ideas. It is always appealing to follow new inventions. Community policing was seen also as a response to the increasing demands on and expectations for improved police services. One reason for implementation failures at the beginning of the process was that police managers themselves could not answer the question “why?”, posed by their staff. Therefore, the whole process of implementation of the community policing strategy was a process of learning by doing. The result is now the more systematic, holistic and strategic approach to local policing. Although no longer called community policing, there exists a coherent strategy of partnerships and networking. Local security management means policing through networks, and local networks are important actors in safety planning.

If the future of policing lies in diverse networks, as argued by Johnston (1998), the dynamics of those networks, as well as impacts and outcomes of policy-making, have to be evaluated. In the partnership context, it becomes impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of policing in terms of the effectiveness of the police. We have to take into consideration the whole variety of interests, hybrid combinations of strategies of crime prevention, complexity of relationships, decision-making capacities, power imbalances and the issues of representation and participation. What is needed is politicization[2] of a so far rather technological network and partnership approach (Virta, 2001b). Or, as argued by Stenson and Edwards (2001), a theory of local politics of crime control.

Notes
1. The BSC initiatives in European police organizations are rather new, though. For instance, the NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) in the UK adopted the BSC approach at the beginning of 2001, the Baden-Wurttembergs police in Germany in the 200, the Swedish police in 1998 (Virta and Kujanpää, 2001c).
2. By “politicization” I do not mean party-politicization with the negative connotations of the term. Rather, politicization is an interpretative action, asking new questions and opening new playgrounds, showing that there are chances for action, choices to be made and a possible opposition against some generally accepted “truths”.

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Perspectives on policing:
a synopsis of recent research

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Arrest for domestic and other assaults
R.B. Felson and J. Ackerman
Criminology, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 655-75

Felson and Ackerman study the likelihood of arrest in domestic violence situations compared to other forms of assault. The authors seek to improve upon methodological problems in previous research on this topic, such as sampling limitations, variations in suspect-victim relationships, lack of statistical controls, and unknown effects of pro-arrest legislation or department policies. The authors discuss prior research on both Black’s theory of the mobilization of law and the leniency hypothesis regarding arrests in cases of intimate assaults. This study attempts to support a number of research hypotheses:

- Police will show leniency in assault cases when the victim knows the suspect rather than when it is an identifiable suspect.
- Police will show more leniency in assault cases as the relational distance between the suspect and victim decreases.
- Police leniency will be mitigated by a victim’s willingness to sign a complaint.
- Police leniency will be mitigated by the presence of witnesses to the assault.
- Police leniency will be greater in misdemeanor than felony instances of assault.

Using National Crime Victimization Survey data spanning 1992-1998, Felson and Ackerman focus on single victim-single suspect assaults ($N = 4,565$ cases). The independent variables of interest are the victim-offender relationship (including spouses, ex-spouses, other intimates, other family members, friends, acquaintances, unidentified strangers, and identifiable suspects), gender-social relationship interactions, and seriousness-social relationship interactions. The authors also controlled suspect/victim gender, suspect/victim race, history of past assault, presence of weapons, victim’s income, offense location, and presence of injury. The dependent variables of interest are arrest and victim-signed complaint (as a proxy for victim preference which influences police behavior).

A number of results were reported in the analysis. Beginning with signing complaints, women were more likely to sign assault complaints than men. Victims were more likely to sign assault complaints when there is more serious injuries, a past history of abuse, and the suspect is male. For the arrest variable,
controlling for the presence of witnesses and a signed complaint, police are significantly more likely to arrest when the victim has an intimate relationship with the suspect than when the suspect is someone else known to the victim. Victim-signed complaint is a stronger predictor of arrest when the suspect is an intimate than for other family, friends, and acquaintances. Overall, the police are more likely to arrest when a weapon is present, injuries are present, there is a black suspect, white victims, and higher income victims. For the interaction variables, women are more likely to sign a complaint against a spouse than men are. And, the police are significantly less likely to arrest in minor incidents involving spouses, friends, or acquaintances.

Felson and Ackerman conclude that neither of the first two hypotheses regarding the leniency hypothesis were supported. Police response to assaults depend on available evidence: suspect identification, witnesses, and victim compliance. Also, in terms of the leniency hypothesis, the authors conclude that police leniency in domestic assault cases is not due to an uncaring attitude towards domestic violence or a bias against females, but, rather is due to victim reluctance to sign complaints, lack of witnesses, and an unwillingness of the police to arrest in minor (misdemeanor) cases of assault involving people who know each other.

How great is GREAT? Results from a longitudinal quasi-experimental design
Criminology and Public Policy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 87-118

The first issue of the new policy journal published by the American Society of Criminology contains an outcome evaluation of the Gang Resistance and Education Training program (GREAT). Beginning in 1991, GREAT is modeled after DARE and seeks to provide students with life skills to resist gang involvement, including conflict resolution, cultural diversity, and negative consequences of gang activity. Unlike its sister, DARE, this program targets middle school students.

Prior studies on the effectiveness of GREAT have focused on both process and outcomes. The process evaluation was conducted early in GREAT's history and found high measures of integrity in its implementation. Three prior outcome evaluations had mixed, but generally positive results using cross-sectional post-test and multi-site pre- and post-test designs. The cross-sectional post-test study was conducted as part of a national evaluation of the program. While the development of the program itself was not theory-driven, the structure of the national evaluation of the program was. Both the cross-sectional and the current longitudinal study used both self-control and social learning constructs in the creation of measures.

In this longitudinal study, Esbensen et al. used both attitudinal and behavioral measures to evaluate the effectiveness of GREAT at meeting three goals: increased negative attitudes towards gangs, decreased gang membership and delinquency, and increased positive attitudes towards the
police. This last goal is not a stated goal of the program, but has become an implied goal in practice. The authors constructed multiple measures of peer group importance and conduct and used self-report questions for measuring criminal behavior and gang membership.

Inclusion in the sample for this study required the meeting of three criteria: active GREAT program, geographical location, and cooperation from schools and police departments. The sites selected from which the sample was selected were Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Phoenix, AZ; Omaha, NE; Lincoln, NE; and Las Cruces, NM. From these six sites, 22 schools were chosen and 153 classrooms randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. The random assignment process occurred for 15 of the 22 schools, while seven of the schools were constrained by police department or school limitations. Therefore, the classrooms in those schools were purposefully chosen. Equal numbers of classrooms were assigned to treatment and control groups within each site and included seventh grade classes at five of the sites and sixth grade classes at one of the sites.

The study used a pre- and post-test longitudinal design. Pre- and post-test surveys were conducted with those students who received parental consent. The response rate on consent forms allowed for retention of 57 percent of the original sample overall with site-specific response rates ranging from 48-70 percent. Sample attrition across the multi-year surveys resulted in 86 percent at one year and 67 percent by the fourth year of the study.

Esbensen et al. used a multi-level analysis (individual student, classroom, and school) to analyze the data controlling for classroom and school variance. They found small, but statistically significant, changes on measures of victimization (negative relationship), negative feelings about gangs (positive relationship), attitudes toward police (positive relationship), pro-social peers (positive relationship), and risk-seeking behaviors (negative relationship). In their trend analysis, they found statistically significant relationships between GREAT and victimization (negative relationship), self-reported personal crime delinquency (negative relationship), and parental monitoring (positive relationship). Tests for alternative explanations of the observed program effect (pre-test differences between experimental and control groups) proved negative.

Esbensen et al. conclude that the goals of positive attitudes toward the police and negative attitudes about gangs were supported, but the goals of decreasing gang membership and delinquency were not supported by this research. But, the positive effects of the GREAT program were lagged by three to four years, so cross-sectional or short-term longitudinal research may not uncover these effects. Because of this, a developmental perspective may be best in designing evaluation research for these types of programs.

Reducing firearms violence through directed police patrol
E.F. McGarrell, S. Chermak, A. Weiss, and J. Wilson
Criminology and Public Policy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 119-48
The inaugural issue of ASC’s new journal, Criminology and Public Policy, contains an evaluation of directed patrol effectiveness in reducing firearms
Using the Kansas City Gun Experiment as a comparison, McGarrell et al. describe the results of Indianapolis’ test of directed patrol and gun crimes.

Using prior research on directed patrol, aggressive traffic enforcement, police crackdowns, and targeted firearms strategies, the authors advance the argument that directed patrol strategies in high-crime areas should have negative effects on gun crimes. Why this should happen is explained through the use of both deterrence and incapacitation theories. Deterrence may work by increasing the probability of detection and arrest for all gun carriers (general deterrence). The focus of directed patrol on high-crime areas and/or high-risk people brings deterrence into the realm of specific deterrence. Incapacitation may work through incarceration, but, as the authors point out, it has not been effectively tested for gun reduction efforts. But, incapacitation could be a result of directed patrol strategies by removing guns from high-risk people in high-risk areas.

Through multiple methods of data collection (officer logs, uniform crime reports, incident reports, and researcher observations), McGarrell et al. are attempting to answer two primary research questions:

(1) Are either general or specific deterrent strategies more effective in reducing gun crimes?

(2) Are reductions in gun crimes a result of removing guns or increased focus on high-risk people in hot spots of crime?

The authors used two different research designs to attain a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of the directed patrol strategies: a pre-post, non-equivalent control group design and a multiple interrupted time series analysis with a non-equivalent comparison group. Four of the highest crime rate beats were chosen as treatment areas. Two were from the North district which predominantly comprises low-income African-American neighborhoods. The other two treatment beats were from the East district which predominantly comprises low-income white neighborhoods. Two non-contiguous beats were chosen as non-equivalent comparison groups (from predominantly African-American neighborhoods).

The two districts chose different strategies for their directed patrol treatment. The East district used maximum traffic stops, while the North district focused on targeted vehicle and pedestrian stops of suspicious persons. While the East district had 900 more patrol hours, the North district had higher rates of citations (versus warnings), arrests, and gun seizures per stop. The pre-post test analysis (using general linear model analysis of variance) found that homicides significantly decreased in the target beats, as compared to control beats and citywide trends. But, the decrease was completely accounted for by the reductions in the North district alone. The same result was found for aggravated assaults with guns. In fact, the East district saw increases in this crime during the study (but was still less than the comparison beats). The time series analysis showed the North district intervention had a significant effect with two less violent crimes per week, while the comparison beats increased by one violent crime per week. Also, the North district effect remained after the
intervention was removed. Finally, the researchers found no evidence of either diffusion of benefits or displacement of crime due to the intervention.

The authors conclude that the targeted approach was more effective in reducing gun crimes. They also suggest that this reduction was the result of either specific deterrence focusing on illegal gun carriers or incapacitation of probable gun offenders, but not through the general removal of firearms from the community. McGarrell et al. end the article by suggesting areas in need of further research, such as the causal mechanism for firearm crime reductions, differential impact of directed patrol strategies on racial/ethnic communities and neighborhoods, and differential effects of both strategies on police-minority group relationships.

**Community policing: is it changing the basic functions of policing? Findings from a longitudinal study of 200+ municipal police agencies**

*Jihong Zhao, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and T. Hank Robinson*

*Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 29, 2001, pp. 365-77*

One important element of community-oriented policing is organizational change. The study tests two competing theories of organizational change: contingency theory and institutional theory. The researchers examine whether priorities among core police functions shifted during a time when community policing gained momentum. Further, they observe whether changes in priorities were due to external environmental factors.

The study uses data from a longitudinal national survey of police chiefs conducted in 1993 and 1996, as well as UCR data from 1992 and 1995. The researchers examine whether changes in the serious crime rate, amount of community-oriented policing programs, and the number of community policing officers are related to a shift in priorities among crime control, order maintenance, and service functions.

The researchers do not find support for the contingency perspective and suggest that the institutional perspective better explains organizational change in municipal police agencies. Despite the adoption of COP programs, the addition of officers, and funds for COP training, their findings indicate that the core functions of policing remain closely tied to a professional model. The authors note that the transition from the political model of policing to the professional model took approximately 30 years, and therefore it is too soon to judge whether community-oriented policing will ultimately be responsible for a paradigm shift in policing.

**How dangerous are routine police-citizen traffic stops? A research note**

*Ilya D. Lichtenberg and Alisa Smith*

*Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 29, 2001, pp. 419-28*

It is often assumed that routine traffic stops are dangerous for police officers. This assumption is supported by US Supreme Court decisions regarding police
practices during such stops. The authors argue that there is a lack of research to support the claim that police-citizen traffic encounters are dangerous, and attempt to determine the level of danger associated with such stops.

The researchers use FBI data published in “Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted” (LEOKA) and data on motor vehicle stop frequencies from the National Center for State Courts. The authors argue, however, that it is important to go beyond raw statistics on homicide and assault. The researchers use a ratio of police homicides and assaults to the number of traffic stops in order to estimate the level danger, accounting for the frequency of this activity.

The authors note that one potential weakness of their study was that officers were permitted to order passengers out of their automobiles, and this may have reduced the level of danger faced by officers. Despite limitations with the study, the researchers conclude that routine traffic stops might not be as dangerous as suggested by the court. The authors also contend that how the data are analyzed affects perceptions of the level of danger faced by officers.
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) was created in the late 1970s to improve policing through research and involvement in public policy debates. A nonprofit organization, PERF is supported by grants, contracts, and private foundations and organizations. The main goals of the forum are to improve policing nationwide through debate, the use of research, and providing leadership and assistance to police agencies. PERF’s Web site (policeforum.org) provides an excellent venue for the furtherance of these goals. The site provides users with information concerning the forum, its activities, publications, and related information of interest to both policing researchers and practitioners.

Probably the most extensive section of PERF’s Web site and the area of greatest interest to many researchers and police administrators is the wide variety of publications on PERF’s site. In addition, a variety of publications are available for order through PERF’s online publications catalog, with publications available on a range of topics, including community policing, management practices, crime analysis and research. In addition to the online bookstore, the site also contains an electronic library with a number of publications available for easy downloading. For example, monographs on community policing and training curricula are available through the electronic library. Also available through the site are a small number of downloadable datasets collected during PERF research projects.

In addition to disseminating information through publications, the Web site also provides information on the professional assistance activities of PERF. One such professional assistance activity is the Police Executive Employment Search. Through this program PERF offers guidance to city administrators who are looking for a new police chief. Specifically, on the site is information concerning PERF’s police executive employment search assistance, including a related handbook for local governments. Relatedly, for those seeking employment as a police chief, the site contains job postings. PERF also offers training courses for mid to upper level police executives through its Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP). Information on SMIP’s management training for police executives is also available on the site.

One of the more innovative features of the Web site is the POP Network (POPNet). The POP Network was created by PERF with support from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). POPNet is a database of problem solving information designed to assist in the exchange of information regarding policing problems and problem solving. The database
allows people to share experiences and learn about ideas and strategies used by officers from other agencies. The database contains descriptions of problems encountered and the various responses. Using the SARA model as an organizing framework, the scanning, analyses, responses, and any assessments are presented in narrative form. The database can be searched by agency and/or type of problem encountered. Further, contact information for the persons involved in cases is made available to encourage further sharing of information. Although POPNet was clearly designed to encourage the exchange of information and ideas among police officers of different agencies from around the country, it could also prove useful to educators as a tool for exposing students to the myriad problems encountered in policing and the variety of solutions available.

Beyond publications and technical assistance, PERF’s site also contains information concerning recent legislative activity and a variety of related links. PERF position papers and letters regarding legislation are available for perusal as well. As with most Web sites, the PERF site contains related links to a number of related Web sites of interest to researchers and practitioners.

Overall, PERF’s site is a good stop for anyone looking for information on police related matters. Although the online publications are far from complete, it does offer a number of its own publications not often available for libraries. Further, PERF’s site is a good place for city or police administrators to learn about technical assistance available from PERF. As with most Internet sites the primary benefit of PERF’s site is the rapid conveyance of information about itself, its services, and its message. PERF has taken advantage of this medium and provides browsers with a variety of publications, information on technical assistance, information sharing technology (POPNet), legislative activity, and related links.

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